COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND

MOLLOY v COMMISSIONER OF INLAND REVENUE

RICHARDSON, McMullin and Somers JJ

24 June 1981 -

Somers J This is an appeal by Mrs Petranella Maria Theresia Molloy (the taxpayer) against a decision of Mahon J, delivered in the Supreme Court at Auckland on 6 October 1977, in which he dismissed her objection, by way of case stated under s 32 of the Land and Income Tax Act 1954, to the disallowance by the Commissioner of Inland Revenue of a deduction claimed by her by way of special exemption under s 84B of the Act in respect of the income year ended 31 March 1974.

The facts, so far as they relate to the taxpayer, are that at some unspecified date during the relevant income year she donated $5 to the New Zealand Society for the Protection of the Unborn Child (the Society). She claims to be entitled to deduct that sum from her assessable income for the year in question by reason of the provisions of s 84B(2)(a) of the Act. That claim involves an enquiry as to the objects and activities of the donee society and a consideration of some aspects of the law of charity.

Section 84B(1)and (2) of the Land and Income Tax Act 1954, which were in force at the material times and which are now replaced in s 58 Income Tax Act 1976, relevantly provided as follows: 84 B . Special exemption in respect of gifts of money and payments of school fees-

(1) For the purposes of this section, the term "gift" includes a subscription paid to a society, institution, association, organisation, trust, or fund, only if the Commissioner is satisfied that that subscription does not confer any rights arising from membership in that or any other society, institution, association, organisation, trust, or fund.

(2) For the purpose of assessing (income tax), every taxpayer, other than an absentee or a company or a public authority or a Maori authority or an unincorporated body, shall, subject to the provisions of this section, be entitled to a deduction by way of special exemption from his assessable income of the amount of any gift (not being a testamentary gift) of money of the amount of ($2) or more made by him in the income year to any of the following societies, institutions, associations, organisations, trusts, or funds (being in each case a society, an institution, an association, an organisation, a trust, or a fund in New Zealand), namely:

(a) A society, institution, association, organisation, or trust which is not carried on for the private pecuniary profit of any individual and the funds of which are, in the opinion of the Commissioner, applied wholly or principally to any charitable, benevolent, philanthropic or cultural purposes within New Zealand:

(b) A public institution maintained exclusively for any one or more of the purposes within New Zealand specified in paragraph (a) of this subsection:

(c) A fund established and maintained exclusively for the purpose of providing money for any one or more of the purposes within New Zealand specified in paragraph (a) of this subsection, by a society, institution, association, organisation, or trust which is not carried on for the private pecuniary profit of any individual:

(d) A public fund established and maintained exclusively for the purpose of providing money for any one or more of the purposes within New Zealand specified in paragraph (a) of this subsection.

( Paras (e)to (f) of the subsection are omitted as shedding no light upon the present enquiry.)

Section 84B(2) raises a number of problems. It may be said at the outset that the present case does not call for any determination of the following matters: (1) the meaning of the words "in New Zealand"; (2) when the purposes referred to in subs (2)(a) can properly be said to be "within New Zealand"-the present case is confined entirely to New Zealand; (3) whether in using the words "the funds" in the phrase "the funds are applied wholly or principally" in subs (2)(a) the Legislature intended that the whole or the principal part of the totality of the donee's funds should be or have been so applied or whether it is enough that such an application of the income of invested capital is made-s 84B(2)(c) and (d) may touch on that; (4) whether the words "the funds are applied" relate to an income year or import a history of consistent qualifying application; (5) whether an accumulation for the relevant purposes is relevantly an application - see the contrasting views of Lord Sands and Lord Blackburn in General Nursing Council for Scotland v IRC (1929) 14 TC 645 at 653-4, 656.

More positively it can be said that s 84B(2) does not postulate that the donees mentioned-it may be noticed that in para (a) the fund earlier referred to is not repeated - are required to possess any independent legal persona such as is conferred upon registration of a company under the Companies Act 1955 or of a society under one of the many statutes giving similar status: cf IRC v Yorkshire Agricultural Society [1928] 1 KB 611 at 625; and that the adverbs "wholly or principally" in s 84B(2)(a) are referable to the verb "applied" and not to the nature of the purpose. As to those words it may also be added that it being sufficient that funds are applied principally to an enumerated purpose, the application of the residue of such funds to a non-stipulated purpose or the failure to apply them to any purpose at all will not disqualify. Such circumstances will involve an enquiry as to the quantum of those funds and a determination whether what has been applied to the expressed statutory purposes can in relation to the whole properly be described as the principal part. What s 84B(2)(a) refers to is not the intended or actual fate of the donation itself but the manner of the application of the whole or the principal part of the funds of the donee.

The purposes stipulated in s 84B(2)(a) are "charitable benevolent, philanthropic, or cultural purposes within New Zealand". By s 2 of the Act "charitable purpose" unless the context otherwise requires, "includes every charitable purpose, whether it relates to the relief of poverty, the advancement of education or religion, or any other matter beneficial to the community". There is no context in s 84B which would displace that definition. The word "includes" is normally used to bring within a definition something which might not otherwise be embraced by it. But the statutory definition as a whole justifies the view expressed by Mahon J that it was not intended to, and does not have the effect of, enlarging or altering the ordinary legal connotation of charity. It is a definition by reference to the classes of charity distinguished by Lord MacNaghten in Comrs for Special Purposes of the Income Tax v Pemsel [1891] AC 531 at 583 itself founded upon the submissions of Sir Samuel Romilly when arguing Morice v Bishop of Durham (1805) 10 Ves 522. The addition to the word "charitable" of the words "benevolent, philanthropic or cultural" in s 84B(2)(a) supports that construction and extends the scope of the purposes beyond that which is charitable in law. The word "benevolent" is capable of importing both charitable and non-charitable purposes. To be charitable in law - unless saved by the provisions of s 61B of the Charitable Trusts Act 1957 - an expressed purpose upon its true construction must be limited or confined to charitable purposes only. In this context the vice of the word benevolent is illustrated by A-G for New Zealand v Brown [1917] AC 393; A-G of New Zealand v New Zealand Insurance Co Ltd [1937] NZLR 33 PC; Chichester Diocesan Fund and Board of Finance v Simpson [1944] AC 341 (Diplock's case). So with the word philanthropic: Re MacDuff [1896] 2 Ch 451; Re Eades [1920] 2 Ch 353. And so it is too with the word cultural. That word may properly have attributed to it its ordinary dictionary meaning as relating to the training development and refinement of mind, tastes and manners.

The taxpayer claims that her donee, the Society, was one whose funds were "applied wholly or princially to … charitable … or cultural purposes within New Zealand". She did not claim that it had any relevant benevolent or philanthropic purpose.

No balance sheet or accounts of the Society were produced, and no evidence was given to show what moneys had been received by it or from time to time comprised its funds, or how the same or any part were expended either in respect of the taxpayer's income year or over any other period. As a result it was not possible to analyse the application of its moneys at any relevant time. The taxpayer accepted that no significant part of the Society's funds were expended on assisting or promoting the pre- or post-natal well being of mothers and children or in relief of poverty, those being among the expressed objects of the Society. She conceded, and the Crown agreed, that the principal part of the Society's funds were at all material times expended upon the other activities referred to in the affidavit of Sir William Liley and in the newsletters and other exhibits produced by him. In that context the taxpayers submission requires an examination of the Society's constitution and activities.

The Society came into being as a response to the pressure for the relaxation of abortion laws which had taken place in the United Kingdom and elsewhere and which it was considered by its founders ought not to occur in New Zealand. According to the affidavit of Sir William Liley (one of the founders, the president until 1973, and thereafter founder-president) the Society was formed at a meeting on 8 March 1970 at which a constitution was approved and an executive elected. That was followed by a public meeting in Auckland on 3 June 1970, the latter being preceded by a Newsletter (No 1) of May 1970 which made reference to the birth of the Society. Other newsletters were published and other activities took place during the rest of 1970 and in the years 1971 and 1972, and branches were established in many places. Sir William Liley deposed that on 19 March 1972 delegates from each of these branches met in Wellington and formed a national body. The Newsletter for February 1972 (No 9) indicates that any financial members were welcome to attend and the subjects to be discussed would include a constitution for the national body, finance, policy for the year with special emphasis on election tactics, publicity, future activities and the newsletter itself. The next Newsletter, dated May 1972 (No 10), records that on 19 March 1972 about 50 delegates from all over the country met in Wellington and constituted a nationwide society. Prolonged discussion was apparently had on the constitution and an additional aim was proposed, namely the undertaking of welfare projects to help distressed mothers who might see abortion as the only solution to their problem. The constitution itself was reported as having been left to a Wellington sub-committee which would embody the numerous suggestions put forward by the audience. The Newsletter of December 1972 (No 13) refers to the receipt by the Society of a threatening letter from the Inland Revenue Department demanding an income tax return and remarks "At present we are not an incorporated society a limited liability company or a charitable organisation. Our legal adviser is working on it".

In Newsletter No 15 of June 1973 there is a report of the Society's national conference on 24 March 1973 in which it is said: "from the constitutional point of view the conference legitimized the hitherto de facto existence of the national council."

The constitution was said to have been ratified.

It is clear from Sir William Liley's affidavit that there are differences between the objects expressed in the constitution of 1970 and in that of the national body finally ratified on 24 March 1973. In the end nothing may turn on this for the manner in which funds have been applied has not changed since 1970. In both the Supreme Court and in this Court the later constitution was accepted by the taxpayer and the Crown as the relevant document. It provides that the objects of the Society are:

"(a) To uphold and promote the intrinsic value of human life.

(b) To uphold and protect the rights of unborn children from the time of conception.

(c) To maintain and improve legal and social and medical safeguards for protecting and preserving the rights of unborn children.

(d) To encourage and promote study and research and the collection and dissemination of information on the moral, medical, legal, political and social implications of pregnancy and questions associated therewith.

(e) To inform and educate the public on the need for legal and other safeguards for protecting and preserving the rights of unborn children.

(f) To assist and promote the well being of mothers and children, both before and after childbirth, and in particular those who face adverse circumstances.

(g) To encourage the formation of local constituent societies and to co-ordinate their activities on a national basis.

(h) To co-operate with government departments other organizations and individuals engaged in fostering respect for human life and in promoting social conditions which will provide the best opportunities for mothers and children."

While those objects can be said to have a broad common theme, yet within it they embrace a wide spectrum of interests. The constitution does not indicate with clarity which, if any, are the main or dominant objects. In such cases it is well settled that reference is to be made not only to the expressed objects but as well to the activities of the society: see IRC v Yorkshire Agricultural Society [1928] 1 KB 611 at 633 per Atkin LJ; Keren Kayemeth Le Jisroel Ltd v IRC [1932] AC 650 at 661 per Lord MacMillan; Royal Australasian College of Surgeons v FCT (1943) 68 CLR 436; 2 AITR 490. But the motives of those who promoted the formation of the Society are not material: see the Keren case at 661. That approach accords well with the provisions of s 84B(2)(a) of the Act. As it is common ground that the activities of the Society have at all times been within the ambit of its stated objects the enquiry must be focused upon what it did in pursuit of those objects. That is a question of fact. Whether a main or the main purpose so ascertained is charitable or cultural is a question of law.

In the Supreme Court Mahon J said: "Looking at the documentary material which has been produced, it seems a fair conclusion that the dominant object of the Society has been to frustrate the attempts of organizations like the Abortion Law Reform Association to liberalize the law relating to abortion and to persuade the public mind by every available means towards the validity of the proposition that the unborn child has a right to life and that such right ought not, as a matter of law, be suppressed or cast aside by the wishes of the child's mother."

Concentrating on the "clear purpose" of the Society in seeking to prevent the changes in the statute law advocated by the Abortion Law Reform Association he held that such a purpose "being aimed at frustrating an obvious political object" must be itself a political object depriving it of the public benefit necessary to support a charitable purpose in law. The judge considered the activities of the Society were the means by which one end or object was to be attained, namely, the prevention of any change by Parliament in the penal sanctions for procuring an abortion.

So much of the above as involved findings of fact was disputed by the taxpayer. Submissions were confined to the general plea that the tenor or import of the evidence-the reference is to what was said by Sir William Liley and what can be inferred from the newsletters and other material exhibited by him-was to the contrary. The material is extensive: there are for example twenty three newsletters covering 93 pages of the case in small print. Necessarily we can do little more than indicate the impression conveyed by the evidence.

The essential substrata of the objects and activities of the Society were at material times, and still are, the biological facts that life begins at conception - although implantation is necessary to evidence pregnancy - and that from implantation to birth changes in the unborn child are not qualitative in character. Those matters forged the common bond between the members of the Society reflected in both its expressed objects and its activities - as Sir William Liley puts it, when speaking of the beliefs of those who founded the Society, "induced abortion is just another name for killing a human baby". That conclusion inferentially but necessarily involves concordant views on the social moral and philosophical issues and the medical and legal aspects all inherent in it and on which patently other opinions can be and are held and, particularly relevant to the present case, involves support for the statutory provisions about abortion in force at material times and opposition to those desiring a change.

It is no part of this Court's function in these proceedings to express any opinion on the complex of issues involved in (and resolved by) the Society's views and we do not do so. But it is material and necessary to say that there are more views than one on the point of time at which recognition should be given to the humanity of that life which begins at conception. We do no more than refer to the passage in ch 14 of the Report of the Royal Commission of Enquiry into Contraception Sterilisation and Abortion in New Zealand under the heading "When does Human Life begin"-see the Report; Government Printer, March 1977 at 184. It is not in doubt that some of the views there mentioned are strongly held by sections of the community.

Education of the public on the biological facts and the moral medical and social issues perceived as flowing from them has undoubtedly formed a conspicuous part of the Society's activities and has been undertaken by a variety of means including the distribution of literature and the publication of advertisements. It was said by Sir William Liley in his affidavit sworn in 1976 to be a major function. Sir William also said: "It is worth emphasising that it is no purpose of the Society to seek a change in the law: in fact it is fundamental to the society that the present law is adequate and that the society exists to see that it is upheld … The only sense in which this society has aims that could be called political is that it speaks out actively, to members of Parliament, and to the community generally, on the issues at stake, and on the dangers of changing the law so as to diminish the protection it gives to human life; …"

The Judge, in the findings he has made, has not accepted that the Society's objects and activities at material times were only incidentally political. He has held that its main object was and is to resist any change in the law about abortion and that the enhancement of public understanding of the issues as seen by the Society was but a means by which that object might be attained.

The newsletters fall into four groups: (1) the nine following the original formation of the Society in 1970 and preceding the meeting of 19 March 1972 when the national Society was launched; (2) five following the latter meeting and preceding the adoption of the constitution in 1973; (3) two which followed that event and were published in the income year in question; (4) the remainder down to November 1975. They record meetings held at which the Society's views are propounded; events said to have occurred overseas in places in which abortion has become more readily available and illustrative, in varying degrees, of the dangers involved in a relaxation of the law; frequent exhortations to members to communicate their views to the local member of Parliament; and other material forwarding the Society's views. The newsletters suggest that the tempo and vigour of the Society's activities were stimulated by such matters as a pending general election and the introduction, as occurred in 1972, of a bill considered to be restrictive of abortion activities. And throughout of course there ran the central theme of the right to life.

But the newsletters are not to be considered in isolation. The Society was not formed, and has never existed, in a vacuum. While the motives of its founders are not material the known circumstances in which it came into being cannot be ignored. Those circumstances and the activities of the Society after its formation lead to the inescapable conclusion that the preservation of the then existing state of the law was its primary object or at least one of its main objects, the attainment of which would sustain its underlying premise of the right to life and to a large degree achieve its expressed objects. And upon the evidence it is to that object that the principal activities have been directed and to which, upon the concessions made, the principal part of its funds have at material times been applied.

The first way in which the taxpayer's case is put is that the application of the funds of the Society was principally to charitable purposes. The purposes relied upon were the second and fourth in Lord MacNaghten's classification in Pemsel's case [1891] AC 531 at 583 namely, the advancement of education and other purposes beneficial to the community not falling under any of the three preceding heads.

Although public benefit is expressly mentioned by Lord MacNaghten only in relation to the fourth head it is beyond dispute that such element is a necessary prerequisite for valid charitable purposes at least under the second and third heads. In the case of educational purposes that is illustrated by Oppenheim v Tobacco Securities Trust Co Ltd [1951] AC 297 at 305.

In many classes of case the existence of public benefit will be readily assumed - but in the end "the question whether a gift is or may be operative for the public benefit is a question to be answered by the Court by forming an opinion upon the evidence before it": per Russell J in Re Hummeltenberg [1923] 1 Ch 237 at 242; and see National Anti-Vivisection Society v IRC [1948] AC 31, 49 at 65-66, 78-79; Gilmour v Coats [1949] AC 426. It is in this area that the determinative features of the present case are to be found.

In a well known passage in Bowman v Secular Society Ltd [1917] AC 406 at 442 Lord Parker of Waddington observed: "… a trust for the attainment of political objects has always been held to be invalid, not because it is illegal, for everyone is at liberty to advocate or promote by any lawful means a change in the law, but because the Court has no means of judging whether a proposed change in the law will or will not be for the public benefit, and therefore cannot say that a gift to secure the change is a charitable gift."

The invalidity referred to by Lord Parker was of course in relation to an asserted charitable element in such a trust.

Political objects are not confined to matters of party political philosophy as Lord Simonds emphasized in the National Anti-Vivisection case by reference to the passage in Tyssen on Charitable Bequests 1st Ed, 176 - see [1948] AC at 62. See too per Dixon J in Royal North Shore Hospital of Sydney v A-G (NSW) (1938) 60 CLR 396 at 426.

The foregoing principles have been recognized in many cases including in New Zealand Re Wilkinson dec'd [1941] NZLR 1065 and Knowles v Comr of Stamp Duties [1945] NZLR 522. But they do not assert that the mere existence of any such object or purpose ipso facto precludes recognition as a valid charity. To reach that conclusion the political object must be more than an ancillary purpose, it must be the main or a main object. If such purpose is ancillary, secondary, or subsidiary, to a charitable purpose it will not have a vitiating effect: see eg the Royal North Shore Hospital case (1938) 60 CLR 396; National Anti-Vivisection case [1948] AC 31, per Lord Simonds at 60, 63, per Lord Normand at 76; the Knowles case [1945] NZLR 522 at 528.

The cases so far mentioned involve trusts having as their leading object a change in the law. So too did the passage in Tyssen specially mentioned by Lord Simonds in the Anti-Vivisection case - Tyssen observed that the law "could not stultify itself by holding that it was for the public benefit that the law itself should be changed".

The relevant object of the Society in the present case however was not to change the law but to preserve it in its integrity against the claims of those who desired its alteration. Although the consideration advanced by Tyssen is not applicable to such a circumstance, reason suggests that on an issue of a public and very controversial character, as is the case of abortion, both those who advocate a change in the law and those who vigorously oppose it are engaged in carrying out political objects in the relevant sense. The law, statutory or otherwise, is not static. Unless it is for purposes such as the present to be regarded as immutable and having attained an unchallengeable degree of perfection the reasons given by Lord Parker of Waddington in Bowman v Secular Society Ltd [1917] AC 406 at 442 - the inability of the Court to judge whether a change in the law will or will not be for the public benefit - must be as applicable to the maintenance of an existing provision as to its change. In neither case has the Court the means of judging the public benefit.

There is some recognition of this in the cases. In Roman Catholic Archbishop of Melbourne v Lawlor (1934) 51 CLR 1 at 32-33 Dixon J referring to a gift claimed to be for religious purposes said:

"In order to be charitable the purposes themselves must be religious; it is not enough that an activity itself secular is activated or inspired by a religious motive or injunction: … The law has found a public benefit in the promotion of religion as an influence upon human conduct; but it has no standard by which to estimate what public benefit of that order is produced directly or indirectly or incidentally by means which, although they may be considered to contribute to the good of religion, are not in themselves religious and do not serve directly a religious object. There have been many, and there are still some, provisions of the law, the maintenance or abrogation of which has been a matter of deep concern to adherents of one or other religious faith. But these have been considered not charitable religious purposes, but political objects."

(The emphasis is added.)

And in Re Hopkinson (dec'd) [1949] 1 All ER 346 at 350, Vaisey J having referred to that part of the speech of Lord Parker of Waddington in Bowman v Secular Society Ltd [1917] AC 406 at 442 set out above said: "I venture to add as a corollary to that statement that it would be equally true to apply it to the advocating or promoting of the maintenance of the present law, because the court would have no means in that case of judging whether the absence of a change in the law would or would not be for the public benefit."

It was a central part of the taxpayer's submissions that the law, in a variety of circumstances, has so far shown its concern for, and extended its protection to, human life that the public good which is a prerequisite of a valid charity and necessary to be shown in relation to the Society's activities may be assumed or taken as established. On this part of the case Mr Molloy first referred to cases such as Re Wedgwood [1915] 1 Ch 113; Re Tetley [1923] 1 Ch 258 at 266 and Re Moss [1949] 1 All ER 495 in which gifts in varying forms for the benefit or protection of animals were held to be valid charitable dispositions. He submitted that the promotion of the value of human life was a fortiori. But the premise is erroneous. The protection of animals has not per se been held to be to the public advantage in the relevant sense. Such cases derive the element of public good not from notions of general public utility but from the stimulation of sentiments of humanity in mankind, that is to say from the moral improvement of humans which may flow from such gifts. That is referred to in the three cases already mentioned and is spoken of by Lord Wright in the Anti-Vivisection case [1948] AC 31 at 44-45. Where that good cannot be inferred, as in the case of a provision for a sanctuary for animals free from molestation or destruction by man, the gift has been held not to be charitable: Re Grove-Grady [1929] 1 Ch 557. Whether current views on conservation may today lead to a different conclusion can be left until the point arises.

Next there is a series of cases in which, it is submitted, the Courts have protected the interests of an unborn child. Thus in George and Richard (1871) LR 3 A&E 466 at 480 Sir Robert Phillimore said:

"I now approach the anxious and novel question of the right of the unborn child, of which the widow of Philip Noyes was pregnant at the time of the collision, to claim. There is no doubt that the law in many cases considers and protects the status of the unborn child. A bill may be filed in equity to restrain damages by a tenant for life where the infant, if born, would be the remainderman …;

and at 481-482:

"I am of opinion that the proctor for the unborn child has a right to claim in this suit; though until the child is born a reference on this subject cannot be made."

Leave was reserved to the infant, if born alive within due time, to prefer its claim for damages. In Watt v Rama [1972] VR 353 a child who suffered injuries at and from birth caused by the negligence of the defendant preceding the birth was held to have a cause of action. The case contains an extensive review of authorities from many jurisdictions touching on the issue.

A like theme can be seen in the case of testamentary gifts to the children of A living at his death. Subject to any contrary intention in the will a child en ventre sa mère is treated as one of the class: see eg Elliot v Lord Joicey [1935] AC 209 at 233. There are similar observations in the great accumulation case of Thellusson v Woodford (1798) 4 Ves Jun 227.

Then there are cases showing the priority of life over property, as Mouse's case (1608) 12 Co Rep 63; Scaramanga v Stamp (1880) LR 5 CPD 295 and Harris v Pennsylvania Railroad Co (1931) 50 F 2d 866. Haynes v Harwood [1935] 1 KB 146 illustrates a similar aspect of the recognition by the law of the value of life. In this class of case it is human life after parturition that is protected.

Finally Mr Molloy referred to a passage in the summing-up of MacNaghten J in R v Bourne [1939] 1 KB 687 at 690: "… before even Parliament came into existence, the killing of an unborn child was by the common law of England a grave crime: see Bracton, Book III, (De Corona), fol 121. The protection which the common law afforded to human life extended to the unborn child in the womb of its mother."

That was an expression of the common law about the crime of abortion.

No one would gainsay the importance and few the desirability of the general principles exhibited by the cases mentioned. They demonstrate a respect for and protection of proprietary and other rights to which, upon its birth, an unborn child may be entitled and in the case of the criminal law the protection of the life itself now affected by statute in New Zealand. Not all the circumstances mentioned in the cases have as yet come before the Courts in New Zealand. Thus actions in negligence of the type of Watt v Rama which involved some refinement of the principles relating to that tort and a finding that damage occurred at birth have not yet arisen here. But save for that case and the statutory provisions about the crime of abortion the cases referred to have their counterpart in or are recognized as illustrating principles applicable to New Zealand.

But we are unable to accept that either their expressed reasoning or any implications to be drawn from them convey the present case to the terminus which the taxpayer must reach - that is that the public good in restricting abortion is so self-evident as a matter of law that such charitable prerequisite is achieved. The issue in relation to abortion is much wider than merely legal. And the fact, to which we have already referred, that this public issue is one on which there is clearly a division of public opinion capable of resolution (whether in the short or the long term) only by legislative action means that the Court cannot determine where the public good lies and that it is relevantly political in character.

The main, or a main, object of the Society in the present case was opposition to a change in the statutory provisions about abortion. It was political. In those circumstances the application of its funds cannot be said to be principally for charitable purposes. Nor can such object be properly described as cultural.

For those reasons, which are but an expansion of those expressed by Mahon J, the appeal must be dismissed.

The respondent is entitled to costs which are fixed at the sum of $500.