CASE Z17

Members:
KL Beddoe SM

Tribunal:
Administrative Appeals Tribunal

Decision date: 9 April 1992

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KL Beddoe (Senior Member)

The applicant seeks review of objection decisions in respect of an amended assessment of income tax for the year of income ended 30 June 1986 and assessments of income tax for the years of income ended 30 June 1987 and 30 June 1988.

2. The applicant incurred interest charges in connection with bills of exchange used to finance a loan to a trust. The applicant claims that the interest incurred is an outgoing incurred in gaining or producing assessable income and is therefore deductible in terms of sub-section 51(1) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (``the Act''). The respondent says that the interest was not so incurred in the course of gaining or producing assessable income.

3. Mr Alexander of counsel appeared for the applicant and Mr Bickford of counsel appeared for the respondent.

4. Oral evidence was given by the applicant, his former business associate and a chartered accountant. No oral evidence was called for the respondent. The Tribunal also had before it the documents filed pursuant to section 37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (T Documents) and a large number of documents admitted into evidence during the course of the hearing. The amounts claimed as deductions which have not been allowed in the assessments are as follows:

Income Year ended          $
30 June 1986             18,781
30 June 1987             55,254
30 June 1988             51,046
      

During the course of the hearing and with the respondent's consent the amount claimed for the year ended 30 June 1987 was amended by the Tribunal to $71,766 in accordance with section 190 of the Act. The added amount of $16,512 represents discount of bills. Clearly the amount cannot be allowable in both the years of income in which it is now in issue but the amendment will allow the real issues between the parties to be dealt with by the Tribunal. This accords with Parliament's amendment of section 190 in 1986. Subject to the duplicated claim no issue arose before me as to whether the amounts claimed had been incurred. I am satisfied that the amounts claimed were incurred.

5. The applicant is a medical practitioner by profession but also chairman of K Pty Ltd which in turn was at all relevant times, the trustee of the M Trust. In effect the applicant is the controlling mind of the trustee and the trust. Notwithstanding that, the applicant made it clear that in many things he relies upon his solicitor and accountant.

6. The main business of the trust is development of a significant land holding in a provincial city which was to be developed at the relevant time as an industrial estate. That development was to be carried out jointly with a construction company I will call H Pty Ltd.

7. The arrangement between the trustee and H Pty Ltd was really one of investor and builder. The trust had the money and H Pty Ltd had the construction capacity. The trust undertook financing of the project. In particular the trustee obtained a bill-line facility through Westpac Bank in an amount of $560,000 in 1982 secured by a first mortgage over stage 1 of the industrial estate together with mortgages over other properties.

8. The applicant also provided personal finance for the project by making loans to K Pty Ltd as trustee. Those loans were secured by a second mortgage over stage 1 of the project and a first mortgage over stages 2 and 3 of the project. H Pty Ltd also lent money to the project which was secured by mortgages over stages 1,

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2 and 3 ranking after the applicant's mortgages (Exhibit G).

9. H Pty Ltd got into difficulties with another project and went into provisional liquidation in 1983. This had the effect of placing the full responsibility for funding the development of the industrial estate onto the trust, the provisional liquidator taking no part in the project.

10. Consequent upon the failure of H Pty Ltd, H, who was the controlling mind of that company, resigned as a director of K Pty Ltd and transferred his share in that company to the applicant's wife (Exhibit H). At about the same time (November 1984) the applicant was nominated as the appointor by virtue of the terms of the M Trust (clause 2e).

11. By a document dated 5 November 1984 the applicant, as appointor of the M Trust, gave notice in writing that he, his wife, his children and their spouses and children were appointed to be beneficiaries of the M Trust.

12. By 1987 the applicant had taken over full responsibility for the project when he bought out the interest of H Pty Ltd in the industrial estate and from that time on, the applicant, the trust and the applicant's family were the only persons with interests in the industrial estate (subject to mortgages) (Exhibit J).

13. With the removal of H and H Pty Ltd from the project, K Pty Ltd as trustee was left with a debt due to Westpac Bank of $560,000 which was guaranteed by the applicant. That loan was reduced to $460,000 by repayment of $100,000 financed by sale of shares belonging to the applicant's wife.

14. The applicant then negotiated with Westpac Bank for the effective transfer of the loan of $460,000 owing by K Pty Ltd as trustee to the applicant. On 6 June 1986 the Westpac Banking Corporation wrote to the applicant in these terms (Exhibit K):

``We are pleased to confirm that the Bank has agreed to provide finance to enable you to clear the existing liabilities of K Pty Ltd.

Accommodation is offered on the following basis:-

• • Bill Acceptance Line Limit of $560,000 ;
• • Subject to full review after twelve months or upon earlier reduction from sale of landed assets;
• • Interest Rate to be the Bank Bill Rate plus a margin of 2.0% per annum;
• • No Line Fee or Unused Limit Fee to be applied;
• • Establishment Fee (usually $2,800) reduced to $300 to cover cost of document preparation, etc.;
• • Security to be that already held by the Bank being Equitable Mortgage and Bill of Mortgage over (applicant's) land plus Bill of Mortgage by (applicant and wife) over (applicant and wife's) house, together with a Registered Mortgage by K Pty Ltd over 29 blocks of land comprising (`Industrial Estate');
• • Your Bill of Encumbrance over the (`Industrial Estate') is to be released or at least withdrawn, to enable prior registration of our fresh mortgage;
• • Surety's Consent to Advance to be taken from (applicant's wife).

Our Regional Securities Office have been requested to prepare security documentation to enable drawdown on 19 June, which will coincide with next maturity date for K Pty Ltd's Bills.''

15. On 20 June 1986 the applicant drew 90 days bank bills totalling $460,000 which bills were accepted by Westpac Banking Corporation on the same day (Exhibit L). Those bills were discounted with the Bank and the proceeds paid to the account of K Pty Ltd on 20 June 1986 (Exhibit N). The basis of this transaction was set out in a letter sent by Westpac Bank on 24 June 1986 in these terms (Exhibit M):

Term of Bills                    90 days
Due Date                         18/9/86
Amount of Bills                 $460,000
Less
----
Interest at 15.1%   $16,512.32
Acceptance Fee        2,268.49   18,780.81
                     ---------   ---------
Net Proceeds                   $441.219.19
                                ----------
      

16. Exhibit O, which is a bundle of letters sent to K Pty Ltd by Westpac Bank makes it clear that the applicant took over, in effect, the bank bill facility previously provided by the Bank to K Pty Ltd. The facility was maintained at $560,000 although the drawn down amount reduced to $460,000 for the reason already mentioned.

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17. Exhibits P and Q evidence the subsequent rolling over of the bank bills. The drawn down amount on the facility was reduced to $360,000 in September 1987 and in May 1988 was further reduced to $320,000.

18. On 1 November 1986 the trustee passed a resolution in the following terms (Exhibit R):

``The additional financial support of $460000 given by (applicant) to the (M Trust) in June 1986 is acknowledged. It has been agreed that interest will be payable by the Trust to (applicant) equivalent to the interest which he bears on the funds raised by him to make the loan.

To enhance the prospect of continuance of that loan facility to the Trust by (applicant), the company in its capacity as Trustee of the (M Trust) hereby RESOLVES that the first $500000 of profit derived by the Trust shall be allocated and distributed to (applicant).''

19. Also on 1 November 1986 a document addressed to the Trustee was brought into existence by the applicant and acknowledged by the trustee (Exhibit R). It included the following text:

``I wish to put on record the terms pertinent to the financial arrangements which I entered into in June, 1986, relative to the financial requirements of the (M Trust). On the 20th June, 1986, I negotiated a Commercial Bill for $460000 with Westpac Banking Corporation to enable me to make a loan to you to clear your bank debt following completion of negotiations with (H) to sever his involvement with the operations of the Trust.

The continuance of my loan to the trust is subject to the payment to me of interest on the loan made to you, equivalent to the amount of interest which I have incurred and will in the future incur on my bank bill borrowings. The interest on my loan to you is to be payable by you periodically at the same time as interest is payable by me on my bank bill borrowings.

At the present time my borrowings are $360000 having been reduced from $460000 that level, on the 20th October, 1986.

The loan principal will continue to be subject to repayment on demand.''

20. That commitment by the applicant to financing the operations of the trust replaces his earlier commitment in 1983 to guarantee repayment of moneys lent by Westpac Bank direct to the trust. That guarantee was effected by a deed dated 21 January 1983 and was made jointly with H. The deed was stamped by the Stamp Duties Office in March 1983.

21. Notwithstanding the trustee's resolution it had not, to the date of hearing, made any payments to the applicant. Nor has the applicant sought to obtain payments in accordance with the alleged agreement. The reality of the matter is that the money lent to the trust is tied up in the development of the industrial estate which is not producing income to the trust and will not do so until the development is sold. The applicant said that attempts have been made to sell blocks but that seems to have been thwarted by the lack of electricity supply on the site, a situation which was being rectified at the time of hearing.

22. The change in the financing arrangements outlined above came about, so the applicant says, because of advice from his accountant. That advice, on the applicant's understanding, was to the effect that by taking over responsibility for the bill finance, the charges would become an immediate deduction in the applicant's hands for income tax purposes. If, however, the trustee continued to incur the charges they may only become deductible for tax purposes at some indeterminate time in the future as the development was sold.

23. However, the applicant was clear that he did not refinance the project only because of tax considerations. He needed to reduce the commitment to the Bank and also improve the Bank's security. He was of the view that the continuing facility would only be provided if the Bank's security was improved and its doubts about the payment of the charges assuaged. Those problems were solved by using $100,000 provided by his wife to reduce the facility and by committing his own assets as security and his own income to meet the charges. These changes were caused by the decline in the property market and the extension by several years of the original sales program.

24. H gave oral evidence generally corroborating the applicant's evidence about events leading up to but not including the refinancing with Westpac Bank. H remained optimistic that the estate would eventually be sold at a profit although he did not demonstrate any rational basis for this belief.

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25. W is a chartered accountant engaged by the applicant to look after the accounting affairs of the applicant and the trust estate from about the time that the applicant became the controlling mind of the trustee. W made calculations of the amount due to the applicant by the Trust and credited those amounts to an account in the applicant's name in the books of the Trust. Although, because of oversight or error he failed to do so, the intention was to credit the applicant with interest equivalent to all charges including discounts incurred by the applicant in maintaining the bill facility. That account appears in the balance sheet of the trust attached to the relevant income tax returns (Exhibit 1) described as ``Loans - (Applicant)''. Balances of the account for the years ended 30 June 1985 to 1988 are as follows:

Year ended                      $

30 June 1985                 590,236
30 June 1986                 837,677
30 June 1987               1,681,332
30 June 1988               1,720,892
      

For the year ended 30 June 1986 there also appeared an account entitled (Applicant) No 2 Account - $441,219. There is no reason to doubt the evidence of W to the effect that a payment in the nature of interest was made to the applicant each year by crediting an amount to the applicant's loan account. That amount is based upon the charges incurred in relation to the Westpac Bank bills.

26. The accountant's understanding of the arrangement is set out at pages 103-104 of the transcript as follows:

``Q. To include all of those amounts, that is, bank charges, stamp duties, acceptance fees and discounts?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Did you speak to (applicant) at all about what was to be - did you get instructions from (applicant) in relation to that?

A. In respect of the nature of the charges to be paid or to be covered?

Q. Yes?

A. Only in fairly general terms, but there was to be a payment of interest to cover the costs that he would incur.

Q. I understand the other side of the accruals is reflected in the land development costs on the balance sheet?

A. Yes.

Q. Is there any reason why the amount is just shown in the balance sheets as accruals, as opposed to some other way of dissecting entries?

A. I do not believe there is any other way that it can be shown because it is an accrual, and (applicant) is awaiting payment of the amounts due to him. The agreement that he entered into with the trust specified that the amounts were to be paid to him, and the amounts have not been paid to him, and accordingly the Trust needs to recognise the liability by taking it up as an accrual.

Q. If it was not payable at this time, but payable in the future at some time, how would that be reflected?

A. I would still record it in the same way as a liability because of the interest.

Q. But this entry, which of those does it reflect? Does it reflect a present payment or present liability?

A. It reflects a present liability.

Q. Is that the way in which you accounted for it?

A. It is.

Q. Was there any reason for not identifying it in with the loans liability?

A. I believe there is no authority to do that. The agreement was quite clear, that it was a payment due to (applicant) and there was no authority for the trustee to make an entry to (applicant's) loan account.''

27. That evidence confirms the documentary evidence and the applicant's evidence that an amount of interest was payable to the applicant by the trustee. The quantum of that interest was determined by the charges incurred by the applicant in respect of the bill facility.

28. However, Exhibit V purports to tell an entirely different story. It is a document which sets out movements in the applicant's loan account from 1983 to 1989. That document recognises funds contributed by the applicant but makes no reference to interest payable to the applicant. I have not been able to reconcile on their face the details of that exhibit with the

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summary in Exhibit U. In the circumstances I have decided that the balance sheets lodged with the respective tax returns reflect the true position as established before this Tribunal.

29. Notwithstanding those balance sheets W said in evidence that the interest due to the applicant had been treated as an accrual and was not credited to the applicant's loan account. He took the view that if the amounts had been credited to the applicant's loan account it would constitute constructive receipt of the interest. By crediting the amount to another account that constructive receipt did not arise. There is no doubt, on the evidence, that the amount credited each year was payable on demand by the applicant and on the accountant's evidence was payable at each time the applicant incurred charges on the bill facility. It is also clear that the trustee lacked any cash flow that would permit actual payment of the interest.

30. It is the essence of accounting that it provides an historical record of what actually happened. The treatment of a transaction in a particular way by the accountant does not thereby alter the character of that transaction. If, therefore, the applicant derived certain amounts of interest each year from the trust, the designation of those amounts as ``accruals'' by an accountant does not in any way change the essential character of the amounts in question.

31. Counsel for the applicant submitted that the charges incurred by the applicant in relation to the bill facility were deductible under section 51. The basis of this was said to be that the charges were incurred in the course of deriving assessable income, namely the interest agreed to be paid by the trustee.

32. In the alternative it was said that the charges were incurred for the purpose of deriving assessable income from the trust in the applicant's capacity as a beneficiary of that trust.

33. As to the first argument, Mr Alexander relied upon dicta of the Federal Court in
FC of T v Total Holdings (Australia) Pty Limited 79 ATC 4279 at 4283 where Lockhart J expressed the general proposition in these words:

``In my opinion if a taxpayer incurs a recurrent liability for interest for the purpose of furthering his present or prospective income producing activities, whether those activities are properly characterised as the carrying on of a business or not, generally the payment by him of that interest will be an allowable deduction under sec. 51. See Munro's case (supra); The Texas Co. (A'sia) Ltd. v. F.C. of T. (supra); F.C. of T. v. Green (1950) 81 C.L.R. 313 per Latham C.J., McTiernan, Webb, Fullagar and Kitto JJ. at p. 319; and Usher's Wiltshire Brewery Ltd. v. Bruce (supra).

I say `generally' as some qualification may be necessary in appropriate cases, for instance, where interest is paid by a taxpayer as a prelude to his being in a position whereby he may commence to derive income. In such cases the requirement that the expenditure be incidental and relevant to the derivation of income may not be satisfied. See Lodge v. F.C. of T. 72 ATC 4174; (1972) 128 C.L.R. 171; F.C. of T. v. Hatchett 71 ATC 4184; (1971) 125 C.L.R. 494.''

34. In my view those propositions have equal force to the charges incurred by the applicant in respect of the bill facility. While such charges are not correctly described as interest they are of a similar character although the discount is more correctly described as a loss rather than an outgoing.

35. It was the essence of counsel's submission that the charges had been incurred for the purpose of deriving interest income but that income will not be derived until it is either paid or constructively received. As the taxpayer is a ``cash basis taxpayer'' it is said that he does not derive income until he receives it.

36. Mr Alexander also submitted that the applicant's right to the first $500,000 of profit arising from realisation of the industrial estate provided the basis for the nexus between the charges incurred and the derivation of assessable income. I think that the connection is both too remote and furthermore is uncertain. It would always be open to the applicant, as the controlling mind of the trust, to change or cancel this arrangement by having the trustee make another resolution of different effect.

37. Mr Bickford submitted that the charges claimed as deductions were not allowable under sub-section 51(1) but if it were held that they were, then the same amount should be brought to account as assessable income. It is not part of the applicant's case that any relevant amount has been derived as assessable income.

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38. The test applied by the High Court in
Ronpibon Tin NL & Tongkah Compound NL v FC of T (1949) 8 ATD 431; (1949) 78 CLR 47 was expressed in these words at ATD pages 435-436; CLR pages 56-57:

``For expenditure to form an allowable deduction as an outgoing incurred in gaining or producing the assessable income it must be incidental and relevant to that end. The words `incurred in gaining or producing the assessable income' mean in the course of gaining or producing such income. Their operation has been explained in cases decided under the provisions of the previous enactments: see particularly Amalgamated Zinc (de Bavay's) Ltd. v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1935) 54 C.L.R. 295, 303-304, 307, 309-310; 3 A.T.D. 288, and W. Nevill & Co. Ltd. v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1937) 56 C.L.R. 290, 300-301, 305-306, 308.

Notwithstanding the differences in other respects in the present provision, the expression `incurred in gaining or producing the assessable income' has been left unchanged and bears the same meaning. In brief substance, to come within the initial part of the subsection it is both sufficient and necessary that the occasion of the loss or outgoing should be found in whatever is productive of the assessable income or, if none be produced, would be expected to produce assessable income.''

That is the fundamental test which must be met in this case.

39. The recent decision of the High Court in
Fletcher & Ors v FC of T 91 ATC 4950 is directly in point for the present case. After referring to the dicta quoted above from the Ronpibon case their Honours said at pages 4957-4958:

``So to say is not, however, to exclude the motive of the taxpayer in making the outgoing as a possibly relevant factor in characterisation for the purposes of the first limb of s. 51(1). At least in a case where the outgoing has been voluntarily incurred, the end which the taxpayer subjectively had in view in incurring it may, depending upon the circumstances of the particular case, constitute an element, and possibly the decisive element, in characterisation of either the whole or part of the outgoing for the purposes of the sub-section. See, e.g., W. Nevill & Co. Ltd. v. F.C. of T. (1937) 4 ATD 187 at p. 193-199; (1937) 56 C.L.R. 290, at pp. 301, 308; F.C. of T. v. South Australian Battery Makers Pty. Ltd. 78 ATC 4412 at p. 4420; (1977-1978) 140 C.L.R. 645, at p. 660; John 89 ATC at p. 4105; (1989) 166 C.L.R. at p. 426; Magna Alloys and Research Pty. Ltd. v. F.C. of T. 80 ATC 4542 at p. 4547; (1980) 49 F.L.R. 183, at p. 189; 33 A.L.R. 213, at pp. 218-219; Ure 81 ATC, at p. 4103; (1981) 50 F.L.R., at pp. 231-232; 34 A.L.R., at pp. 248-249; F.C. of T. v Ilbery 81 ATC 4661 at pp. 4666-4667; (1981) 58 F.L.R. 191, at pp. 199-201; 38 A.L.R. 172 at pp. 179-180. In that regard and in the context of the sub-section's clear contemplation of apportionment, statements in the cases to the effect that it is sufficient for the purposes of s. 51(1) that the production of assessable income is `the occasion' of the outgoing (see, e.g., Ronpibon Tin (1949) 8 ATD, at p. 436; (1949) 78 C.L.R., at p. 57; John 89 ATC, at p. 4105; (1989) 166 C.L.R., at p. 426) or that the outgoing is a `cost of a step taken in the process of gaining or producing income' (see John 89 ATC, at p. 4105; (1989) 166 C.L.R. at p. 427) are to be understood as referring to a genuine and not colourable relationship between the whole of the expenditure and the production of such income.

Nonetheless, it is commonly possible to characterise an outgoing as being wholly of the kind referred to in the first limb of s. 51(1) without any need to refer to the taxpayer's subjective thought processes. That is ordinarily so in a case where the outgoing gives rise to the receipt of a larger amount of assessable income. In such a case, the characterisation of the particular outgoing as wholly of a kind referred to in s. 51(1) will ordinarily not be affected by considerations of the taxpayer's subjective motivation. If, for example, a particular item of assessable income can be earned by making a lesser outgoing in one of two possible ways, one of which is a loss or outgoing of the kind described in s. 51(1) and the other of which is not, it will ordinarily be irrelevant that the taxpayer's choice of the method which was tax deductible was motivated by taxation

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considerations or that the non-deductible outgoing would have been less than the deductible one. In such a case, the objective relationship between the outgoing actually made and the greater amount of assessable income actually earned suffices, without more, to characterise the whole outgoing as one which was incurred in gaining or producing assessable income. If the outgoing can properly be wholly so characterised, it `is not for the Court or the commissioner to say how much a taxpayer ought to spend in obtaining his income, but only how much he has spent'. See, e.g., Ronpibon Tin (1949) 8 ATD, at p. 437-438; (1949) 78 C.L.R., at p. 60; Cecil Bros. Pty. Ltd. v. F.C. of T. (1962) 12 ATD 449 at p. 451-452; (1962-1964) 111 C.L.R. 430, at p. 434.

The position may, however, well be different in a case where no relevant assessable income can be identified or where the relevant assessable income is less than the amount of the outgoing. Even in a case where some assessable income is derived as a result of the outgoing, the disproportion between the detriment of the outgoing and the benefit of the income may give rise to a need to resolve the problem of characterisation of the outgoing for the purposes of the sub-section by a weighing of the various aspects of the whole set of circumstances, including direct and indirect objects and advantages which the taxpayer sought in making the outgoing. See, e.g., Robert G. Nall Ltd. v. F.C. of T. (1936) 4 ATD 335 at pp. 338, 340, 342-343; (1936-1937) 57 C.L.R. 695, at pp. 699-700, 706, 708-709, 712-713. Where that is so, it is a `commonsense' or `practical' weighing of all the factors which must provide the ultimate answer. See, e.g., B.P. Australia Ltd. v. F.C. of T. (1966) A.C. 224, at p. 264; Hallstroms Pty. Ltd. v. F.C. of T. (1946) 8 ATD 190 at p. 195; (1946) 72 C.L.R. 634, at p. 648; F.C. of T. v. Foxwood (Tolga) Pty. Ltd. 81 ATC 4261 at pp. 4264, 4268-4269; (1981) 147 C.L.R. 278, at pp. 285, 293. If, upon consideration of all those factors, it appears that, notwithstanding the disproportion between outgoing and income, the whole outgoing is properly to be characterised as genuinely and not colourably incurred in gaining or producing assessable income, the entire outgoing will fall within the first limb of s. 51(1) unless it is either somehow excluded by the exception of `outgoings of capital, or of a capital, private or domestic nature' or `incurred in relation to the gaining or production of exempt income'. If, however, that consideration reveals that the disproportion between outgoing and relevant assessable income is essentially to be explained by reference to the independent pursuit of some other objective and that part only of the outgoing can be characterised by reference to the actual or expected production of assessable income, apportionment of the outgoing between the pursuit of assessable income and the pursuit of that other objective will be necessary.''

40. Adopting that guidance from the High Court I must first decide whether the applicant has or may be expected to derive assessable income. The answer to that is to my mind quite simple. The trustee decided on 1 November 1986 that interest would be payable to the applicant equivalent to the ``interest'' which he incurs on the bank bill facility (Exhibit R).

41. For these reasons I have come to the view that the applicant did incur the charges for the purpose of deriving assessable income and those charges are therefore deductible in terms of the first limb of sub-section 51(1). I think the principles enunciated by the High Court in Fletcher's case make this result inevitable.

42. That is not, however, the end of the matter. As Mason J indicated in
Gauci & Ors v FC of T 75 ATC 4257 at 4261, section 190(b) of the Act imposes upon the taxpayer the burden of proving that the assessment is excessive - the Act does not place an onus on the Commissioner to show that the assessment was correctly made. Nor is there any statutory requirement that the assessment must be sustained or supported by evidence. In these proceedings section 177 makes the assessment prima facie correct except in appeal proceedings when the taxpayer can contest the excessiveness of the assessment.

43. In the present case the taxpayer has not returned the interest derived from the trust but has claimed the charges incurred in deriving that interest. In view of the resolution of the trustee these amounts should be equal and offsetting. It may be, however, that the interest is derived earlier than the discounts fructify into

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an allowable deduction - although I doubt that is the case.

44. Given that no amounts of interest derived have been included in the making of the assessments and given that the amounts of interest derived proximate the charges incurred, I cannot be satisfied that the assessments are excessive. I do not understand how the taxpayer can succeed before this Tribunal unless the Tribunal is satisfied that the assessment is excessive.

45. In my view the Commissioner should have allowed deductions for the charges incurred and assessed as income the amounts of interest payable by the Trustee.

46. If the assessments had been correctly made the taxable income would be the same (subject to the possible qualification mentioned above) as the assessments as made by the Commissioner.

47. For these reasons I cannot be satisfied that the assessments are excessive and I will therefore affirm the objection decisions under review.