House of Representatives

Explanatory Memorandum

(Circulated by authority of the Minister for Agriculture, the Hon. Barnaby Joyce MP)

Human Rights Compatibility Statement

Prepared in accordance with Part 3 of the Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011.

Biosecurity (Consequential Amendments and Transitional Provisions) Bill 2014

This Bill is compatible with the human rights and freedoms recognised or declared in the international instruments listed in section 3 of the Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011.

Overview of the Bill

The Biosecurity (Consequential Amendments and Transitional Provisions) Bill 2014 (the Bill) is a companion bill to the Biosecurity Act which provides a modern regulatory tool aimed at better managing biosecurity risks in current and future trading environments.

The purpose of this Bill is to:

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repeal the Quarantine Act 1908 (the Quarantine Act)

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repeal the Quarantine Charges (Collection) Act 2014 (the Collection Act)

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make consequential amendments to Acts that refer to the Quarantine Act, replacing redundant terminology such as 'quarantine' with more appropriate terminology, amongst other consequential amendments, and

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provide for certain matters managed under the Quarantine Act to transition to being managed under the Biosecurity Act.

General protections and principles affecting decisions

A number of Quarantine Act directions or requirements will transition to a direction or requirement given under the Biosecurity Act. To ensure that the decision to exercise certain powers under the Biosecurity Act is reasonable and proportionate to achieve a legitimate objective, section 32 provides a range of principles that a biosecurity official must be satisfied of when making certain decisions, including:

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that exercising the power is likely to be effective in, or to contribute to, achieving the purpose for which the power is to be exercised

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that exercising the power is appropriate and adapted to achieve that purpose

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that the manner in which the power is to be exercised is no more restrictive or intrusive than is required in the circumstances

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if the power is to be exercised in relation to an individual - that the power is no more restrictive or intrusive than is required in the circumstances, and

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if the power is to be exercised during a period - that the period is only as long as is necessary.

Decisions to which these principles apply are listed under section 32 of the Biosecurity Act.

While the directions or requirements given under the Quarantine Act will transition to a direction or requirement given under the Biosecurity Act, the principles under section 32 of the Biosecurity Act would not have been considered in making these initial directions or requirements. However the principles will have ongoing application after the commencement of the Biosecurity Act and biosecurity officials will need to consider these principles when exercising powers after commencement day.

In addition, the normal principles of administrative law also apply to the exercise of powers in sections to which the principles under section 32 of the Biosecurity Act apply, such as reasonableness, proportionality and natural justice - as they do to currently to the Quarantine Act and the Biosecurity Act as a whole (except where express limitations apply, such as in Chapter 8 which deals with emergencies.

List of human rights

List of rights engaged:

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Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) - right to freedom of movement

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Article 14(2) of the ICCPR - right to the presumption of innocence

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Article 14(3) 0f the ICCPR - right to be free from self-incrimination

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Article 17 of the ICCPR - right to protection from arbitrary interference with privacy, and

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Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR ) - right to health.

Right to freedom of movement

The right to freedom of movement under Article 12 of the ICCPR includes the right to move freely within a country for those who are lawfully within the country, the right to leave any country and the right to enter a country of which you are a citizen. The right may be limited in certain circumstances, including where the limitation is justified on any of the following grounds: to protect national security, public order, public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others. The limitation must be necessary and proportionate to protect the purpose for which it is imposed, and should be as least intrusive as possible to achieve the desired result.

Item 32 of Schedule 4 sets out the circumstances when a conveyance being managed under the Quarantine Act is taken to be subject to biosecurity control under subsection 191(2) of the Biosecurity Act with the effect that provisions in Chapter 4 of the Biosecurity Act apply that may impact on the right to freedom of movement.

Conveyances will become subject to biosecurity control on commencement day if:

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the conveyance had entered Australian territory before the commencement day during a flight or voyage that commenced outside Australian territory, or

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the conveyance was subject to quarantine (under any provision of the Quarantine Act) immediately before commencement day.

The following items involving a transition from a direction under the Quarantine Act to the Biosecurity Act may impact the right to freedom of movement:

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Item 33 of Schedule 4 provides that a biosecurity officer may give a direction to move an exposed conveyance, in certain circumstances, under subsection 207(2) of the Biosecurity Act

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Item 36 of Schedule 4 provides that a requirement given to a master of a vessel in relation to the movement of a vessel under section 25 may transition to a direction given under subparagraph 202(1)(a)(ii) of the Biosecurity Act

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Item 39 of Schedule 4 provides that a movement direction given to a person in charge of a conveyance under subsections 36(1), (2), 74D(1) or 78B(1) of the Quarantine Act in some circumstances may be treated as a direction under paragraph 206(2)(a) of the Biosecurity Act, and

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Subitem 40(2) of Schedule 4 provides that a biosecurity officer is taken as giving a person in charge of a conveyance a direction under subparagraph 202(1)(a)(iii) of the Biosecurity Act if the conveyance is in quarantine immediately before the commencement of the Biosecurity Act.

These provisions are necessary for the legitimate objective of managing biosecurity risks associated with conveyances (and goods and people on board) by ensuring they arrive at appropriate places, and if necessary, to manage unacceptable risks, can be prevented from arriving at places. These provisions may operate to limit the right to free movement of passengers on board a conveyance to which the direction or requirement relates, as although they are not required to remain on board the conveyance, they may not be able to disembark (for example if the aircraft is in flight when a direction is given)

These provisions only apply to conveyances that are subject to biosecurity control.

Summary:

The right to freedom of movement under Article 12 of the ICCPR may be permissibly limited in these instances because these sections are necessary for the protection of public health, and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others (for example, the right to an adequate standard of living, including food, water and housing under Article 11(1) of the ICESCR).

Right to the presumption of innocence (reverse burden provisions)

Article 14(2) of the ICCPR states that everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law. The right to presumption of innocence is also a fundamental common law principle.

Laws which shift the burden of proof to a defendant, commonly known as 'reverse burden provisions', can be considered a limitation of the presumption of innocence. This is because a defendant's failure to discharge a burden of proof or prove an absence of fault may permit their conviction despite reasonable doubt as to their guilt. This includes where an evidential or legal burden of proof is placed on a defendant or where strict liability is applied to an offence (an explanation of strict liability follows below).

When a defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to an exception, it means that the defendant bears the burden of adducing or pointing to evidence that suggests a reasonable possibility that the exception has been met. That is, the defendant must produce or point to evidence that suggests a reasonable possibility that an exception applies in their particular case. It is then up to the prosecution to establish that this exception does not apply.

Reverse burden offences will not necessarily be inconsistent with the presumption of innocence provided that the reverse burden pursues a legitimate objective and is reasonable, necessary and proportionate to achieving that objective. Whether a reverse burden provision impermissibly limits the right to the presumption of innocence will depend on the circumstances of the case and the particular justification for the reverse burden.

The Australian Government Guide to Framing Commonwealth Offences Infringement Notices and Enforcement Powers (the Guide) notes that placing the burden of proof on the defendant should be limited to where the matter is peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant and where it is significantly more difficult and costly for the prosecution to disprove than for the defendant to establish the matter. The Guide also notes that a reverse burden provision is more readily justified if:

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the matter in question is not central to the question of culpability for the offence

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the penalties are at the lower end of the scale, and

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the conduct proscribed by the offence poses a grave danger to public health or safety.

An additional factor to consider is whether the offences only impose an evidential burden (as the prosecution must still disprove the matters beyond reasonable doubt if the defendant discharges the evidential burden).

The Bill may operate to limit the right to be presumed innocent through imposing an evidential burden on the defendant in relation to a range of matters. Sections in which an evidential burden is imposed on the defendant, and where strict liability applies, are outlined below. Chapter 4 of the Guide was considered in the development of these sections and is considered consistent with the proposed reverse burden of proof. Agreement of the Attorney-General was also received in relation to these sections.

Item 10 of Schedule 4 continues the offence provisions in subsection 29(5) of the Quarantine Act which provides that a master of a vessel is guilty of an offence if he or she contravenes a condition of a permission granted to remove goods from a vessel or installation under subsections 29(4) and 29A(3) and the offence and exception in subsections 29A(4) and (4A).

The offence and exception in subsections 29A(4) and (4A) of the Quarantine Act will continue to apply after commencement day in relation to any conditions made on the permission. If a condition of the permission is contravened the master of the vessel or installation may commit an offence. The maximum penalty for each offence is two years imprisonment if the elements of a fault-based offence are established.

Subsection 29A(4A) provides for an exception to the offence if the removal is made with the written permission of a quarantine officer but the person charged with the offence bears the evidential burden. Placing the evidential burden on the defendant is reasonable in the circumstances as the fact of whether there is permission should be readily within the person's knowledge and the penalties are at the lower end of the scale. This provision is to ensure the legitimate objective that biosecurity risk is managed.

Item 45 of Schedule 4 continues subsection 78C(2) of the Quarantine Act which provides that a person may be guilty of an offence for moving a vessel that may be in an insanitary condition or carrying pests or diseases. If the vessel or good is moved from the specified place a person may commit an offence. The maximum penalty for this offence is two years imprisonment if the elements of a fault-based offence are established.

The offence provision will not apply if a person has permission under paragraph 78C(2)(b) of the Quarantine Act but he or she bears the evidential burden of proving the defence. Placing the evidential burden on the defendant is reasonable in the circumstances as the fact of whether there is permission should be readily within the person's knowledge and the penalties are at the lower end of the scale. This provision is necessary to ensure that a vessel that may pose to public health is not moved.

Subitem 12(2) of Schedule 4 modifies section 149 of the Biosecurity Act to provide that a person who receives or has in his or her possession goods that were unloaded from an aircraft or vessel in contravention of section 44 of the Quarantine Act is liable to a civil penalty. Section 149 of the Biosecurity Act has exceptions where the defendant bears the evidential burden of proving the exception.

It is necessary that the defendant bears the evidential burden in this instance in order to achieve the legitimate objective of ensuring the biosecurity risk associated with the goods is managed. This is reasonable and proportionate to the legitimate objective because the defendant will have the information or knowledge that is evidence of the exception.

Summary

These provisions are compatible with Article 14(2) of the ICCPR as they:

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impose an evidential, rather than legal, burden on the defendant, and

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the burden relates to facts which are readily within the person's knowledge, and

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the offences are necessary, reasonable and proportionate to the legitimate objective of protecting Australia's human, plant and animal health, the environment and economy.

Right to the presumption of innocence (strict liability provisions)

Article 14(2) of the ICCPR states that everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law. The right to presumption of innocence is also a fundamental common law principle.

When 'strict liability' applies to an offence, the prosecution is only required to prove the physical elements of an offence, they are not required to prove fault elements, in order for the defendant to be found guilty. The defence of honest and reasonable mistake of fact is available to the defendant (see section 9..2 of the Criminal Code). Strict liability is used in circumstances where there is public interest in ensuring that regulatory schemes are observed and it can reasonably be expected that the person was aware of their duties and obligations. Strict liability offences can be considered a limitation of the presumption of innocence because the defendant can be found guilty without the prosecution being required to prove fault.

Strict liability offences will not necessarily be inconsistent with the presumption of innocence provided that removal of the presumption of innocence pursues a legitimate objective and is reasonable, necessary and proportionate to achieving that objective. Whether a strict liability provision impermissibly limits the right to the presumption of innocence will depend on the circumstances of the case, and the particular justification for an offence being a strict liability offence.

Item 59 of Schedule 4 continues subsection 2B(4) of the Quarantine Act which provides that it is an offence to fail to comply with a direction given by the Agriculture or Health Ministers under subsection 2B(2) of the Quarantine Act, to control and eradicate an epidemic by quarantine measures or measures incidental to quarantine. The maximum penalty for contravening a direction is ten years imprisonment if the elements of a fault-based offence are established.

Strict liability applies to only one element of the offence being the physical element of the circumstance that the direction given to the person was made under subsection 2B(4) of the Quarantine Act. The defence of honest and reasonable mistake is available under the Criminal Code. Placing strict liability on the defendant is reasonable in the circumstances as this provision is dealing with conduct that poses a grave danger to human, plant and animal health, local industries, the economy and the environment.

Section 2B was added to the Quarantine Act by the Quarantine Amendment Act 2002 and was found by the Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills to be consistent with its Sixth Report of 2002: The Application of Absolute and Strict Liability Offences in Commonwealth Legislation (First Report of 2003, 5 February 2003).

Right to be free from self-incrimination

Article 14(3)(g) of the ICCPR protects the right of an individual to be free from self-incrimination in the determination of a criminal charge by providing that a person may not be compelled to testify against him or herself or confess guilt. The common law also recognises the privilege against self-incrimination which applies unless expressly or impliedly overridden by statute. The privilege against self-incrimination may be subject to permissible limits. Any limitations must be for a legitimate objective, and be reasonable, necessary and proportionate to that objective.

Subitem 5(2) of Schedule 4 provides that a notice under subsection 16AC(1) of the Quarantine Act in relation to a proposed importation of goods into Australia, the Cocos Islands or Christmas island is treated as if it has been given under subsection 120(1) of the Biosecurity Act, if the importation of goods has not occurred before commencement of the Biosecurity Act.

Item 6 of Schedule 4 provides that a notice under subsection 16AD(1) of the Quarantine Act requiring a person to give information about particular goods immediately in force before the commencement of the Biosecurity Act is treated as if it had been made under subsection 126(1) of the Biosecurity Act after commencement.

Subitem 37(4) and subitem 38(4) of Schedule 4, dealing with pre-arrival reporting that occurred under the Quarantine Act for vessels and aircraft respectively, provide that section 194 of the Biosecurity Act will apply, requiring additional or corrected information after commencement of the Biosecurity Act where the pre-arrival reporting was incomplete or incorrect.

Section 635 of the Biosecurity Act removes the privilege against self-incrimination for information provided under sections 120, 126 and 194. Removing the privilege in these circumstances is necessary to achieve the legitimate objective of effective assessment and management of biosecurity risks to human health, plant and animal health, the environment, and the economy of Australia posed by pests and diseases.

Upholding the privilege in relation to individuals who have information regarding a potential biosecurity risk could have significant consequences such as reduced agriculture, fisheries or forestry productivity, serious environmental damage or increased costs associated with controlling pests and diseases. A disease outbreak (such as foot and mouth disease) has the potential to cause significant and long term damage to Australian industries and the reputation of Australia overseas.

Whilst in some cases it may be feasible to obtain information by other means (for example, warrants), the additional time taken to obtain such information may significantly increase the risk of a disease or pest entering, establishing or spreading to Australia, or within Australian territory. Without these limitations, the Commonwealth's ability to manage biosecurity risks through a responsive, evidence-led approach will be significantly reduced. Removal of the privilege ensures that the assessment of biosecurity risk and application of response measures can occur as urgently as necessary and reflects the magnitude of the potential impacts biosecurity risks pose to Australia.

These limitations are reasonable and proportionate to achieving the legitimate objective of managing biosecurity risk and, as section 635 of the Biosecurity Act provides, self-incriminatory disclosures cannot be used against the person making the disclosure either directly in court (use immunity) or indirectly to gather other evidence against the person (derivative use immunity). The only exception to the use and derivative use immunity are in relation to proceedings arising out of sections 137.1 and 137.2 of the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) in relation to false and misleading information and documents.

Summary

The limitations on the right to be free from self incrimination under Article 14(3)(g)of the ICCPR are permissible as protections apply to ensure the exercise of these powers is reasonable and proportionate to achieving the legitimate objective, and adequate safeguards apply to prevent the risk of abuse or arbitrary exercise of discretion.

Right to protection from arbitrary interference with privacy

Article 17 of the ICCPR protects the right to be free from arbitrary or unlawful interference with an individual's privacy family, home or correspondence. This right may be subject to permissible limitations where those limitations are provided by law and are non-arbitrary. In order for limitations not to be arbitrary, they must seek to achieve a legitimate objective and be reasonable, necessary and proportionate to this purpose.

Item 6 of Schedule 4 provides that a notice under subsection 16AD(1) requiring a person to give information about particular goods immediately in force before the commencement of the Biosecurity Act, is treated as if it had been made under subsection 126(1) of the Biosecurity Act after commencement.

Subitem 37(4) and subitem 38(4) of Schedule 4, dealing with pre-arrival reporting for vessels and aircraft under the Quarantine Act respectively, provide that section 194 of the Biosecurity Act may apply in some circumstances to require additional or corrected information after the commencement of the Biosecurity Act where the pre-arrival reporting was incomplete or incorrect. Reporting and notification obligations under section 194 of the Biosecurity Act apply only in particular circumstances, and the persons required to provide the information (such as the owner or operator of the aircraft or vessel) can be reasonably expected to be aware of these obligations.

By exercising powers to ask questions or requiring persons to provide documents, notices or reports in the exercise of these powers, a biosecurity officer may incidentally require the provision of personal information. These provisions are necessary for the legitimate objective of assessing the level of biosecurity risk associated with goods or conveyances in, or intending to enter, Australian territory.

Biosecurity officers need access to this information in order to properly assess the level of biosecurity risk and to be able to manage any biosecurity risks appropriately. However, the collection, use, storage and sharing of personal information may operate to limit the right to privacy.

Part 2 of Chapter 11 of the Biosecurity Act includes a range of protections relating to the collection, storage and disclosure of protected information. Section 580 provides that only certain persons may collect, disclose, or use information, and that they may only do so for a permissible purpose (a purpose which promotes the objects of the Act). Section 585 also provides an offence for improper collection or use of protected information.

Item 61 of Schedule 4 applies Parts 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 and Divisions 4 and 6 of part 10 of Chapter 9 of the Biosecurity Act which provide for compliance and enforcement powers, including powers to be drawn from the Regulatory Powers (Standard Provisions) Act 2014 (the Regulatory Powers Act). Section 511 of Chapter 9, and sections 18 and 48 of the Regulatory Powers Act, provide for powers to enter premises, which enables a number of monitoring and investigation powers to be exercised on those premises.

These powers include the ability to search the premises, inspect documents or things on the premises, take extracts or copies of documents, and sample anything on the premises (sections 19 and 49 of the Regulatory Powers Act and subsections 482(2) and 485(2) of the Biosecurity Act).

Additional powers available include the powers to seize evidence (sections 49 and 52 of the Regulatory Powers Act) and ask questions and seek production of documents (sections 24 and 54 of the Regulatory Powers Act).

These powers are necessary for the legitimate objective of ensuring that relevant information required under the Act, and information required to assess compliance with the Act, is accessible and available to biosecurity officials when required. However, these sections may operate to limit the right to privacy as they enable entry to premises that may be a person's residence as well as inspection, copying and sampling of potentially personal information.

Entry to premises is only allowed with consent or a warrant, and a warrant to enter premises may only be granted for the purposes of:

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determining whether the Act has been, or is being, complied with

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determining whether information supplied for the purposes of the Act is correct, or

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there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that there may be evidential material on the premises.

The threshold tests that are laid out above are designed to ensure that any interference with the right to privacy is lawful and is only to ensure compliance with the Act and manage biosecurity risks.

A number of protections are in place to ensure that any interference with the right to privacy is lawful and protect individuals' rights including:

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obligations on biosecurity enforcement officers when entering with consent or under warrant, which include the requirement that consent of the occupier is only to be given voluntarily; and where entry is with a warrant, the requirement that an announcement must be made before entry and details of the warrant given to the occupier (section 25 to 28, 55 to 58 of the Regulatory Powers Act, and sections 500 to 504 of the Biosecurity Act), and

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the limitations on use of force against things (subsections 482(8) and 485(8) and section 505 of the Biosecurity Act).

Entry to premises without a warrant is only provided for in specific circumstances listed in section 513, which include:

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entering landing places or ports for the purposes of performing function or exercising powers under the Act (section 252(2)), and

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monitoring or searching premises at which biosecurity activities are carried out by a biosecurity industry participant that is covered by an approved arrangement, or at a first point of entry (sections 511 and 512).

Protections apply in these circumstances including the requirement for announcement before entry (section 514), and rights of the appropriate person for the premises (as defined under section 9) to observe the exercise of powers while on the premises (section 516).

Stakeholders affected by section 252(2) will be informed of this power through the public release of a determination by the Director of Biosecurity or the Director of Human Biosecurity establishing a place to be a first point of entry. Additionally, entry to premises under this section is only allowed if the biosecurity official is satisfied of the principles affecting the decision to exercise certain powers (section 32).

Entry to premises without a warrant or consent is provided for in sections 511 and 512, as the relevant premises relate to an approved arrangement, where consent to entry is implied by the voluntary nature of the arrangement (and will be a condition of the approved arrangement). Additionally, the premises may only be entered during business hours. Entry under section 512 is limited to situations where a biosecurity officer has reasonable grounds for suspecting that there may be evidential material on the premises.

The above sections involving the collection, use and storage of personal information are also subject to the confidentiality of information sections (Part 2 of Chapter 11). These limit the circumstances and purposes for which personal information obtained in accordance with the Act can be recorded, disclosed or used (for example, contacting the applicant regarding the application). Additionally, the powers contained in these sections are required to be exercised in compliance with the Privacy Act 1988, which means that there are additional protections on the use and storage of personal information collected under these sections.

Summary

These limitations of the right to protection from arbitrary interference with privacy under Article 17 of the ICCPR are permissible as tests and protections apply to ensure the exercise of these powers is reasonable and proportionate to achieving the legitimate objective, and adequate safeguards apply to prevent the risk of abuse or arbitrary exercise of discretion.

Right to health

Article 12 of the ICESCR promotes the right of all individuals to enjoy the highest attainable standards of physical and mental health. This includes the application of measures for the prevention, treatment, and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other diseases (Article 12(2)).

The United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has stated in General Comment 14 (2000) that health is a 'fundamental human right indispensable for the exercise of other human rights', and that the right to health is not to be understood as the right to be healthy, but rather entails a right to a system of health protection which provides equality of opportunity for people to enjoy the highest attainable level of health.

Article 4 of the ICESCR provides that countries may subject economic, social and cultural rights (such as the right to health) only to such limitations 'as are determined by law only in so far as this may be compatible with the nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society.' The United Nations Committee has stated that such limitations must be proportionate, and must be the least restrictive alternative where several types of limitations are available, and that even where such limitations are permitted, they should be of limited duration and be subject to review.

The Bill operates to transition certain directions given in relation to conveyances under the Quarantine Act to the Biosecurity Act, with the effect that provisions in Chapter 4 of the Biosecurity Act that may limit the right to health may apply.

These provisions are necessary to achieve the legitimate objective of preventing harm to human, animal or plant health as they enable the assessment and management of biosecurity risks related to conveyances. In managing biosecurity risks, the Bill promotes the right to health for the Australian community.

However, these provisions may also operate to limit the right to health as they may affect passengers' access to health facilities and goods, including essential medications and services, by preventing them from disembarking from a conveyance that is subject to a direction (for example, to stay out of a port). This is unlikely to occur in practice, as individuals are not required to remain on board a vessel that is subject to a direction.

The relevant powers to give directions are in subitems 33(4) and items 36, 39 and 40 of Schedule 4.

Subitem 33(4) of Schedule 4 provides that a biosecurity officer may give a direction to move an exposed conveyance under subsection 207(2) of the Biosecurity Act where a conveyance is in Australian territory, on or after commencement day, notwithstanding that under subitem 33(3) of Schedule 4 the biosecurity officer has no power under subsection 206(2) of the Biosecurity Act in relation to the conveyance.

Item 36 of Schedule 4 provides a requirement given to a master of a vessel in relation to the movement of a vessel under section 25 of the Quarantine Act may transition to a direction given under subparagraph 202(1)(a)(ii) of the Biosecurity Act.

Item 39 of Schedule 4 provides that a movement direction given to a person in charge of a conveyance under subsections 36(1), (2), 74D(1) or 78B(1) of the Quarantine Act in some circumstances may be treated as a direction under paragraph 206(2)(a) of the Biosecurity Act.

Item subitem 40(2) of Schedule 4 provides that a biosecurity officer is taken as giving a person in charge of a conveyance a direction under subparagraph 202(1)(a)(iii) of the Biosecurity Act if the conveyance is in quarantine immediately before the commencement of the Biosecurity Act.

Summary

This Bill represents a positive measure to protect the right to health under Article12 of the ICESCR. Where it limits this right, the limitations are permissible as tests and protections apply to ensure the exercise of these powers is reasonable and proportionate to achieving the legitimate objective, and adequate safeguards apply to prevent the risk of abuse or arbitrary exercise of discretion.

Conclusion

This Bill is compatible with the human rights outlined above because it advances the protection of human rights, and to the extent that it may operate to limit these rights, the limitations are reasonable, necessary and proportionate to achieve legitimate objectives.

Minister for Agriculture, the Hon. Barnaby Joyce MP