BRACKENREG v FC of T

Members:
D Muller DP

Tribunal:
Administrative Appeals Tribunal

MEDIA NEUTRAL CITATION: [2003] AATA 824

Decision date: 22 August 2003

DW Muller (Deputy President)

This is an application by Deborah Odile Brackenreg for review of an objection decision dated 25 March 1999, in respect of the taxation year ended 30 June 1996, to include as assessable income an amount of $50,004.74 paid to Ms. Brackenreg by Comcare as a lump sum redemption payment of weekly payments of compensation, made pursuant to section 137 of the Commonwealth Employees Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (the SRC Act).

Background

2. The following matters are not in dispute and the Tribunal finds as follows:

3. Ms. Brackenreg's initial workers' compensation payments in 1984, were paid pursuant to the provisions of the Compensation (Commonwealth Employees) Act 1971 (the 1971 Act). The 1971 Act was repealed and replaced by the SRC Act. Parts of the SRC Act commenced on 1 July 1988 and the remainder on 1 December 1988.

4. Ms. Brackenreg's weekly compensation payments continued to be paid pursuant to the 1971 Act until the SRC Act commenced. Thereafter she was paid weekly compensation payments pursuant to the SRC Act. She was being paid pursuant to the SRC Act when the decision was made in November 1992 to cancel her payments.

5. The subsequent litigation, settlement, calculation of weekly payments and calculation of the quantum of the redemption was all done pursuant to the SRC Act.

6. Ms. Brackenreg was put into the category of ``former employee'' by s. 123 of the SRC Act because she was a person who was receiving weekly payments of compensation under the 1971 Act immediately before the commencing day of the SRC Act in respect of an injury resulting in an incapacity and had ceased to be an employee before that day. (She ceased to be an employee in January 1987.) Consequently, some of the ``special transitional provisions relating to certain former employees'' applied to her.

7. The SRC Act provides for the redemption of weekly payments which fall below a certain low level, by payment to the recipient of a lump sum. The redemption is available to current employees (s. 30), a person who has ceased to be an employee, (s. 30 would also apply) or a ``former employee'' (special transitional provisions sections 131 to 137). There is no pre-condition to the receipt of a lump sum redemption payment, that the recipient have their employment terminated. It is merely a convenient option which has been thought to be an efficient and probably economic way for Comcare to deal with small ongoing weekly payments, and also to give a more significant benefit to the employee in the form of a useful lump sum instead of relatively insignificant weekly amounts. There is no connection at all between the lump sum redemption payment to Ms. Brackenreg in the 1996 financial year and the termination of her employment in 1987. Ms. Brackenreg's payment was not an ``eligible termination payment''.

8. Ms. Brackenreg has submitted that she was paid the $50,000 ``to go away''. That is, she claims that a commercial decision was made by Comcare to pay her a lump sum to settle the matter, and that the lump sum was not referable


ATC 2202

to any specific weekly payment. The Tribunal does not accept that proposition. The documents show that Comcare conceded liability to settle the matter, but thereafter the quantum of the weekly payments and subsequently the redemption lump sum were calculated in accordance with the provisions of the SRC Act.

9. Whilst it is true that some lump sum payments of compensation or damages may be of a capital nature when they involve compensation for pain and suffering, loss of amenities, permanent physical or mental impairment and other non-economic loss. However, there is no such component in the payment to Ms. Brackenreg. Her payment was confined to compensation for loss of earnings.

10. There is no component of Ms. Brackenreg's payment which relates to any entitlement beyond 65 years of age. One of the changes brought about by the SRC Act was the provision (s. 23(1)) that compensation is not payable on a weekly basis (pursuant to s. 19) to an employee who has reached 65. There is a ``transitional provision'' (s. 134) which allows for a ``reduced payment'' to be made to certain ``former employees'' beyond the age of 65. The formula contained in s. 134 takes into account the age of the employee at the date of the commencement of the SRC Act. The older the employee, the less the reduction. Ms. Brackenreg's relative youth would have meant that if she had continued to receive her weekly compensation payment until 65, she would have received zero beyond 65. Similarly, the amount calculated pursuant to s. 137(4) for the purposes of the lump sum redemption (the 65 + factor) was zero in her case (see the calculation in paragraph 2 (q) above).

11. These issues have been the subject of many court and tribunal appeals. In Case X21,
90 ATC 239, Deputy President Gerber embarked on a useful analysis of the main line of authority in the area. He said [at 240-242]:

``Dr P. Gerber (Deputy President): The facts in this case can, for present purposes, be briefly stated. The applicant, a worker for purposes of the Compensation (Common- wealth Government Employees) Act 1971 (the `Compensation Act') asserts that an amount of $49,061, paid in a lump sum for weekly payments of workers' compensation, does not constitute assessable income. The said sum was received by the taxpayer on 3 April 1985 as part of a greater amount of $54,786, being the amount of compensation the delegate had calculated as being due to the taxpayer as weekly payments of compensation for total incapacity from 30 April 1977 to the date of payment; i.e. 3 April 1985. The amount of $49,061 now in dispute is that proportion of the sum of $54,786 which covers weekly payments for the period 30 April 1977 to 3 April 1985....

...

3. At the hearing, Mr Schoch, who ably represented the applicant, relied on two alternative submissions. Firstly, he argued that compensation payable under the Compensation Act were payments for loss of earning capacity, as distinct from loss of earnings, thus constituting an affair of capital not subject to tax; cf. Groves v. United Pacific Transport Pty. Ltd. (1965) Qd. R. 62 at p. 65; alternatively, he submitted that even if weekly payments of compensation were prima facie assessable as income, a lump sum constituted a capital payment, even if exclusively made up of the arrears of weekly payments.

4. Neither argument is new. Thus, as far back as 1959 a Taxation Board of Review held, in Case K34 (1959) 10 T.B.R.D. 187, on facts difficult to distinguish from those before me, that weekly payments of compensation had `elements of a substitute for earnings, of regular periodicity, and of indefinite duration... and... clearly have the quality of income in ordinary parlance'. The Board concluded in that case the determination of the employer's liability to pay weekly payments, `being retrospective in its operation, raised certain arrears of compensation which were paid to the taxpayer in one sum. The sum so received consisted of an aggregation of weekly payments paid in one amount, and the fact that they were so paid does not alter their nature from that of income to that of capital' (at p. 189).

...

6...., it is necessary to examine recent judicial decisions dealing with the treatment of compensation for tax purposes, involving the `earnings' versus `earning capacity' controversy, which in fiscal terms, comes to `revenue' versus `capital'.


ATC 2203

7. In
Tinkler v. F.C. of T. 78 ATC 4565, 79 ATC 4641;
F.C. of T. v Smith 81 ATC 4114; (1981) 147 C.L.R. 578 and
F.C. of T. v Slaven 83 ATC 4387, 84 ATC 4077, all the judges accepted that the distinction was not a mere artificiality. In all three cases it was accepted that the test in determining whether a payment of compensation has the character of assessable income must turn on the characterisation of the payment, a process which looks at the purpose for the payment as (hopefully) revealed by the statute pursuant to which the compensation becomes payable.

8. I have had the additional advantage of reading the most recent pronouncements on the subject by the Full federal Court in Inkster (supra). In that case, the taxpayer had worked as a fitter and turner in railway workshops in Western Australia (the `railways'). Upon cessation of his employment with the railways, he worked with the Police Department until his retirement in 1982. In 1983, he was diagnosed for the first time as suffering from asbestosis. It was common ground that he had been exposed to asbestos dust whilst working for the railways. The taxpayer, who was in receipt of a superannuation pension from the Police Department, applied for compensation under the Workers' Compensation and Assistance Act 1981 (W.A.) (the `Act').

9. In August 1984, the railways were ordered to pay the taxpayer fortnightly compensation payments under the Act, backdated to November 1983 (subsequently increased in amount due to further physical impairment). In September 1987, the taxpayer reached 65 years and was thereupon paid a lump sum of $25,834 in full settlement of his rights under the Act. The Commissioner assessed the taxpayer to tax on the compensation payments received in each of the 1985 and 1986 income years.

10. The Federal Court upheld the Commissioner's assessments and unanimously overturned the decision of this Tribunal which had earlier concluded the payments were of a capital nature and not assessable under sec. 25(1)(a) or 26(j) of the Tax Act.

11. On a careful perusal of Inkster, I am satisfied that the case has not changed the law....

...

His Honour found some difficulty in reconciling Slaven with Tinkler. In the result, he preferred to follow, what he referred to as the `basic rule' in Tinkler; viz. that payments made to compensate for lost income are themselves income.

...

16. I am therefore satisfied that the mechanics provided by the Act for calculating compensation indicate that the compensation payable is directly related to the amount of earnings which the employee would have been entitled to receive if he had been earning it in the form of wages. Compensation is thus in substitution for earnings and is paid for loss of earnings and assessable under sec. 25(1)(a) of the Tax Act.''

12. In 1999, Matthews J. re-visited some of these issues in
Coward v FC of T 99 ATC 2166. Mr. Coward had been injured in a workplace accident whilst employed by the Commonwealth in 1983. He was formally retired due to incapacity in 1985, and from that date received compensation payments. From 1988, those weekly payments were pursuant to the SRC Act. In 1996, Mr. Coward turned 65 and thereafter his weekly payments were dramatically reduced to $62.46 pursuant to s. 134 (mentioned in paragraph 10 above). Mr. Coward decided to apply for a lump sum redemption of the weekly payments of $62.46 which he was to get after turning 65 (s. 137). His redemption payment was calculated to be $39,590.24, and income tax of $11,206.70 was deducted from this amount. Matthews J. held at 2180.

``71. The applicant received compensation under s 132 (or possibly s 131) between 1 December 1988 and 16 February 1996 when he turned 65. On the latter date, by virtue of s 134 of the SRC Act, the amount payable to him was reduced by a formula which had, amongst its ingredients, the amount of weekly compensation then currently payable to the applicant, and his age as at 1 December 1988.


ATC 2204

72. The fact that there is a statutory reduction in the rate of weekly compensation payments when the recipient turns 65 plainly recognises that most members of the community are no longer in the workforce at that age. The object of compensation which then becomes payable can no longer be to compensate the individual for lost earnings, for it is assumed at that stage that there would not in any event be any earnings. What, then, was the nature of the payments to which the applicant was entitled after he turned 65? The answer provided by the majority in Inkster, in not dissimilar circumstances, is that the payments represented compensation for loss of earning capacity. As such, the payments had their genesis in capital, but nevertheless were income in the hands of the applicant so long as they were paid on a weekly basis.

73. Lee J's observation in Inkster as to the likelihood of a redemption payment being capital in the hands of the taxpayer was clearly obiter, and the circumstances of that case were by no means identical to those of the applicant here. In particular, the weekly payments made to Mr Inkster were calculated on a `notional' basis which had no relevance to his present circumstances. The weekly payments made to the present applicant, at least before he turned 65, had their basis in his `normal weekly earnings' at the time he received his injury. However when he turned 65, and the payments were reduced under the formula contained in s 134, any relevance that the resultant amount had to his present circumstances was so remote as to be indistinguishable from the circumstances in Inkster. Accordingly I consider that the analysis undertaken by Lee J is both relevant and applicable in this case. Under this analysis, the weekly payments which the applicant was entitled to receive after he turned 65 constituted income in his hand notwithstanding that they were designed to compensate him for a capital loss. The periodicity of the payment was the principal feature which converted them from capital to income. The lump sum redemption payment, which clearly lacked this feature, therefore reverted to capital.

74. It follows that Mr Murphy's second submission must prevail. The amount paid to the applicant by way of lump sum redemption of his compensation entitlements was a payment of capital and was therefore not assessable income under s 25(1) of the ITA Act.''

13. The Tribunal adopts the reasoning of Deputy President Gerber in Case X22, and the reasoning of Matthews J in Coward's case. The weekly compensation payments made to Ms. Brackenreg had their basis in a formula which took account of her ``normal weekly earnings'' which was referable to what she was earning when she was employed by the Commonwealth. Her compensation was in substitution for earnings and was paid for loss of earnings and was assessable under section 25(1)(a) of the Tax Act. In her case (unlike Mr.Coward) the weekly payments did not change their character upon being redeemed by the payment of a lump sum.

14. The objection decision under review is affirmed.


 

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