Explanatory Memorandum
(Circulated by authority of the Treasurer, the Honourable Peter Costello MP)6 Schedule 2: Amendment of the Banking Act 1959
Schedule 2 to this Bill will extend the coverage of the BankingAct1959 (the Act) to establish a single licensing and prudential regime for DTIs. This will be achieved by capturing both the business of banking and the business of taking deposits and making advances by corporations under the Commonwealth's Constitutional powers. Scope will, however, be available to extend this definition as the nature of financial products changes and the financial system evolves.
NOHCs containing an ADI will be facilitated by allowing APRA to authorise and regulate these entities under the Act and enabling conglomerates to hold multiple ADI authorities (current policy has precluded this in most circumstances). APRA will, however, process requests for NOHC authorities and multiple licences on a case-by-case basis to ensure that prudential requirements are not compromised. APRA will have greater access to information about nonregulated entities within a financial conglomerate allowing APRA to better manage potential sources of risk to ADIs. In addition, APRA will be able to make standards on prudential matters in relation to ADIs and NOHCs of ADIs.
The amendments will also abolish the requirement on banks to hold NCDs with the RBA from a date to be determined by proclamation.
This Bill will strengthen existing depositor protections contained within Division 2. Currently, Division 2 provides for:
- (a)
- an obligation for the prudential regulator to use its Division 2 powers to protect depositors and an obligation upon banks to provide information to the prudential regulator;
- (b)
- options for the prudential regulator to appoint an investigator or take control when a bank is likely to become unable to meet its obligations or to suspend payment (or is actually experiencing these problems) and a requirement that the prudential regulator, if it has taken control, remain in control at least until provision has been made for the repayment of deposits; and
- (c)
- a requirement that banks back Australian deposit liabilities with assets in Australia and that Australian depositors rank ahead of other creditors.
These features are retained in the amended Division 2 but are supplemented by the following measures.
- (a)
- The regulator will have new powers in Division 1BA to direct the activities of an ADI or NOHC in the interests of depositors or when it has contravened a prudential standard or regulation. These direction powers enable the prudential regulator to impose specific corrective action without actually taking control and are intended to facilitate early intervention to prevent a crisis from emerging. The inclusion of the powers outside Division 2 extends their coverage to branches of foreign banks and to NOHCs and is consistent with their early intervention character (including the direction trigger of failure to comply with a prudential regulation or standard).
- (b)
- The mechanisms for taking control (statutory management) of an ADI within Division 2, including provision for the appointment of an administrator to exercise that power, will be clarified. The statutory manager has all the powers of the institution's board so that it can effectively manage the institution in crisis for the protection of depositors.
- (c)
- In addition, when APRA considers that an ADI under statutory management is insolvent and could not be restored to solvency within a reasonable period, it will be able to apply to the Federal Court for an order that the ADI be wound up. The timely wind up of an insolvent institution could prevent further losses from accruing.
A number of minor amendments have been included to update the Act and bring it in line with international prudential practice and plain English requirements.
Commencement
6.1 The amendments to the Banking Act will become effective when the APRA is established. The only exception is the removal of the requirement for banks to hold NCDs with the RBA which will take effect from a date specified by proclamation (capped at 24 months).
Section 5 - Definitions
6.2 Definitions of APRA, APRA board members and APRA staff members will be inserted to enable APRA to assume responsibility for exercising prudential regulation under the Act.
Authorised Deposit-taking Institution
6.3 An authorised deposittaking institution or ADI will refer to a body corporate granted an authority to carry on banking business by APRA under subsection9(3) of the Act. Generally, "authorised deposittaking institution" replaces previous references to the word "bank" throughout the Act and extends the coverage of "banking business" to State and Territory-based DTIs. State and Territorybased DTIs will, however, be given an exemption initially while negotiations are underway between the Commonwealth, State and Territory governments.
6.4 Under the Banking Act 1959, an authorised NOHC will be a company incorporated in Australia that owns one or more ADIs and is authorised under subsection 11AA(2). The difference between an authorised NOHC and a NOHC authority will be that the former contains one or more ADIs while the latter does not contain any ADIs.
6.5 A NOHC will be precluded from carrying on any business directly but will be able to satisfy the other corporate and regulatory requirements of being a company, such as owning assets, possessing a balance sheet and receiving and paying dividends.
6.6 While the word "bank" will be replaced by the phrase "authorised deposittaking institution" or "ADI" in most parts of the Act, a definition of "bank" will still be necessary for the bank holiday and unclaimed moneys provisions of the Act. The term "bank" will capture any ADI permitted to use the word "bank" or like words. In the first instance, consistent with current policy, to use the word "bank" an ADI will be required to possess $50 million in capital and hold an exchange settlement account with the RBA. This policy may be reviewed at a future time if changes in the financial system warrant consideration of a change.
6.7 In order to regulate all DTIs within the scope of the Act, a broad definition of banking business will be inserted. Banking business will therefore be defined to cover not only the concept of banking under the Constitution but corporations that are both engaged in the business of accepting deposits and the business of making advances. Given the potential for any definition of financial system activity to become dated, the GovernorGeneral will be given the power to make a regulation extending the definition.
6.8 References to bodies that no longer exist will be removed. Therefore, definitions of the Queensland Industry Development Corporation and State Bank Limited will be deleted.
6.9 The definition of subsidiary is the same as that in the Corporations Law.
Section 6 - Application of the Act
6.10 Section 6 will be amended to remove references to entities that no longer exist.
Division 1 - Authority to Carry on Banking Business
6.11 The application process to gain an authority to carry on banking business will be streamlined. APRA will be responsible for approving or rejecting written applications for an authority to carry on banking business in Australia.
6.12 The Treasurer and Governor-General will no longer have any role in the licensing process for ADIs under the Act.
6.13 Under the proposed section 9A, APRA will be able to revoke an authority to carry on banking business in certain circumstances without the body corporate requesting a revocation. For example, APRA may revoke an authority where an institution consistently does not comply with, nor endeavour to achieve compliance with, a condition of its licence or a direction made consistent with the Act. Generally, APRA will be required to give the institution written notification of its intention to revoke an authority; allow the body sufficient opportunity to make a submission presenting any mitigating factors or other concerns; and have regard to any submissions made.
Bodies that cease to exist or change their name
6.14 These provisions will allow APRA to quickly and effectively revoke authorities of ADIs and NOHCs that no longer exist and deal with body corporates that hold authorities when they change their name.
6.15 This item will ensure that an uptodate list of ADIs is readily available to industry, the public and interested persons on a regular basis.
6.16 Documents required as part of an application for an authority to carry on banking business will be provided to APRA rather than the Treasurer.
6.17 Under proposed replacement subsection 11(1), APRA may exempt a body corporate from the need to get a banking authority or from the need to comply with all or specified provisions of the Act. These exemptions are normally granted to institutions carrying on a limited range of banking business.
6.18 All existing exemptions granted by the Treasurer under section 11 will be retained. However, APRA may review any existing exemption at any time as the circumstances of the institution change.
Proposed Division 1AA - Authority to be a Non-operating Holding Company
Whether a NOHC needs to be Authorised?
6.19 APRA may require a NOHC that holds an ADI or intends to hold an ADI to be licensed under proposed section 11AA of the Banking Act 1959.
6.20 A body corporate will be able to apply, in writing, to APRA, at any time, seeking an authority to own or become an authorised NOHC under the Act. APRA will be able to grant the body corporate approval to be a NOHC and attach prudential conditions to its authority, which may be varied, added to or revoked at any time by APRA.
6.21 A body corporate may also be required to obtain other approvals under the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975 and the proposed Financial Sector (Shareholdings) Act 1998 and may be required to meet other requirements of the Government's foreign investment policy.
6.22 By authorising NOHCs, APRA will be able to access information, as necessary, about the NOHC and other financial and non-financial entities within the group thus providing early warning of any potential risk imposed on the ADI from other parts and activities of conglomerates.
Can APRA Revoke a NOHC Authority?
6.23 APRA may revoke a NOHC authority upon the request of the body corporate or without a request in certain circumstances. The revocation process for a NOHC will be similar to the revocation process for an ADI.
6.24 APRA will be able to choose whether to publish a list of authorised NOHCs from time-to-time.
Division 1A - Prudential Supervision
6.25 APRA will be given the power to make standards on prudential matters for ADIs and authorised NOHCs. These prudential standards will specify the requirements to be met by ADIs and NOHCs and will become effective from the date of release, unless a later date is specified.
Proposed Division 1BA APRA's Power To Issue Directions
6.26 APRA is provided with both a general directions power in relation to ADIs and NOHCs, and a specific power relating to enforcing certified liquidity contracts.
Proposed Subdivision A - Directions other than directions to enforce certified liquidity contracts
6.27 The general directions power provides a means for APRA to correct institutional behaviour before a crisis develops. These powers may be contrasted with the control powers in Division2, which the regulator may wish to exercise in more troubled circumstances. At such times, the regulator may wish to use these directions powers in conjunction with control powers to more effectively resolve a crisis but their primary function is intended to be preventative.
6.28 Clearly, failure of an ADI to comply with a prudential standard or regulation is an important trigger for a direction intended to ensure that the institution remains sound, but some early corrective action may be appropriate in the interests of depositors even if a standard has not been breached. Of course, directions may also be motivated, in part, by the desire of APRA to ensure financial system stability but the depositor protection trigger should prove sufficient for this purpose also since financial instability would directly threaten the safety of deposits.
6.29 The prudential regulator may also issue directions to an authorised NOHC where APRA considers that the NOHC has contravened a prudential regulation or standard; or where it is in the interests of the depositors of an ADI that is a subsidiary of the NOHC.
6.30 The legislation draws upon the Financial Institutions Code 1992 by providing an indicative list of the kinds of directions which APRA may make. However, since the circumstances under which directions powers may be used are difficult to prescribe before the event, the list also includes a broad power to make a direction regarding the way the affairs of a body corporate are to be conducted. APRA must therefore also be given broad discretion in relation to decisions about the time period for compliance and nature of such directions.
6.31 The power to revoke a direction must likewise be flexible to allow an appropriate response in the face of compliance, changed circumstances or valid objection by the institution concerned.
Proposed Subdivision B - Directions to enforce certified industry liquidity contracts
6.32 The current Statebased regulatory regime requires institutions to contribute funds to an Emergency Liquidity Support Scheme. Under the new Commonwealth regulatory framework, it is envisaged that some parties may wish to voluntarily participate in a liquidity support scheme through a 'liquidity contract' with other institutions. The terms and conditions of that contract would be a matter for the parties to agree amongst themselves and, in developing prudential standards, APRA may wish to take such participation into account.
6.33 Before doing so, however, APRA would need to be sure that participants will promptly meet their obligations if and when they become due. APRA will, therefore, have the power under proposed section 11CB to certify a liquidity contract upon the request of the parties concerned, where it believes the terms of that contract are appropriate, and to subsequently direct the parties to comply with the terms of that certified liquidity contract, under proposed section 11CC, in the interests of those depositors whose financial safety is put at risk by the failure to extend liquidity. By the same token, APRA may also revoke the certification of any industry liquidity contract if it considers it appropriate to do so for any reason.
Proposed Subdivision C - General provisions relating to all directions
6.34 Because there is a risk that a direction from APRA may trigger conditions in contracts or agreements that would destabilise an already fragile institution, the Bill provides that directions should not provide grounds for other parties to deny obligations, accelerate any debt or close out any transaction with the institution unless, because of the direction, it has failed to meet its contractual obligations. The possibility that one party may unfairly benefit from this process, or react disproportionately to a partial failure by the ADI to meet its obligations, is addressed by allowing the Federal Court to resolve problem cases (but not in a way that would contravene the direction).
6.35 The qualification allowing other parties to deny obligations, however, does not extend to a direction to not repay any money on deposit or advance because certainty in outcome may be required in this case eg to suspend the payment of deposits in the event of a bank run.
6.36 APRA may publish information relating to any direction it has issued in the Gazette, but is under no obligation to do so since this may, in particular circumstances, cause needless concern in the community about the soundness of the institution involved. If it has previously published a direction and then revokes that direction, APRA must also publish the revocation.
6.37 Accountability is addressed by requiring APRA to report to the Treasurer or the RBA on directions when requested. However, this does not prevent APRA reporting at any other time.
6.38 Information relating to directions is confidential unless it has been published in the Gazette.
6.39 Non-compliance with a direction gives rise to criminal sanctions, applicable to both a body corporate or an individual, as appropriate, because the consequences for the safety of deposits may be very severe possibly with implications for the confidence and stability of the financial system in general.
Division 2 - Protection of Depositors
6.40 Although most of the provisions of Division 2 have been repealed and replaced by new sections, the content of the repealed sections has largely been retained in the new provisions, as has been outlined above in the summary of this schedule. The subsequent discussion is therefore confined to those amendments that reflect new provisions.
Proposed Subdivision A - General provisions relating to depositor protection
6.41 This subdivision houses the current Banking Act provisions relating to: APRA's powers to demand, and an ADI's obligations to provide, information; APRA's powers to appoint an investigator; the triggers for regulatory control of an ADI that is facing difficulties; and the existing depositor priority provisions.
6.42 Under proposed section 13A(1), the prudential regulator may now appoint an administrator to take control of an ADI rather than assume control itself. The appointment of an administrator provides APRA with the flexibility to avail itself of skills that exist outside its ranks. The term 'statutory management' is also introduced in this proposed section to refer to either control by the prudential regulator or control by the administrator it appoints. The provisions, however, relating to statutory management and the administrator are fleshed out in the proposed SubdivisionB.
6.43 In addition to the existing conditions for the termination of control, proposed section 13C(1) allows APRA to relinquish statutory management control of an insolvent ADI provided that it has applied to the Federal Court (which it may now do under SubdivisionC) and a liquidator has been appointed. The liquidator would then follow processes set down in the Corporations Law. The importance of the insolvency provision has already been discussed. Firstly, it clarifies the fact that deposits are not guaranteed, which should reduce moral hazard and so enhance system stability. Secondly, it helps to protect deposits by removing a possible source of regulatory forebearance and by preventing an ADI from accumulating further loss.
6.44 Because the exercise of statutory management replaces other forms of control (directors and external administrators, see below), special provision has been made in proposed section 13C(2) to ensure that such controls are in place before statutory management may be ultimately terminated. Where control is to be handed to directors, provisions specify the duration of such control.
Proposed Subdivision B - Provisions dealing with control of an ADI's business by an ADI statutory manager
6.45 Under current arrangements, the prudential regulator is permitted to take control of an enterprise in the interests of depositors while there remains in place a board of directors, acting on behalf of shareholders and/or, possibly, an external administrator acting for a range of possible interests. The potential for conflict between these parties may not only compromise the resolution of problems in depositors' interests but could deter the supervisor from intervening when needed. The amendments in proposed section14A(1) remove this potential for conflict by giving the statutory manager the powers and functions of the board it replaces (although it is acting in the interests of depositors not shareholders) and by precluding (or terminating) the appointment of any external administrators.
6.46 At the same time, these parties and other former officers (for example, an executive who has resigned during the crisis) may possess information needed by the statutory manager to perform its duties. Therefore, the proposed section also provides the statutory manager with the power to require them to provide such information, even if self incriminating (however, individuals are indemnified against the direct use of such incriminating information). A criminal sanction applies for a breach of this provision because the information sought might be essential in a period of crisis.
6.47 This proposed section also makes it clear that the statutory manager has the power to sell or otherwise dispose of the whole or any part of the business. Although this would also follow from the fact that the statutory manager replaces the board, the proposed section removes any possible uncertainty.
6.48 APRA's powers to make directions or to initiate wind up action may not be delegated to an administrator since decisions regarding these are appropriately left in the hands of the prudential regulator. An administrator appointed by APRA is, however, able to recommend such action to APRA.
6.49 Taking control of an institution in such circumstances is an onerous responsibility and a statutory manager will therefore not be held liable for losses (but must report them to APRA) unless they arise because of fraud, dishonesty, negligence or wilful failure to comply with the Act. For that reason, also, while a statutory manager has the powers and functions of the board, it is not taken to be a director for the purposes of section 588G of the Corporations Law, which relates to a director's duty to prevent insolvent trading.
6.50 Where the statutory management function is exercised by an administrator appointed by APRA, the administrator will not have any additional powers that APRA would not have in the circumstances (other than those that arise from the appointment of an external person such as the power to make recommendations to APRA). The administrator must report to and accept direction from APRA.
6.51 Regardless of any contractual arrangement that may exist between APRA and the administrator, APRA may terminate the administrator's appointment if the latter does not comply with the proposed provisions of Division 2 (provided other control arrangements are put in place).
6.52 The new insolvency provision in the proposed Subdivision A is accompanied by a power for APRA to apply to the Federal Court for an ADI to be wound up (in accordance with the Corporations Law) when an institution is under statutory management. Statutory management would conclude upon appointment of a liquidator under these circumstances.
Proposed Sections 15, 15A, and 15B
6.53 The need for the statutory manager to be able to act with certainty has been discussed. Provision is therefore made in this proposed subdivision to remove any scope for participation by directors or external administrators in the affairs of the ADI. While a statutory manager is in control, existing directors cease to hold office, the appointment of external administrators is terminated, and no one may take their place. Similarly, legal proceedings could foul effective crisis management so the Bill provides the regulator with the discretion to suspend and prevent them. The discretion will enable APRA to allow proceedings that do not compromise the statutory manager's effective control. In any case, the court will have ultimate discretion where hardship is involved.
6.54 Because there is a risk that statutory management may, like directions, trigger conditions in contracts or agreements that would destabilise an already fragile ADI, the Bill provides that statutory management should not provide grounds for parties to deny obligations, accelerate any debt or close out any transaction.
6.55 Statutory management also involves administrative costs associated with running the enterprise. The legislation provides that these costs are a debt owed to APRA and that their repayment ranks ahead of other unsecured debts but behind deposits. The statutory manager is seen as fulfilling certain obligations to depositors that an ADI should have met but did not and a fee for that service is considered appropriate under these circumstances.
6.56 The exercise of these powers carries with it reporting requirements. The regulator must not only inform the Treasurer when such action is commenced but also annually if statutory management arrangements have been exercised in that year. Moreover, because other community interests are involved, the assumption or termination of statutory management must be notified in the Gazette. The public media may be expected to report such notices.
Proposed Division 2A - Auditors
6.57 The proposed sections 16B and 16C will enable adequate voluntary and compulsory disclosure of significant irregularities by external auditors of ADIs. These provisions may enable APRA to obtain earlier warning of potential problems with an ADI.
6.58 Auditors will be compelled to report to APRA when, in their opinion, the institution they are auditing is in financial difficulty or failed to comply with a licence condition, prudential standard, regulation, direction, provision of the Act or any other requirement which, as a result, might jeopardise the interests of depositors. The use of compulsory disclosure is necessary to ensure that APRA receives a minimum level of disclosure from external auditors on prudential matters. Moreover, external auditors will be provided with direct protection from damages (or proceedings instigated by the body corporate they are auditing) for information reported to APRA except from any loss caused by a wilful or negligent action on the auditor's part.
6.59 Auditors that fail to fulfil these compulsory reporting requirements will commit an offence under the Act with a maximum penalty of six months imprisonment. An auditor would not be liable, however, where he or she could prove that the information was immaterial, he or she was unaware of the information or had reasonable grounds for believing that no breach of the Act had occurred or that a matter did not materially prejudice the interests of depositors.
Division 3 - Non-callable deposits
Why remove Non-Callable Deposits?
6.60 Banks are required to hold one per cent of their eligible liabilities with the Reserve Bank as non-callable deposits (NCDs). The RBA pays interest half yearly to each bank based on the daily level of each bank's NCDs at a rate set, currently around five percentage points below the prevailing market rate. Significantly more funds are collected from the banks via NCDs than it costs the RBA to supervise these institutions.
6.61 NCDs are no longer serving any necessary prudential purpose. Their use as a means of imposing a financial impost on banks is not consistent with principles of regulatory neutrality.
6.62 As part of the process of recouping only the costs of consumer and prudential regulation of ADIs from that sector, NCDs will be removed and costs will be recouped under separate new levy Acts.
6.63 NCDs will be removed from a date to be determined by proclamation. This proclamation date has been given a 24 month cap from the date that this Bill is enacted, rather than the usual 6 months cap, to allow its removal to be in the context of bringing nonbank DTIs (not subject to the requirement) into the Banking Act scheme, if agreed by States and Territories.
6.64 Subsection 38A allows the Treasurer to make a declaration to bind the Commonwealth, Northern Territory and Norfolk Island in respect of a law of a State or Territory relating to a merger. This amendment will extend that power to cover the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) and is similar to those made to other pieces of Commonwealth legislation as a result of the ACT achieving self government. The amendments also extend the reach of this Part to all ADIs.
Part VI - Collection and publication of information
6.65 The changes to section51 will give the GovernorGeneral the power to make regulations about the collection and publication of specific information about ADIs and NOHCs.
6.66 Presently, the RBA has the power under section 61 to conduct investigations and report on prudential matters in relation to banks. These proposed changes will update the wording of the existing provision and extend this power to all ADIs, authorised NOHCs and, where relevant, their subsidiaries. In addition, these amendments will ensure that APRA appointed investigators receive the required level of assistance from employees of the entity being investigated.
6.67 The purpose of these changes is to extend the current 'provision of information' requirement to all ADIs, authorised NOHCs and, where relevant, their subsidiaries.
6.68 In addition, a new provision will be included to ensure that self incrimination does not prevent persons from providing to APRA the requested information, which may be necessary to protect depositors.
6.69 To balance the requirement to provide information even if it may incriminate the provider, the new provisions will also provide persons with indemnities from the use in a court proceeding of any information given by the person to APRA (use indemnity) where they invoke that privilege.
6.70 The consent of the Treasurer is necessary before an ADI can sell or dispose of its business, enter a partnership with another ADI or effect a reconstruction of the ADI. The Treasurer will be able to delegate all or any of his or her powers under section 63 to APRA, an APRA Board member, a member of APRA's staff or an officer in the Treasury.
6.71 Section 64 on the settlement of balances will be repealed as this provision is superseded by the proposed Payment Systems (Regulation) Act 1998. In addition, payment system issues will remain the responsibility of the RBA and therefore these provisions should not be retained in an Act administered by APRA.
Directed Compliance with the Act
6.72 Section 65 of the Act, amongst other things, allows the Federal Court of Australia to authorise the RBA to assume control of, and to carry on, the business of a bank under certain circumstances. This item transfers that responsibility to APRA, extends coverage to ADIs and NOHCs and provides for the same notion of control as APRA will now have for depositor protection purposes.
6.73 Under section 66, any financial business wanting to use certain financial names, namely "bank", "building society", "credit union", "credit society" or related names, will need to obtain written approval from APRA before using the name. APRA will be able to attach conditions to the use of any of these business names and these conditions may be varied by APRA at any stage.
6.74 The legislation will not describe the conditions that must be met before APRA will approve the use of a particular business word. Instead, APRA will take into account current policy with respect to these names. For example, under current policy, a bank is required to possess at least $50 million in capital and an exchange settlement account with the RBA while only mutuals are allowed to be a "credit union" or "credit society".
6.75 Approval to use certain business names may be given for a range of persons or a particular person.
6.76 Only financial businesses authorised to carry on banking business under subsection 9(3) will be able to use the expression "authorised deposittaking institution" or "ADI" under section66A. These institutions will not require approval from APRA.
6.77 Banks are often called upon to release funds prior to a grant of probate or letters of administration in order to meet the immediate needs of the executor, next of kin, or other relevant persons in relation to funeral and probate expenses.
6.78 These proposed amendments will provide protection to banks and other DTIs from legal action, in the event of an error, where payments of up to $15,000 are made from deceased customers' accounts before the granting of probate or the provision of letters of administration, or where the person dies intestate. These amendments will offer some protection to ADIs similar to that already given to credit unions, building societies and life insurance companies.
6.79 The new table of offences will preserve existing offences and their associated penalty levels and add additional offences for the new provisions elsewhere in the Act. The table contains the maximum penalty for a person convicted of an offence. For corporations, the maximum penalty is five times the maximum applicable to an individual convicted of the same offence.
Compensation for Acquisition of Property
6.80 This proposed provision ensures that the Act is not in contravention of section51(xxxi) of the Constitution which requires any acquisition of property or removal of property rights to be on just terms. If an acquisition is not on just terms, the affected person may apply for compensation from the Commonwealth. There is, however, no expectation that the operation of the Act will lead to an acquisition of property other than on just terms.
Constitutional Issues under the Act
6.81 The proposed section 69F will assist a court in determining the valid operation of the provisions relating to NOHCs and subsidiaries of ADIs and NOHCs under the Constitution.
6.82 The proposed section 70A will be similar to that currently contained in the Reserve Bank Act 1959. It will ensure that employees of APRA, administrators, statutory managers, auditors etc are indemnified for any actions connected with carrying out their functions under the Banking Act or any directions given under the Act. A global indemnity item for APRA employees, APRA Board members and executives will be contained in the proposed Australian Prudential Regulation Authority Act 1998.
Schedules to the Banking Act 1959
6.83 Schedule 1 is being repealed and Schedule 3 is being renumbered as Schedule1.
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