House of Representatives

Explanatory Memorandum

(Circulated by authority of the Treasurer, the Hon Scott Morrison MP)

Chapter 2 - Regulation impact statement

WHAT IS THE PROBLEM THAT NEEDS TO BE ADDRESSED?

2.1 Companies want greater access to equity financing without having to become a public company. Extending crowd-sourced equity funding (CSF) to proprietary companies will facilitate this. Similarly, investors want to be able to invest in start-up and early stage businesses but cannot do so easily under currently regulatory arrangements, which prohibit proprietary companies from raising capital from the general public.

REGULATORY BARRIERS TO CSF FOR PROPRIETARY COMPANIES

2.2 CSF is an innovative type of online fundraising that allows a large number of individuals to make small financial contributions towards a company, in exchange for an equity stake in the company. Development of a CSF market in Australia will provide an additional funding option for entrepreneurs to assist in the growth of their business, and provide additional investment options for people wishing to invest in start-ups and small businesses.

2.3 The use of CSF in Australia is currently limited by a range of regulatory impediments. These include governance and reporting requirements for companies, equity fundraising rules, and requirements for financial intermediaries as set out in the Corporations Act 2001 ('Corporations Act').

2.4 The Government has already legislated a CSF framework for public companies, including as a part of its response to the Financial System Inquiry and in the National Innovation and Science Agenda. It will commence on 29 September 2017.

2.5 Under this framework, proprietary companies are not eligible to use CSF. This is because proprietary companies are intended to be closely-held, with shareholders who have a close connection to management. The regulatory framework for proprietary companies reflects this intent through reduced reporting and governance obligations compared to public companies, balanced with limitations on their fundraising activities. The regulatory framework for proprietary companies is described in more detail in the Appendix.

2.6 However, most small and early-stage companies operate as proprietary companies. Some of these proprietary companies that may be interested in using CSF may be unwilling or unable to convert to a public company form to access the Government's CSF framework for public companies, due to the higher regulatory obligations imposed on public companies. Some of these companies also wish to remain proprietary companies as this company form is more compatible with their future plans such as exit via acquisition by another company that may have a preference for proprietary companies.

THE NEED TO IMPROVE ACCESS TO FINANCE FOR SMALL AND INNOVATIVE BUSINESSES

2.7 Access to finance is crucial for innovative new businesses, particularly those that are creating a new product or service or significantly improving an existing product or service. Innovative developments often require costly research and development in the early stages of a business at a time when there may be little or no revenue flowing in.

2.8 The Government has implemented a number of policies to address the challenges faced by small businesses, including improving access to affordable finance. A number of these measures were included in the Growing Small Business and Jobs package announced in the 2015-16 Budget.

2.9 Difficulties in accessing debt finance can arise as a result of gaps in information between lenders and borrowers. As the provision of debt finance requires an assessment of a business' ability to service the debt, small businesses and start-ups that do not have adequate evidence of past performance or prospects for success can face particular challenges accessing credit. Lenders may not be willing to bear the cost of obtaining detailed credit-related information to assess the level of risk involved in lending to a smaller business. Some businesses may also struggle to obtain finance from lenders due to insufficient collateral being offered in the event of default.

2.10 However where a bank loan can be obtained, it may not be well suited to the business. Bank loans involve regular repayments starting almost immediately, and failure to meet these payments risks default of the loan. In reality the cash flows of small businesses, particularly start ups, can be volatile, making it difficult to meet such regular repayments.

2.11 Equity finance is therefore a more suitable option than debt for some businesses. Unlike debt finance, equity does not require immediate repayments and equity investors generally accept that returns are contingent on profits. A CSF framework will improve access to equity financing for eligible companies.

WHY IS GOVERNMENT ACTION NEEDED?

2.12 The main barriers to the use of CSF by proprietary companies are regulatory in nature.

2.13 The Government has already introduced a CSF framework for public companies. Proprietary companies are not eligible to use this framework as they would continue to be prohibited from making equity offers requiring disclosure. Other elements of corporate law, such as the limitation for proprietary companies of 50 non-employee shareholders, also limit the usefulness of CSF for these companies.

2.14 There are currently a small number of operators of online platforms offering investment in Australian start-ups, including proprietary companies. These operators may continue to offer their services to proprietary companies if the CSF framework for public companies is implemented. However, under current legislation offers to invest in proprietary companies, including by online platform operators, can only be made to a limited set of investors, such as wholesale investors or those who fall within the small scale personal offer exemption.

2.15 While this environment may be suitable for some proprietary companies and investors, it does not comprehensively address the barriers to CSF for proprietary companies.

2.16 A consistent theme resulting from the stakeholder consultation process was that many proprietary companies will not access the CSF public company framework because:

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early-stage companies usually do not have the resources to comply with the regulatory burden (both perceived and real) of operating as a public company. Despite the temporary governance and reporting concessions granted under the public company framework, proprietary companies that convert under the framework must:

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satisfy significantly higher financial reporting requirements (if a small proprietary company);

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implement higher governance standards such as appointing a minimum three directors and must appoint a secretary;

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hold an AGM, comply with all financial reporting requirements and appoint an auditor (regardless of the amount a company raises) after the concessions lapse.

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conversion may disrupt the normal lifecycle of the proprietary companies, as proprietary companies usually only convert when they intend to undertake an initial public offer. Further, future exit options may be more limited, as proprietary companies are generally a more attractive target for sophisticated bidders in trade sales (for example venture capital) due to the light regulatory nature of proprietary companies and the complexities of converting a public company back to a proprietary company;

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proprietary companies may be more suitable for early-stage high-growth companies where founders do not intend to cede significant control to shareholders (for example there is no statutory right for shareholders of a proprietary company to remove a director while public company shareholders have such a right);

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extensive disclosure obligations may not be appropriate for early-stage companies that have a business model heavily dependent on a technology or intellectual property which needs to be kept confidential.

2.17 More generally, stakeholder feedback suggested that many companies would only access CSF to supplement existing fundraising and financing mechanisms, and CSF would not be the primary method of raising funds. Following this, many proprietary companies may decide against converting on the basis that the benefits of accessing CSF do not outweigh the burden of operating as a public company. This leaves the Government open to the risk that very few companies will use CSF if the only framework available is the public company legislation.

IMPLEMENTATION OPTIONS

2.18 There are three main stakeholder groups with an interest in the extension of the CSF framework to proprietary companies:

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Companies seeking to raise funds stand to benefit from the extension of the CSF framework. This is particularly the case for innovative firms and start-ups, which typically have more difficulty obtaining bank debt finance than established firms, but existing equity fundraising is prohibitively expensive. These companies would be issuers of CSF offerings.

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As noted above, under the current CSF legislation, only public companies with up to $25 million gross assets and annual turnover will be eligible to raise up to $5 million of equity per 12-month period via CSF with reduced disclosure requirements.

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Individuals seeking new opportunities to invest stand to benefit from the increased range of financial products that CSF would present, and the inclusion of proprietary companies would expand the number and diversity of investment opportunities. These individuals would be able to diversify the range of products they invest in, and would be investors in CSF offerings.

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Under the CSF legislation, investors have certain protections such as a disclosure document and risk warning, with additional protections for retail investors such as an investment cap of $10,000 per issuer per 12-month period, a cooling off period of five days and signature of a risk acknowledgement statement.

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A number of organisations are establishing a platform that allows issuers to list their CSF offerings, bringing together issuers and potential investors. These organisations will operate as intermediaries in the CSF market. Expanding eligibility to proprietary companies would increase the number of issuers, and assist platforms with reaching 'critical mass'.

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Under the CSF legislation, intermediaries will be be licensed and have obligations such as undertaking certain due diligence on CSF issuers and providing a communications facility for investors to communicate with the issuer.

OPTION 1: NO CHANGE

2.19 Under Option 1, there would be no change to the current requirements under the Corporations Act for proprietary companies, nor any change to the legislated CSF framework for public companies. CSF

2.20 Proprietary companies would only be able to access CSF if they transition to public companies. Companies that transition will be given certain exemptions from the more costly and time consuming governance and reporting requirements, including:

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relief from the requirement to hold an annual general meeting;

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the option to provide financial reports to members in an online format only; and

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no requirement to appoint an auditor unless the company has raised more than $1 million.

OPTION 2: EXTEND CSF TO PROPRIETARY COMPANIES WITHOUT ADDITIONAL INVESTOR PROTECTIONS

2.21 Option 2 would allow proprietary companies to access CSF without converting to a public company or complying with any additional governance and reporting requirements.

2.22 Consistent with the public company framework, proprietary companies with less than $25 million in assets and annual turnover would be able to raise up to $5 million in any 12 month period through crowdfunding platforms. Retail investors would be able to invest up to $10,000 per company per 12 month period.

2.23 Small proprietary companies accessing CSF would continue to experience light regulation and would not be required to hold annual general meetings, prepare annual financial reports, appoint auditors or have their financial statements audited. The main corporate governance and reporting standards small proprietary companies are subject to include:

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constitution: no requirement to have a constitution (or lodge a constitution where a company adopts one). In the absence of a constitution a company is subject to the replaceable rules in the Corporations Act;

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financial reporting: must keep financial records but there is no requirement to produce financial reports unless 5% of the company's members request the company to produce such reports or ASIC directs it;

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related party transactions: not subject to the Chapter 2E restrictions and processes on related party transactions (note that there are indirect restrictions on related party transactions for proprietary companies including the application of director's duties);

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directors: a proprietary company needs only one director (and that director must ordinarily reside in Australia); and

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annual general meeting: there is no requirement for a proprietary company to hold an AGM.

2.24 There would be no requirement for these companies to convert to public companies at any stage. Please see section 3.4 for a table summarising the characteristics of proprietary companies.

2.25 To ensure that proprietary companies can use the regime, two amendments to the existing requirements of proprietary companies would be necessary:

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shareholder limit: the current proprietary shareholder limit of 50 non-employee shareholders would be amended (via section 113 of the Corporations Act) so that proprietary companies are restricted from having more than 50 non-employee or non-CSF shareholders (rather than simply 50 non-employee shareholders). This will ensure that the crowd can access CSF in proprietary companies; and

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takeover provisions: the takeover provisions in Chapter 6 of the Corporations Act will not apply to CSF proprietary companies.

OPTION 3: EXTEND CSF TO PROPRIETARY COMPANIES WITH APPROPRIATE PROTECTIONS

2.26 Option 3 would permit both public and proprietary companies to access CSF subject to meeting base level governance and reporting requirements. Proprietary companies that elect to access CSF would need to comply with higher governance and reporting obligations (compared to what they are currently subject to), while public companies would already meet these standards due to existing Corporations Act obligations.

2.27 Under Option 3, amendments would be needed to the CSF public company framework to ensure that the reporting and governance concessions extended to proprietary companies that converted to public companies for the purpose of accessing CSF are removed (although grandfathered for those companies who have already converted prior to the commencement of the extension to proprietary companies). These concessions were initially granted on the assumption that proprietary companies would not have the opportunity to access CSF under their current structure.

2.28 The preferred design characteristics of Option 3 are set out below, and fall within the following categories:

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rules around the CSF offer and intermediaries;

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structural issues;

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corporate governance obligations; and

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financial reporting obligations.

A: Rules around the CSF offer and intermediaries

2.29 To ensure consistency between the public company legislation and any proposed proprietary company framework, the rules around the CSF offer and intermediaries will be the same for both types of companies. The design of these policy features will largely mirror the content of the CSF public company Bill, including:

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eligibility: to be eligible to access CSF a company must have less than $25 million in gross assets and annual turnover, not be listed on a stock exchange and the company's principal place of business must be in Australia;

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fundraising & investor caps: a retail investor may invest a maximum $10,000 in a company over a 12 month period and a company accessing CSF may raise a maximum $5 million over a 12 month period through a CSF raise;

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initial disclosure: the regulations prescribe certain information that a prospective CSF issuer will need to disclose in the disclosure document. Companies may need to include some additional generic disclosures around company type, capital structure and any other rights or conditions associated with shares (such as tag and drag rights). CSF

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role of the intermediary: the intermediary will have the same gatekeeper obligations with respect to both proprietary and public companies that access CSF. These include conducting certain checks on the issuer and management as well as ensuring disclosure documents are completed and clear.

B: Structural issues in relation to proprietary companies

2.30 To extend CSF to proprietary companies, various mechanical arrangements were considered to ensure that proprietary companies could functionally access the framework:

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'tagging' system: a proprietary company will be subject to the additional governance and reporting obligations once it is tagged as a CSF company. The CSF tag will be triggered as soon as the company has a CSF investor on its register and will continue until no CSF investors remain. This information will be kept by ASIC, and will be accessible by the public through ASIC's company records system. The tagging system will ensure that proprietary companies that do not elect to use CSF will not be subject to additional reporting and governance obligations;

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shareholder limit: the current proprietary shareholder limit of 50 non-employee shareholders will be amended (via section 113 of the Corporations Act) so that proprietary companies are restricted from having more than 50 non-employee or non-CSF shareholders (rather than simply 50 non-employee shareholders). Unless shares of the company have been traded on a secondary market, off-market transfers from CSF shareholders to new shareholders will not count towards the cap. This will ensure that the crowd can access CSF in proprietary companies and ensure that the cap does not unduly constrain liquidity;

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no requirement to convert to a public company: there will be no requirement for a proprietary company to convert to a public company after it accesses CSF (unless an existing trigger in the Corporations Act requires that proprietary company to convert e.g. more than 50 non-employee or non-CSF shareholders); and

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takeover provisions: the takeover provisions in Chapter 6 of the Corporations Act will not apply to CSF proprietary companies. CSF

C: Corporate governance obligations

2.31 It is appropriate that a proprietary company which elects to access CSF complies with additional governance obligations to that of a normal proprietary company. However, by the same measure it is important that proprietary companies are not burdened by unnecessary governance obligations. In terms of the corporate governance issues that were considered:

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annual general meetings: proprietary companies will not be required to hold an annual general meeting;

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number of directors: proprietary companies will be required to have a minimum of two directors (rather than a minimum of one director); and

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related party transactions: proprietary companies will be subject to the related party transaction regime in Chapter 2E of the Corporations Act.

D: Financial reporting obligations

2.32 Similar to the approach adopted for corporate governance standards, proprietary companies would be required to disclose greater financial information than they currently do. Currently, a proprietary company is only required to prepare financial statements and have them audited where more than 5% of its members request it do so or ASIC directs it.

2.33 It is proposed under Option 3 that:

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ongoing financial reporting: companies that issue equity via CSF will be required to provide financial statements to CSF investors in accordance with accounting standards; and

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audit: a CSF proprietary company would be required to undertake an audit where it raises more than $3 million from a CSF raise or any other raise which did not require disclosure. This threshold will also be carried through to the transitional governance concessions that apply to newly converted public companies.

E: Consequential amendments to public company legislation

2.34 If CSF is extended to proprietary companies, it is advisable to remove the governance and reporting concessions granted to proprietary companies in order to lower the cost of conversion to public companies under the public company CSF framework. These concessions will be redundant if proprietary companies are able to retain their current structure to access CSF. The concessions will be grandfathered, that is, companies that converted prior to the date of commencement of the proprietary company extension will retain eligibility for the concessions.

2.35 All public companies that access CSF will be required to meet the standard obligations of public companies, including to:

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hold an annual general meeting;

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appoint an auditor (and have financial statements audited); and

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provide financial statements to shareholders in the usual manner.

2.36 Public companies that meet the eligibility threshold will all be able to access CSF because they automatically satisfy the minimum standards required to access the regime.

TABLE 1: REQUIREMENTS FOR CSF COMPANIES UNDER OPTIONS 1-3

WHAT IS THE LIKELY NET BENFIT OF EACH OPTION?

OPTION 1: NO CHANGE

2.37 The benefits to implementing the CSF public company framework and not extending CSF to proprietary companies include:

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Maintaining public / proprietary distinction: By only extending CSF to public companies, the current legal distinctions between public and proprietary companies will be maintained. The legal framework for public companies is designed to support investment by the general public, whereas the regulatory framework for proprietary companies assumes the company is closely held. This option would preserve the notion that only public companies are able to raise from the public while lowering the cost of transitioning to a public company for a period of time.

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Lower risk: This option will ensure that public investors are afforded greater protection compared to any investment in a proprietary company. Companies that access CSF will be required to produce more comprehensive financial information and comply with higher governance standards. This may reduce the risk of fraud and increase investor, which may be critical to the ongoing sustainability of any CSF market.

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Secondary market: As public companies maintain a more consistent flow of information to the public, it is more likely that a secondary market in shares of public CSF companies could be developed in time. Information about proprietary companies is closely held and it would be difficult for public investors at arms' length to value the shares in a secondary market.

2.38 The disadvantages and risks of this option include:

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Regulatory burden: Approximately 98% of Australian-registered companies are proprietary companies, and start-ups in particular usually adopt this company structure. The regulatory burden of operating as a public company, in particular for companies that do not have adequate resources (for example time and money used to meet higher reporting and governance obligations), may deter proprietary companies from converting to access CSF, limiting the effectiveness of the policy in increasing access to finance.

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Disruption to the normal lifecycle of a company: Many of the types of companies the CSF framework is targeting would not usually consider converting to a public company at the point in time they intended to access CSF. There may be unintended negative consequences for companies that convert earlier than other similar companies. For example, companies that intend to exit via a trade sale may find it more challenging to find bidders as a public company because investors (especially venture capital) generally consider public companies a less attractive target due to the complexities and shareholder consent associated with takeover laws.

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Loss of growth and investor opportunity: If few companies decide to convert to public companies to access CSF due to the above reasons, both retail investors and companies alike will miss out. Firstly, retail investors are not currently able to invest in the majority of Australian SMEs because proprietary companies cannot offer securities to the public. Secondly, stakeholder consultation indicates that there is a funding gap for niche companies, such as companies building themselves based upon investment in intellectual property and for companies that have a proven product and want to scale up. In particular, feedback indicates a "funding gap" for achieving scale between $5 million to $25 million in annual turnover or assets. These companies may continue to miss out on important funding if there is limited take-up of the framework due to barriers to entry.

Net benefit

2.39 Out of the three options, Option 1 is the most conservative approach towards developing a CSF framework. By requiring all CSF companies to comply with the standards set for public companies, this option will provide investors with the greatest protection and do the most to promote consumer confidence in CSF investments. Consumer confidence will be crucial to the long-term sustainability of the sector. However, these benefits are likely to be offset by the regulatory burden imposed on companies due to the requirement to convert to a public company. This is likely to lead to limited take-up of the CSF framework, limiting the effectiveness of the policy in increasing access to funding for businesses and potentially limiting the ongoing viability of the CSF sector.

OPTION 2: EXTEND CSF TO PROPRIETARY COMPANIES WITHOUT ADDITIONAL INVESTOR PROTECTIONS

2.40 A range of stakeholders have expressed a clear appetite for CSF to be extended to proprietary companies given that most companies (particularly start-ups and early-stage companies) in Australia operate as proprietary companies. Under Option 2, small proprietary companies would be able to access CSF and continue to experience light regulation.

2.41 The key benefits of Option 2 include:

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Opening up new funding sources: Option 2 will allow innovative proprietary companies to access a new funding source, allowing them to pursue an agenda of growth. Proprietary companies would be able to choose the optimal mechanism for fundraising based on the company's needs and objectives.

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Removing regulatory burden: This option would remove a key disincentive for these companies to use CSF. As discussed in section 4.1, proprietary companies interested in using CSF may be unwilling or unable to convert to a public company due to the higher regulatory obligations imposed on public companies or because it might limit their ability to find investors or buyers in the future.

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More effective use of resources: Secondary to the above point, early-stage high-growth companies will be able to focus on developing their businesses (and subsequently returns for investors) if they do not have to allocate resources to increased compliance obligations.

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Commercially sustainable: Intermediaries will play a critical role in any CSF framework, and will be regarded as the 'gatekeepers' to CSF issuers. It is important that any CSF framework enables platforms to be commercially viable and offer a good level of service to companies and investors. Extending CSF to proprietary companies will increase the amount of companies accessing CSF, which will strengthen the commercial viability of the industry.

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Increased diversity: Extending CSF to proprietary companies will encourage a greater number of entrants to the market. This may result in a wider range of business models to meet issuer and investor needs and potentially greater competition.

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Minimum legislative changes: This option would require the fewest legislative amendments to the Corporations Act.

2.42 The disadvantages and risks of Option 2 include:

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Increased investor risk: The regulatory regime for proprietary companies was designed on the assumption that the company would be closely held and would not have a broad retail shareholder base. This would no longer be the case if the 'crowd' is able to invest in proprietary companies. CSF investors in these companies will have few rights and less knowledge of the company's operations relative to retail investors in public companies because they will lack important shareholder protection measures such as ongoing financial reporting and restrictions on related party transactions. As a result, they may be exposed to a higher risk of fraud. If consumers lack confidence in the framework, then it could also jeopardise investor interest in CSF and limit the commercial viability of the CSF market.

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No change to company habits: Requiring companies to comply with higher corporate governance and reporting standards encourages companies to adopt better practices. There are associated benefits with imposing higher standards and creating an expectation of better practices, including greater engagement with shareholders, transparency, better decision making and more comprehensive and accurate financial records (which feed into the company's strategic planning).

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Tax incentives: Retail investors may be incentivised to invest in CSF companies to obtain tax offsets for early-stage innovation companies, of which a proportion of eligible investments will be in proprietary companies. Consumers may not assess the risk weight of the company relative to immediate tax considerations.

Costing

2.43 Removing existing restrictions on proprietary companies accessing CSF without mandating additional investor protections is expected to result in a small increase in regulatory costs for individual proprietary companies, intermediaries and investors. However, the expected growth in proprietary companies using CSF is likely to result in the aggregate compliance burden across the economy increasing.

2.44 The removal of the public company exemptions in the CSF legislation for public companies, given proprietary companies will not need an exemption period to ease the transition to public company form, is expected to slightly increase costs for public companies on average. However, expected growth in the number of public companies using CSF is expected to be far lower than under option 1, with most CSF users expected to remain proprietary companies.

2.45 Under this option:

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Costs per issuer are expected to increase by $750 per year for proprietary companies using CSF driven primarily by costs associated with monitoring compliance with the CSF framework. Costs per issuer are expected to increase by $1,090 for public companies using CSF as they will not have the costs associated with monitoring compliance with the CSF framework offset by the temporarily reduced costs associated with exemptions from annual general meetings and audit requirements contemplated in the legislation for public companies.

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Fixed costs for intermediaries are expected to be the same as under the public company framework. Intermediary costs that vary with the number of issuers raising funds are also expected to be the same as under the public company framework, with overall costs increasing in line with the expected increase in businesses raising funds via CSF.

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Costs per investor are expected to be the same as under the public company framework.

2.46 Using the regulatory burden measurement framework, it has been estimated that the indicative model would increase compliance costs by $7.4 million per year. This is due primarily to the assumption that a greater number of companies will use the CSF framework if they can remain proprietary companies rather than switching to public companies, as required under the status quo. For all reporting periods, the Treasury portfolio has reported net compliance cost reductions and there is no reason why the portfolio will not continue to deliver on its red tape reduction targets this year, in line with the Government's regulatory reform agenda.

Table 1: Regulatory burden estimate (RBE) table

Assumptions underlying this estimate are in the Appendix.

Net benefit

2.47 Out of the three options, Option 2 is the most significant departure from the current operation of the Corporations law. This option is likely to have the greatest take-up by potential CSF companies as companies would not incur many additional costs by accessing CSF under this option. However, the risk exposure of retail investors is the greatest under this framework. There is a higher chance of fraudulent activity which may diminish investor confidence and undermine the credibility of the CSF sector. On balance, the lack of a minimum standard for companies in terms of their transparency and responsibility toward investors is a significant departure from the existing mechanisms that support a stable market and confident investors in Australia.

OPTION 3: EXTEND CSF TO PROPRIETARY COMPANIES WITH APPROPRIATE PROTECTIONS

2.48 Shareholders have acknowledged that companies that fundraise from the public should be subject to higher governance and reporting standards than ordinary proprietary companies. Option 3 balances the need to extend CSF to proprietary companies with the importance of providing retail investors with adequate protection by mitigating the risk of fraudulent activity.

2.49 Many of the benefits discussed in section 4.2 apply to this option to varying degrees including 'Commercially Sustainable', 'Increased Diversity', 'Effective Allocation of Resources' and 'Opening up New Sources of Funding'. However, these benefits are achieved in Option 3 without the risk exposure of retail investors being irresponsibly heightened. The benefits of Option 3 include:

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Reduced regulatory burden: As discussed in section 4.2, permitting proprietary companies to access CSF will eliminate the regulatory burden of changing company types. The regulatory burden of converting to a public company includes costs associated with the additional reporting and governance obligations required of public companies (such as the cost of additional directors, preparing full financial records and eventually holding AGMs after the concessions lapse). Although there is relief under the public company CSF framework for some of these costs for up to five years for proprietary companies that convert, the costs will be incurred fully after five years. Option 3 will ensure that the CSF framework does not interfere with the normal lifecycle of a company. Importantly, proprietary companies that access CSF would be able to smoothly transition back to normal proprietary company status if no CSF investors remain on the register. Clear transition paths between company types are crucial to ensuring that companies can use CSF to support their development.

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Responsible practices: Requiring companies to comply with higher governance and reporting standards is likely to promote investor confidence and facilitate a successful CSF market. Proprietary companies which access the 'crowd' will no longer be closely held, and external investors will expect disclosure of certain financial and non-financial information as well as higher governance practices. These higher standards will support meaningful shareholder engagement, better decision-making, greater transparency and more comprehensive and accurate record keeping habits.

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Simplicity in public company structure: By removing the concessions granted to proprietary companies which convert to a public company, all public companies that access CSF after the commencement of the proprietary extension will be subject to the same set of rules.

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Stakeholder support: On balance, this option is the most compatible with the views of stakeholders which were expressed during the consultation. This option strikes the responsible middle ground by opening up CSF to a greater range of companies, creating a manageable framework for intermediaries while also acknowledging concerns about a lowering of investor protections.

2.50 The disadvantages and risks include:

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Increased costs: Proprietary companies will be required to comply with additional obligations. This will mean increased compliance costs, particularly in relation to: appointing an additional director; preparing an annual financial report; and having financial statements audited once the proprietary company exceeds the audit threshold. However, these obligations (and costs) are in aggregate lower than those placed on public companies.

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No secondary market: Due to the reduced ongoing reporting obligations it is less likely that a secondary market will emerge under this option. The public will have no information to value shares or understand the business plans of these companies.

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Increased investor risk: As discussed in section 4.2, the regulatory regime for proprietary companies was designed with the intent that such companies would not have a wide retail shareholder base. Shareholders in these companies consequently have fewer rights and protections. While the additional obligations for proprietary companies undertaking CSF proposed under this option will increase the rights and protections for shareholders, risks to investors will still be higher than under option 1 where retail investors would generally only be able to invest in public companies.

2.51 In particular, shareholders in CSF proprietary companies will not have access to audited financial statements until the company has raised more than $3 million from CSF or other offers requiring disclosure. This may be the case for an extended period of time, compared to the $1 million threshold and five year limit on the concession for public companies under option 1. Audit provides external assurance about the reliability of financial statements; consequently, shareholders may be able to place a lower level of reliance on the accuracy of the financial statements for a longer period than under the status quo. Shareholders will also not have access to the protections provided by the takeovers provisions. This means that shareholders will not have statutory rights in relation to the process of a takeover bid and receipt of information to enable them to assess the merits of the bid. However, shareholders may have access to rights to participate in exit events that are contained in individual companies' constituent documents (e.g. a constitution or shareholders' agreement). Proprietary companies will be required to disclose the existence or otherwise of 'tag' rights (which provide a right to a minority shareholder to choose to sell their shareholding to a buyer that acquires a certain percentage of the company's shares) as part of their CSF offer document. CSFCSF

Costing

2.52 Removing existing restrictions on proprietary companies accessing CSF is deregulatory in nature. However, the additional obligations placed on CSF proprietary company issuers to protect crowd investors increase their regulatory burden compared to non-CSF proprietary companies. The expected growth in proprietary companies using CSF is likely also to result in the aggregate compliance burden across the economy increasing.

2.53 The removal of the public company exemptions in the CSF legislation for public companies, given proprietary companies will not need an exemption period to ease the transition to public company form, is expected to slightly increase costs for public companies on average. However, expected growth in the number of public companies using CSF is expected to be far lower than under option 1, with most CSF users expected to remain proprietary companies.

2.54 Under this option:

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Costs per issuer are expected to increase by $13,700 per year for proprietary companies using CSF driven primarily by costs associated with additional reporting requirements associated with having a wider range of investors and to a lesser extent governance and monitoring requirements. Costs per issuer are expected to increase by $1,090 for public companies using CSF as they will not have the costs associated with monitoring compliance with the CSF framework offset by the temporarily reduced costs associated with exemptions from annual general meetings and audit requirements in the legislation for public companies.

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Fixed costs for intermediaries are expected to be the same as under the public company framework. Intermediary costs that vary with the number of issuers raising funds are also expected to be the same as under the public company framework, with overall costs increasing in line with the expected increase in businesses raising funds via CSF.

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Costs per investor are expected to be the same as under the public company framework.

2.55 Using the regulatory burden measurement framework, it has been estimated that the indicative model would increase compliance costs by $26.8 million per year. This is due primarily to the assumption that a greater number of companies will use the CSF framework if they can remain proprietary companies rather than switching to public companies, as required under the status quo. For all reporting periods, the Treasury portfolio has reported net compliance cost reductions and there is no reason why the portfolio will not continue to deliver on its red tape reduction targets this year, in line with the Government's regulatory reform agenda.

Table 1: Regulatory burden estimate (RBE) table

Assumptions underlying this estimate are in the Appendix.

Net benefit

2.56 Out of the three options, Option 3 represents a balanced approach to opening up investment and fundraising opportunities while recognising the needs of investors to have some transparency of their investments. This will improve the sustainability of the CSF regime over the long-term by increasing investor confidence in the sector, compared to Option 2. Under this option, the scope of the companies that will be able to access CSF will broaden considerably. Proprietary companies accessing CSF will continue to enjoy many of the structural benefits of the proprietary company structure such as reduced reporting requirements, lower governance obligations and greater flexibility in exit events. However, acknowledging that CSF proprietary companies will not be closely held, these companies will be subject to certain obligations designed to increase shareholder engagement and mitigate the occurrence of fraud.

CONSULTATION

CONSULTATION PAPER

2.57 In August 2015, the Government released a consultation paper - 'Facilitating crowd-sourced equity funding and reducing compliance costs for small businesses' - that sought feedback on the proposed public company CSF framework and whether it should be extended to proprietary companies. 53 submissions were received for this consultation (including nine confidential submissions) from a broad range of stakeholders including businesses, crowdfunding and trading platforms, industry bodies, advisory and legal firms, public organisations, individuals and universities.

2.58 Most stakeholders agreed that crowdfunding should be extended to proprietary companies. However, some stakeholders suggested to either first assess the operation of the CSF public company framework before considering any extension, or to not extend the framework at all.

2.59 Other feedback included:

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Stakeholders generally agreed that additional reporting obligations should apply to proprietary companies undertaking CSF, but views diverged on the level and detail of these obligations.

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Stakeholders held diverse views on the fundraising cap that should apply if proprietary companies use CSF.

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Stakeholders who supported extending crowdfunding to proprietary companies generally agreed the current non-employee shareholder limit is too low to facilitate crowdfunding. Stakeholders suggested a range of potential limits.

INDUSTRY ROUNDTABLES

2.60 Given the diversity of stakeholder views received in response to the August 2015 consultation, Treasury hosted two industry roundtables over October and November 2016 with respondents to the public consultation to seek more detailed views on a potential model for extending CSF to proprietary companies. ^[1] Treasury also undertook bilateral discussions to understand issues raised at the roundtables.

2.61 Treasury consulted with approximately 30 stakeholders including: ASIC, AASB, AuASB, law firms and the Law Council, CSF platform operators, accounting firms and industry representatives, academics specialising in corporate law, venture capital investors, investment advisory firms and industry bodies representing companies and shareholder representatives.

2.62 Feedback from these roundtables, as well as follow-up bilateral discussions on specific issues, has informed the development of detailed options for the Government's consideration.

EXPOSURE DRAFT LEGISLATION

2.63 Exposure draft legislation was published for public consultation on the Treasury website. ^[2] 22 submissions were received from a broad range of stakeholders, whom were generally supportive of the CSF extension to proprietary companies.

2.64 Feedback included:

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Several stakeholders raised the concern that CSF shareholders on selling their shares could lead a proprietary company to breach the 50 shareholder limit, requiring it to convert to a public company.

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Stakeholders had diverse views on the audit requirement, with some supporting audit where a proprietary company raises more than $1 million through CSF, with others arguing the audit should start at a lower or higher threshold.

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While stakeholders agreed that it would be inappropriate to apply the general takeover provisions, they were concerned about the complexity and restrictions on shareholding management associated with having a conditional exemption to the general takeover provisions.

2.65 Treasury further refined the legislation through targeted consultation, including with members of the Treasurer's Fintech Advisory Group.

GOVERNMENT POLICY

OPTION 3: EXTEND CSF WITH APPROPRIATE PROTECTIONS IS THE PREFFERED OPTION

2.66 Following consideration of the three options, the Government has elected to implement Option 3: extend CSF with appropriate investor protections. This model balances the need to improve access to finance for small and innovative businesses while maintaining investor protections, and incorporates suggestions from stakeholder feedback. This option builds on the legislated CSF framework for public companies, maintaining one model of CSF offer for public and proprietary companies.

2.67 For issuers, the option to extend CSF proprietary will offer access to the CSF regime without needing to convert to the more onerous public company type. Further, the additional company obligations will require companies to meet a minimum standard that will help to ensure the sustainability of the CSF regime.

2.68 For intermediaries, this option extends the legislated CSF framework, maintaining the same intermediary rules and offer document that will enable them to seamlessly extend their service from public companies to be available to proprietary companies.

2.69 For investors, this option increases the access retail investors have to small proprietary companies. Further the investor protections will raise the standard of investment by requiring: a minimum of two directors; financial reporting in accordance with accounting standards and restrictions on related party transactions.

2.70 The Government considered the application of the takeover provisions for proprietary companies with CSF shareholders (either the general provisions or a modified version). It was decided that a full exemption is the most consistent with a 'light touch' regulatory regime and was also preferred as it would not impede reasonable fine-tuning of major shareholdings.

2.71 These protections represent a balance between encouraging broad take up of CSF by ensuring that the costs associated with raising funds are not excessive, while recognising that the extension of the framework to proprietary companies will have additional risks for retail investors (although they will benefit from a wider range of investment opportunities).

2.72 The option to extend CSF with investor protection is likely to have the highest net benefit of the options considered, despite having higher estimated aggregate regulatory costs than either the no change or extend CSF to proprietary companies without additional investor protections options.

IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION

2.73 The preferred model will be implemented through legislative amendments and regulations to the Corporations Act, and regulatory guidance published by ASIC. It is proposed that the Bill will be introduced into the Parliament in the Spring 2017 parliamentary sitting period. The regulations will be considered by the Federal Executive Council following the Bill's passage through the Parliament. The new laws will commence six months after the Bill receives Royal Assent.

2.74 During the transition period ASIC will produce regulatory guidance to help industry transition to the new laws. In the 2017-18 Budget, ASIC received $4.5 million over four years to implement, monitor and enforce the extension of the CSF framework to proprietary companies. This will build on ASIC's implementation of the CSF framework for public companies, which includes regulatory guidance for intermediaries and companies, and the introduction of a new CSF authorisation category within the AFSL.

2.75 The Government and ASIC will closely monitor the CSF market to ensure that the changes to the law are operating as intended. By making it easier and less costly for small companies to raise equity financing through CSF, the Government would expect that the number of businesses who crowdfund will increase. Further the Government would expect the investor protections to contribute to the sustainability of the CSF sector. ASIC will use its information gathering powers to monitor key metrics, including amounts raised and the types of companies using CSF (including if they are relying on concessions available to companies with a crowd-funding offer); information about unsuccessful offers; and the number of retail clients participating and any complaints made. This will help inform the monitoring by the Government and ASIC.

2.76 The regulation impact assessment has taken into account ASIC's initial regulatory guidance and information gathering initiatives to implement the model.

2.77 The legislation provides a number of regulation making powers to fine tune the framework as the crowd funding market evolves over time. This includes an ability to adjust key eligibility thresholds and an ability to intervene to modify concessions should examples of poor behaviour to the detriment of investors occur. These would be subject to the usual scrutiny and oversight arrangements.

APPENDIX

Current regulatory arrangements for companies

2.78 Governance and reporting requirements for the various types of companies are set out in the Corporations Act.

2.79 These requirements have over time been implemented to address the inherent conflicts of interest in corporations in which the owners of the company, that is the shareholders ('principal') and managers of the company ('agent') are separate. As the agent typically has better information than the principal about the company, the principal cannot easily be assured of the performance of the agent ('agency costs').

2.80 The law provides a number of mechanisms to minimise these agency costs such that companies are directed and controlled in a manner that protects and promotes the interests of participants. These mechanisms differ between the two broad categories of companies provided for in the Corporations Act: public companies and proprietary companies.

2.81 Public companies are able to make public equity offers and are not subject to restrictions on the number of shareholders they may have. Public companies are subject to a range of reporting and corporate governance obligations to protect shareholders and address agency costs, including:

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Auditors who assist in the monitoring of managers by attesting to the accuracy of companies' financial statements.

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A board of directors, each of whom has fiduciary duties to act with reasonable care and diligence, in the interests of the company, and for a proper purpose.

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Disclosure of information by companies allows shareholders to properly monitor managers and directors. Obligations such as annual financial reports, prospectus (or offer information statements in some cases) and continuous disclosure obligations seek to address the asymmetry in access to information regarding the operation and prospects of a company that exists between the managers and the owners. This information is used to determine whether a person wishes to become, remain or exit from being a shareholder of a company.

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Annual general meetings, which provide a forum for shareholders to be informed about financial and other matters, ask questions of management and make decisions relating to matters that need to be considered.

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Members' rights to call a meeting, undertake litigation against the company, and vote when resolutions are put forward by the company.

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Restrictions on related party transactions including processes where a company intends to enter into a related party transaction that falls within a permitted exemption.

2.82 There are also a range of requirements in relation to the contents of disclosure documents, the process for making equity offers, liability of directors for misleading statements in offer documents and restrictions on advertising to ensure the disclosure is clear, effective and reliable.

2.83 Proprietary companies are intended to be closely-held companies where the shareholders have access to the management and consequently information asymmetries and agency costs are likely to be lower than in more widely-held public companies. Proprietary companies are subject to lower compliance and transparency obligations than public companies. Proprietary companies are defined as either small proprietary companies or large proprietary companies , with small proprietary companies having lower compliance obligations than large proprietary companies.

2.84 For example, proprietary companies are not required to hold annual general meetings, and small proprietary companies are not generally required to prepare annual financial reports, appoint auditors or have their financial statements audited.

2.85 To ensure they reflect this closely-held nature, proprietary companies are prohibited from making public offers of equity and are limited to having no more than 50 non-employee shareholders.

2.86 For both public and proprietary companies, there are certain exemptions from the requirement to use a disclosure document in primary capital raisings. These exemptions include wholesale (professional, sophisticated and experienced) investors (who are less likely to suffer from information asymmetries) and 'small scale personal offers' (where a personal offer is made and no more than $2 million is raised in any 12 month period from no more than 20 Australian investors, to facilitate small capital raisings that may not occur if a disclosure document were required).

REGULATORY BURDEN ESTIMATE ASSUMPTIONS