Royal Australasian College of Surgeons v Federal Commissioner of Taxation
68 CLR 436(Judgment by: McTiernan J)
Royal Australasian College of Surgeons
v Federal Commissioner of Taxation
Judges:
Latham CJ
Rich J
Starke J
McTiernan JWilliams J
Subject References:
Taxation and revenue
Income tax
Assessment
Exemptions for scientific institutions
Legislative References:
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 No 27 - s 23(e)
Judgment date: 5 November 1943
Melbourne
Judgment by:
McTiernan J
I agree that the question should be answered: Yes.
The appellant claims that its income derived during the accounting period 1st February 1939 to 31st January 1940 was the income of a scientific or charitable institution within the meaning of s. 23 (e) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936-1941 and is therefore exempt from taxation. The appellant also claims that it is a charitable institution for the reason that it is a scientific institution, but on no other ground. It is to be observed that in the Institution of Civil Engineers Case [F20] , Romer L.J. said: "That the promotion of science is a charitable object is not disputed." In the first place, therefore, the appellant claims that it is a scientific institution. The ground of this claim is that the object of the association is the promotion of the science of surgery. The claim is resisted on the ground that another object of the association relates to the practice of surgery as an art, and the association is therefore not substantially a scientific institution. It is not necessary, to satisfy the section, that the object of the association should be exclusively scientific. But it is necessary that the promotion of the science of surgery should be its main object (Forrest's Case [F21] ; In re Royal College of Surgeons of England [F22] ; Institution of Civil Engineers v Inland Revenue Commissioners [F23] ; Inland Revenue Commissioners v Aberdeen Medico-Chirurgical Society [F24] ). It is not possible from the statement of the objects in the memorandum of the appellant to draw any distinction such as is made in the cases last mentioned between the objects for which the appellant was instituted. The only distinction which is apparent from the terms of its memorandum is that some of its objects could be regarded as being ancillary to the scientific and professional objects of the appellant rather than as principal objects in themselves. The members of the association might have devoted their corporate endeavours either to its scientific objects, the promotion of the science of surgery, or to its professional objects, the maintenance of proper standards for the practice of surgery, or to both of these objects. But the question whether the appellant fulfils the description of a scientific institution depends less upon the fact that it can direct its efforts to all these objects than what it does in pursuit of each of them. In the case stated the principal activities of the association are set out. It shows that the activities of the appellant were mainly devoted to the promotion of the science of surgery. That was the primary and dominant object of the activities carried on by it. The facts do not show more than that its activities were directed to the promotion of surgery merely as an art and to the protection of the professional interests of surgeons, as subordinate and merely concomitant objects. The fact that its memorandum includes these objects does not destroy the exemption to which the appellant is entitled by reason of its activities in the promotion of the science of surgery.