ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Re Z and AUSTRALIAN TAXATION OFFICE

R C JENNINGS QC, Deputy President, R A SINCLAIR and F A PASCOE, Members

24 October 1984 -

Deputy President, R C Jennings QC; Members, R A Sinclair and F A Pascoe The Tribunal has heard together five applications by Z to review decisions of the Australian Taxation Office to refuse him access to numerous documents which relate essentially either to his employment or his financial affairs over a period of years.

The applicant is and has at all material times been an officer in the employ of the respondent.

Following several preliminary conferences many documents sought were released although some contained the deletion of names of officers who had prepared or signed them.

Following hearings by the Tribunal on three occasions, claims by the respondent that further documents were entitled to exemption were withdrawn.

What appeared at first to be a formidable task has accordingly been reduced to a manageable one. It has been made so in part by the preparation by the respondent of a schedule of the contents of the documents in issue and the acceptance of that schedule by the applicant as a practical working basis for determination of the issues. That schedule is substantially reproduced as Sch A to these Reasons for Decision.

At the outset we heard oral evidence from officers of the Department describing in general terms the nature of the documents in issue and explaining the grounds upon which the respondent claimed exemption.

At the end of the second day's hearing we decided that it was appropriate to require production to the Tribunal in confidence of the documents claimed to be exempt. Accordingly, we made an appropriate direction pursuant to s 64(1) of the Freedom of Information Act. We have now had the advantage of studying them and hearing further argument in the absence of the applicant. In some cases we indicated to counsel for the respondent that we were disposed to disallow claims subject to his submissions and in others we gave opportunity to the applicant to submit argument that our disposition to grant exemption should be reversed.

The documents produced in confidence were marked Table A and Table B. It is convenient to deal first with the latter which comprised a bundle of 87 pages. Copies of these documents have been in the applicant's hands for some considerable time. They contain deletions which fall into two categories. The first concerns references to the personal affairs of other persons, the disclosure of which it was submitted for the respondent would be unreasonable. Accordingly, if that is accepted they would be entitled to exemption from production by virtue of the provisions of s 41(1) of the Freedom of Information Act.

The second category concerns documents which bear the names of officers of the respondent. It was submitted that deletion of these names was justified because their disclosure would or could reasonably by expected to have a substantial adverse effect on either the management or assessment of personnel by the agency (ie the respondent) or on the proper and efficient conduct of its operations.

Accordingly, if that is so, they would be entitled to exemption by virtue of the provisions of s 40(1), (c)or (d) unless it could be shown by the applicant that on balance disclosure would be in the public interest: s 40(2) .

As to the former category, in order to determine whether the disclosure of the personal affairs of others would, in our opinion, be unreasonable, it is necessary to consider the nature of the information and any other circumstances which may be relevant including any relationship between the applicant and the person whose affairs may be disclosed.

After considering the contents of some of the documents produced to the applicant and others which were not (as to which reference will be made later) we decided that we should adopt the procedure of writing to one of the persons whose personal affairs would be disclosed if we were to accede to the request for access and denied the ground of exemption claimed.

We considered this course appropriate, partly because of the relationship between the applicant and the person concerned (who is his wife) and partly because we are conscious that the applicant must already be aware from the documents produced to him that the respondent had an interest in procuring information about her affairs. We also had regard for the fact that it seemed unlikely to us that his wife would have any real interest in supporting the claim for exemption which was being made by the respondent, in effect, on her account.

We say this because the information which will be disclosed by production is in itself particularly bland and commonplace. Its disclosure is not, in our view, unreasonable because no serious consequences seem likely to flow from its production.

By letter of 9 July 1984 the Tribunal informed Mrs Z of her right to make application to become a party to the proceedings if she was not willing to consent to production.

The nature of the information contained in the documents in question was also referred to sufficiently to enable her to exercise a judgment as to her options. A copy of the letter is attached as Sch B to these reasons.

On 25 July 1984, Mrs Z advised the Deputy Registrar of the Tribunal by telephone that she had recently received his letter of 9 July and that she would send her written consent to disclosure of the documents referred to. No such consent has been received by the Tribunal nor has any application been made that she should become a party to the proceedings.

We do not regard the failure of Mrs Z to send a written consent as of sufficient importance to deter us from the view that the disclosures which will be made, are not unreasonable.

In so far as the Table B documents contain reference to the personal affairs of persons other than Mrs Z we are satisfied that disclosure would be unreasonable and that it would not be appropriate to invite the persons concerned to consent to disclosure.

The highly confidential nature of the information in one case and the absence of any evidence of any significant relationship with the applicant in two cases, are factors which we have taken into account confirming the decision to refuse request for access.

The submission concerning the officers' names contained in Table B also succeeds because we agree that there is a public expectation that taxpayers' affairs will be the subject of the highest confidentiality. The proper and efficient conduct of the operations of the Australian Taxation Office is a subject of real public importance. There is a strong possibility that the revelation of names of individuals who have dealt even in a routine way with any taxpayers' affairs would undermine public confidence in the strict confidentiality which quite properly surrounds the operations of the agency. That is a confidentiality which both the public and the officers employed by the agency have grown to respect. It would not be in the public interest in our view to breach that confidence.

Section 38

Table A consisted, when it was first produced, of 26 documents but access to those numbered 20, 21, 25 and 26 was conceded by the respondent with one qualification with which we will deal later. All other except numbers 22 to 24 were the subject of a claim that their production was exempt because s 38 of the Freedom of Information Act entitled the respondent to refuse access if the information is itself the subject of the protection conferred by s 16(2) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (ITAA). The relevant statutory provisions are as follows:

"38 A document is an exempt document if there is in force an enactment applying specifically to information of a kind contained in the document and prohibiting persons referred to in the enactment from disclosing information of that kind, whether the prohibition is absolute or is subject to exceptions or qualifications."

"16(2) Subject to this section, an officer shall not either directly or indirectly, except in the performance of any duty as an officer, and either while he is, or after he ceases to be an officer, make a record of, or divulge or communicate to any person any such information so acquired by him."

"Officer" is defined in s 16(1) as follows:

" s 16(1) In this section, unless the contrary intention appears-

" 'officer' means a person who is or has been appointed or employed by the Commonwealth or by a State, and who by reason of that appointment or employment, or in the course of that employment, may acquire or has acquired information respecting the affairs of any other person, disclosed or obtained under the provisions of this Act or of any previous law of the Commonwealth relating to income tax."

As recently as 5 July 1984 this Tribunal decided that s 16(2) is a provision of the type referred to in s 38 "because it specifies the information not to be disclosed", that is to say the information relating to the affairs of any other person. Such a provision, it was said, specifies the nature and the quality of the information which is not to be disclosed for the purposes of s 38 (Re Murtagh and Comr of Taxation (1984) 15 ATR 787 at 804; 6 ALD 112 at 130).

However, a differently constituted Tribunal decided on 7 May 1984 that it would be contrary to the reasoning in two decisions of the Federal Court of Australia to accept submissions that s 38 of the FOI Act founds a claim for exemption in relation to provisions of the Broadcasting and Television Act 1942 which concern the duty of members and staff of the Australian Broadcasting Tribunal not to divulge information concerning the affairs of another person acquired by them under that Act (Re Actors' Equity Assoc of Australia and Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1984) 6 ALD 68).

The Federal Court decisions relied upon in that decision were the News Corp Ltd v National Companies and Securities Commission (1984) 6 ALD 83 and Kavvadias v Commonwealth Ombudsman (1984) 6 ALD 47.

The Tribunal in Murtagh did not refer to any of these decisions in its reasoning as to the application of s 38 possibly because it considered the exemption claimed in relation to the affairs of another person was in any event made out under s 41.

Counsel for the Commissioner of course relied on Murtagh, but he also argued that Kavvadias could be distinguished and that nothing that was said in News Corp Ltd concerning the legislation there in question affected his submissions as to s 16(2) in these proceedings. He also submitted that the Tribunal's decision in Actors Equity Association was based on an incorrect interpretation of the News Corp case.

In Kavvadias the Court emphasised the need for the specific enactment to contain "a direct and explicit reference to the nature of the information" contained in the document and that information, not the discipline or integrity of officers, is the commodity with which the Act deals (at 51).

It drew attention to the importance of giving effect to the broad objects of the FOI Act and the legally enforceable rights conferred by s 11 and then continued:

"If there is an apparent conflict between s 11 and some other provisions of the law, it will have to be resolved according to ordinary principles. Section 11 is expressed to be subject to the Act and there are many provisions of the Act which would go to maintain the policy against disclosure displayed in other enactments. Section 38 is one of these. As we have already intimated, it seems, obviously enough, to be designed to avoid identifying in a list a number of existing enactments, and also the necessity of adding to the list from time to time by amendment.

"Reference to the other sections of the Act dealing with exempt documents, such as, for example, s 41, dealing with protection where personal privacy is concerned, or s 45 dealing with protection where confidentiality is involved, shows at the one time that the policy of other Acts in relevant respects is preserved, and that this is done by the operation of the Act. The scope of other provisions restraining disclosure by officers is not to be given an expansive construction so that they are brought within s 38 ."

The argument that s 16 sufficiently specifies the nature of the information for the purposes of s 38 by the words "respecting the affairs of any other person disclosed or obtained under the provisions of this Act …" is somewhat weakened by the fact that s 41 of the FOI Act also grants protection from disclosure of information relating to the personal affairs of any person.

That protection is only, however, available if such disclosure would be "unreasonable" and if the affairs are "personal".

In our opinion, one of the principal objects of s 16(2) is still achieved if consideration is given, according to the circumstances, to the most appropriate grounds for exemption granted by the FOI Act. For example, the expression "personal affairs of any person" in s 41 has been held in the News Corp case not to relate to corporations but s 43 or s 45 could well apply to such a case.

It was contended that to construe the operation of s 38 by reference to sections such as ss 41and 45 was to ignore the provisions of s 32 which provides special guidance for the interpretation of Pt IV (Exempt Documents). That section provides as follows:

"Interpretation

"32 A provision of this Part by virtue of which documents referred to in the provision are exempt documents-
(a) shall not be construed as limited in its scope or operation in any way by any other provision of this Part by virtue of which documents are exempt documents; and

(b) shall not be construed as not applying to a particular document by reason that another provision of this Part of a kind mentioned in paragraph (a) also applies to that document."

It is true therefore, that s 38 is not to be construed as limited in its scope by virtue of, for example, s 41. But we are not looking to s 41 to construe s 38. We are merely saying, as we understand the Federal Court was saying, that the presence of sections such as s 41 indicates a preservation of the policy of protection of confidentiality contained in income tax legislation. Moreover, the Court warned that sections such as s 16 (ITAA) should not be construed so expansively as to bring them within s 38 (FOI Act)(see above citation).

It was further contended that read as a whole the ITAA constitutes a code which brings s 38 into operation.

The Tribunal in Kavvadias [reported as Re Lucire and Commonwealth Ombudsman (1983) 5 ALN No 223] said at 11 [N316]:

"The Ombudsman Act provides a code which deals specifically with the information which comes to the Ombudsman's knowledge in the course of an investigation. The provisions of the Act, both expressly and by necessary implication, specify the extent to which information, coming into the hands of the Ombudsman in the course of an investigation, may be disclosed."

But the Federal Court said at 6 ALD 52 of its reasons:

"For reasons which we think are sufficiently apparent from what we have said, it is also our view that the provisions of the Ombudsman Act, read as a whole, cannot be taken as constituting a code which brings s 38 into operation. Doubtless, if it is thought that the investigations of the Ombudsman should be free from the operation of the Freedom of Information Act appropriate legislative attention will be given to the matter."

In support of the contention that the ITAA constitutes a code, particular reference was made to the preamble of the Act (ie "An Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to the Imposition, Assessment and Collection of a Tax upon Incomes"), Pt II (Administration) which includes s 16, Pt IV (Returns and Assessments), and Pt VIII (Miscellaneous). It was said that the specific types of information "respecting the affairs of any other person disclosed or obtained under the provisions of this Act" as designated by s 16 are made clear by reference to such sections as 161 to 163, 263 and 264(1).

The argument was developed in a written submission by counsel for the respondent as follows:

"The bulk of the Act, which assists in determining what is assessable income and what are allowable deductions or rebates, completes the code which as a whole particularises the type of information received. While, on one view, the character of the information the Commissioner may obtain under the Act is wide and almost without limit, the information obtained is that necessary for the proper administration of the ITAA and in particular relates to the making of a correct assessment and the collection of the tax payable. Principally, the information to which s 16 refers is information relating to the financial affairs of persons. Information relating to the contents of a document and indications of its source and how it came into the possession of the person who has it is not information to which s 16 of the Income Tax Assessment Act applies unless the information itself relates to the affairs of a person and the information was obtained by another person, being an officer, under the ITAA. It is the Commissioner's contention that this qualification constitutes a significant distinction from the prohibition contained in the Ombudsman Act."

The reference in that argument to "information … almost without limit" was clearly related to the following passage in the reasons of the Federal Court in Kavvadias at 51:

" Section 38 of the Act deals with information in a document. We do not doubt that what is in the document, including indications of its source, and how it came into the possession of the person who has it, is all information in the sense of s 38. It may be thought adequate for the purposes of the section that the enactment to which it refers should prohibit disclosure of information by reference to it having been received by officers in the course of their duty. Such a prohibition would say nothing directly as to the kind of information in question, which, depending upon the role of the officers, may be of a very wide, almost limitless nature."

Despite the fact that it may be true that information to which s 16 refers is likely to be information relating to the financial affairs of persons, it is apparent that information disclosed or obtained under the provisions of the Act, may go well beyond that and is accordingly also of a very wide, almost limitless nature.

We read the decision in Kavvadias as being based primarily on the view that to apply s 38 in the way suggested, would be largely to destroy the objects of the FOI Act:

"In the public interest, there are numerous long-standing provisions which preclude the disclosure of information (in documentary form or otherwise) received by officers of the Government and its agencies, but to hold that they are all prohibitions within the meaning of the Act is plainly not intended. As we have already noted, effect is to be given to s 11."

It was this reason, inter alia, to which reference back was being made in relation to the argument that the provisions of the Ombudsman Act constitute a code which brings s 38 into operation. We apply this reasoning to arrive at the same conclusion in relation to the ITAA and reject the contention that there is a significant distinction between the provisions of that Act and the Ombudsman Act.

It was further contended for the Commissioner that the combination of references to the affairs of persons and the obtaining of information with respect to those affairs under ITAA enables the comprehension of a genus of information sufficient to invoke the provisions of s 38. It is to be distinguished, it was said, from "the almost limitless nature" of information received by the Ombudsman's officers in the course of their duties. Whilst the Commissioner's officers also may obtain information almost without limit, their information, it was argued, is not protected by s 16 unless it relates to the affairs of a person and is obtained under the Act.

In our opinion, these qualifications are not sufficiently explicit to enable it to be said that there is a direct and explicit reference in the section to the nature of the information itself. Information relating to the affairs of a person and obtained under the Act could hardly be more general. The real purpose of reference to the affairs of a person lies in the distinction it draws concerning the affairs of the officer himself. The actual words of the definition are "respecting the affairs of any other person" (ie than the officer).

Accordingly, we reject the submission that s 38 affords a ground for exemption of any of the documents to which access is sought in these proceedings.

Section 41

Documents 1 to 12(see Sch A to these Reasons) were the subject of another claim, namely that they were exempt by virtue of s 41(1) in that their production would involve the unreasonable disclosure of information relating to the affairs of another person. Document 12 was released to the applicant with the deletion of a reference to another person and his file number. We support that deletion.

With the exception of Document 4, we are not prepared to uphold the claim for exemption in respect of the other documents (ie 1 to 3 and 5 to 11). We believe it is proper for us to consider the documents themselves and decide whether the disclosure would be unreasonable.

We find therefore, that in all cases but the one referred to, no harm could possibly flow from the release of information which in all probability is already known to the applicant or at least readily available to him. The reasons which we have already stated for denying the claim for exemption in relation to information contained in Table B documents respecting the personal affairs of Mrs Z have equal application to Documents 1 to 3 and 5 to 11, (all of which refer, inter alia, to her financial affairs including joint accounts with the applicant).

Sections 37and 41

The exemption claimed for Documents 13 and 14 which are sufficiently described in Sch A attached to these Reasons, succeeds on the ground that its disclosure would or could reasonably be expected to disclose lawful methods or procedures for investigating or dealing with matters arising out of breaches or evasions of the law, the disclosure of which would, or would be reasonably likely to, prejudice the effectiveness of those methods or procedures: s 37(2)(b).

It is not possible for us to take this matter further without reference to the affairs of another person which would have also afforded a sustainable basis for exemption under s 41(1).

Documents 15 to 17 were also the subject of a claim for exemption under the same provision. Having read the documents we are satisfied that the claim is sustained.

However, in the case of Document 18, counsel for the respondent indicated there would be no objection to its release if the first and fourth paragraphs were deleted because, it was said, there was a reference to the personal affairs of another person. We do not accept that the disclosure of that information would be unreasonable and we accordingly propose to direct its production with the deletion only of the officer's name and title at the foot of the document.

The claim for exemption of Document 19 succeeds because it falls within the provisions of s 37(1)(b) and also because it would involve the disclosure of information contrary to the provisions of s 43(1)(c)(ii).

Sections 36and 37

The qualification made by respondent's counsel when he conceded access to Document 21 was that certain words should be deleted from the third paragraph. We are not satisfied that those words constitute a valid basis for exemption under ss 36(1), 37(1)(a)or 37(2)(b). Counsel based his submission primarily on the latter provision and contended that disclosure of the words in question could well complete a jigsaw puzzle for the applicant who would thereby learn facts of which he may not now be cognizant.

We do not feel concerned to investigate or speculate about the possible results of our interpretation of the words of the section. Simply because we are not satisfied that disclosure of the words sought to be deleted would offend against any of the provisions relied upon, we propose to direct that full disclosure of the document should be made.

Sections 36and 40

Documents 22 to 24 are claimed to be exempt under ss 36(1)and 40(1). They refer to an incident about five years ago when the applicant made an allegation of misconduct against a fellow officer, say A. B investigated that allegation as a result of which A made a signed statement. B duly reported the results of that investigation to the Acting Assistant Deputy Commissioner. The latter sent a memorandum to the Deputy Commissioner expressing the view that the matter was trivial and that in view of the attitude of the applicant the investigation could not be taken any further.

We reject the contention that s 36(1) applies because the document contains substantially factual material to which the section has no application by virtue of subs (5). In any event we are not satisfied that it would be contrary to the public interest to disclose the remainder of the document assuming, without deciding, that it relates to the deliberative processes involved in the functions of the respondent.

Assuming further that disclosure would, or could reasonably be expected to, have any of the effects referred to in s 40(1), we reject the claim for exemption under that section because on balance we believe that disclosure would be in the public interest.

We take the view that at least in some circumstances an officer of the public service is entitled to know what answer was given by a person against whom he made allegations and what conclusion persons in authority came to about those allegations.

If, as in this case, the investigation was terminated for reasons pertaining to the applicant and the opinion was expressed that the allegation was a trivial one, there is every reason why the applicant who made the allegations should be so informed.

It is not possible or desirable to try and enunciate principles for future guidance. Each case will depend on its own circumstances. We believe that this is a case in which the public interest will be served by removing the unnecessary shroud of mystery which has become attached to these apparently very significant documents.

If we are wrong about their appearance, it is nevertheless very much in the public interest that the applicant should have an opportunity to demonstrate otherwise by whatever means are available to him.

We are assisted in our conclusion as to the public interest arguments by the reasoning of this Tribunal in Re Murtagh. A distinction is to be drawn between high level communication and the discussion of routine matters. It is important, the Tribunal said, to ensure that "sensitive material is not misunderstood or misapplied by an ill-informed public. But that argument has little relevance to the discussion of a routine matter within an agency" ( supra at 127).

The documents in question here relate to a matter of no special sensitivity. There is certainly no risk of them being misunderstood or misapplied by an ill-informed public.

SCHEDULE A

1 Investigation Working Paper - author not evident - a schedule of:

(a) total receipts and withdrawals (from bank and building society accounts) during the years ended 30 June 1974 to 30 June 1977 inclusive in relation to accounts held by Mr Z and another person;

(b) total wage and other income of Mr Z and another person during the years ended 30 June 1974 to 30 June 1977;

(c) the difference between total receipts in (a) above and total income in (b) during the years ended 30 June 1974 to 30 June 1977 inclusive.

2 Investigation Working Paper - author not evident - undated - a schedule of:

(a) total receipts, withdrawals and balances (of bank and building society accounts) during the years ended 30 June 1974 to 30 June 1977 inclusive in relation to a person other than Mr Z;

(b) total debits and credits to a bank account of Mr Z and another person during the years ended 30 June 1974 to 30 June 1977 inclusive.

3 Investigation Working Paper - author not evident - undated - a schedule of:

(a) total receipts, withdrawals and balances (of bank and building society accounts) during the years ended 30 June 1973 to 30 June 1977 inclusive in relation to accounts held by Mr Z and another person;

(b) total net income disclosed in income tax returns for the years ended 30 June 1973 to 30 June 1977 inclusive of Mr Z and another person;

4 File note - author not evident - undated - noting, inter alia, the name and address of a person other than Mr Z, an income tax file number and building society account number of that person.

5 Investigation Working Paper - author not evident - undated - a schedule of information similar to that in document 3 above and in relation to the same persons.

6 Draft asset betterment statement - author not evident - undated - calculation of relationship between taxable income disclosed by Mr Z and another person during the years ended 30 June 1969 to 30 June 1976 and funds available during that same period.

7-11 Photocopies, account movements, Hindmarsh Building Society - obtained from Hindmarsh Building Society - 7 March 1978 - computer listings of transactions on accounts held by persons other than Mr Z.

12 Office memorandum - Director Management to Assistant Director, Accounting and Officer-in-Charge, Correspondence - 24 July 1975 - recording the consideration given to the request for provision of copies of income tax returns of a taxpayer (other than Mr Z) to that taxpayer and setting out the policy to be applied in that situation and similar cases in the future.

13 Draft listing of questions - author not evident - undated - record of list of questions intended to be put to Mr Z at a proposed investigation interview. Reference is also made to the affairs of a person other than Mr Z.

14 Memorandum - Senior Investigation Officer to Assistant Deputy Commissioner, through Chief Investigation Officer - 11 July 1977 - request for access to Mr Z's income tax returns in anticipation of interviewing him. Reference is also made to the affairs of a person other than Mr Z.

15 Memorandum - Deputy Commissioner to Commissioner - 18 September 1981 - response to requests for comments on matters raised by Mr Z in a letter dated 9 October 1981 - deals with history of the investigation into Mr Z's income tax affairs, the request for a reference to a Board of Review and other matters raised by Mr Z. Reference is also made to the affairs of a person other than Mr Z.

16 Memorandum - Acting Assistant Commissioner to First Assistant Commissioner (Compliance) - 29 September 1981 - advising the contents of the Deputy Commissioner's response contained in Document 15(including the reference to a person other than Mr Z).

17 Investigation Report - Supervisor Investigations to Chief Investigation Officer - 25 July 1978 - advising result of the review of Mr Z's affairs. Reference is also made to the affairs of a person other than Mr Z.

18 Investigation Report - Senior Investigation Officer to Supervisor Investigations - 18 July 1978 - comments on result of review of affairs of Mr Z. Reference is made to the affairs of a person other than Mr Z.

19 Investigation Working Paper - prepared by a Senior Investigation Officer - 6 March 1978 and 7 March 1978 - recording information obtained from an informant in the course of investigation into Mr Z's affairs. Reference is also made to the affairs of a person other than the applicant.

20 Report - on request for reference to Board of Review - prepared by Advising Officer Grade II approved by Principal Advising Officer - undated - setting out the nature of the proposed case to be argued before a Board of Review.

21 Memo - Deputy Commissioner to Commissioner - 24 September 1982 - enclosing Document 20 and advising in more detail the nature of the matters in dispute. The reasons for the commencement of the investigation are stated.

22 Report - employee of Australian Taxation Office, Adelaide - 28 June 1979 - in response to an allegation of misconduct made by Mr Z in relation to the actions of that officer.

23 Report - Senior Investigation Officer Grade II to Acting Assistant Deputy Commissioner - 29 June 1979 - in relation to the allegation referred to in 22 above.

24 Report - Acting Assistant Deputy Commissioner to Deputy Commissioner - 2 July 1979 - in relation to the allegation referred to in 22 above.

SCHEDULE B

Mr Z is presently seeking a review before this Tribunal of a decision denying him access under the Freedom of Information Act to certain documents relating to his affairs.

Some of the documents in question have been produced to this Tribunal in confidence because the Australian Taxation Office claims that their contents would involve the unreasonable disclosure of information relating to the personal affairs of another person.

One of the persons whose affairs would be disclosed is yourself because the documents contain, for example, references to bank and building society accounts held jointly by you with Mr Z and individually by yourself.

The references to your affairs contained in the documents in question concern only your financial affairs during the years ended 30 June 1973 to 30 June 1977.

If you consider that your interests might be affected by disclosure of these documents to your husband, you have the right to apply to this Tribunal to become a party to the present proceedings.

If, on the other hand, you have no objection to their disclosure, your written approval can be addressed to the Deputy Registrar, Administrative Appeals Tribunal, 9th floor, 25 Grenfell Street, Adelaide, 5000.

If you are not willing to give such approval and do not intend to apply to become a party to the proceedings, the Tribunal would appreciate advice within 14 days, if possible, of your attitude to the present application.

Please advise what further information, if any, you require in order to assist you to decide which course you propose to adopt.

This letter is sent at the request of the Tribunal.