Brutus Appellant v Cozens Respondent
[1973] AC 854(Judgment by: Viscount Dilhorne)
Brutus Appellant
vCozens Respondent
Judges:
Lord Reid
Lord Morris of Borth-Y-Gest
Viscount DilhorneLord Diplock
Lord Kilbrandon
Legislative References:
Public Order Act 1936 - section 5
Judgment date: 19 July 1972
Judgment by:
Viscount Dilhorne
My Lords, after the magistrates at Wimbledon had dismissed the information laid against the appellant without calling on him to answer the prosecution's case, they were asked to state a case. They did so and in paragraph 7 thereof said:
"Having considered the evidence and the authorities cited to us, we came to the conclusion that the respondent's" (the present appellant's) "behavior was not insulting within the terms of the offence alleged against him." and in paragraph 8 that
"The question for the opinion of the High Court is whether, on the above statement of facts, we came to a correct determination and decision in point of law."
The case stated did not state precisely what was the question of law on which the opinion of the High Court was sought. It may be because the magistrates found some difficulty in formulating it. The Divisional Court, however, treated the case as raising the question of the meaning to be given to the word "insulting" in the expression "insulting behavior" in section 5 of the Public Order Act 1936.
The Divisional Court allowed the appeal but, while refusing leave to appeal to this House, certified that a point of law of general public importance was involved, namely [1972] 1 W.L.R. 484, 488:
"whether conduct which evidences a disrespect for the rights of others so that it is likely to cause their resentment or give rise to protests from them is insulting behavior within the meaning of section 5 of the Public Order Act 1936."
The appellant now appeals with the leave of this House.
In the Divisional Court [1972] 1 W.L.R. 484 in the course of his judgment, with which the other members of the court agreed, Melford Stevenson J. said, at p. 487:
"behavior which affronts other people, and evidences a disrespect or contempt for their rights, behavior which reasonable persons would foresee is likely to cause resentment or protest such as was aroused in this case, and I rely particularly on the reaction of the crowd as set out in the case stated, is insulting for the purpose of this section."
I do not think that this is right. The Public Order Act 1936, by section 5, made it an offence for a person to use threatening, abusive or insulting behavior whereby a breach of the peace is likely to be occasioned. It does not make any kind of behavior which is likely to lead to a breach of the peace an offence. Behavior which evidences a disrespect or contempt for the rights of others does not of itself establish that that behavior was threatening, abusive or insulting. Such behavior may be very annoying to those who see it and cause resentment and protests but it does not suffice to show that the behavior was annoying and did annoy, for a person can be guilty of annoying behavior without that behavior being insulting. and what must be established to justify conviction of the offence is not that the behavior was annoying but that it was threatening, abusive or insulting.
The reaction of those who saw the behavior may be relevant to the question whether a breach of the peace was likely to be occasioned but it is not, in my opinion, relevant to the question, was the behavior threatening, abusive or insulting.
The Act does not define the meaning to be given to the word "insulting" and the cases cited in this House, the Divisional Court and before the magistrates do not say or suggest that it should be given any special meaning. Unless the context otherwise requires, words in a statute have to be given their ordinary natural meaning and there is in this Act, in my opinion, nothing to indicate or suggest that the word "insulting" should be given any other than its ordinary natural meaning.
The magistrates had two questions to decide; first, was the appellant's behavior insulting and, secondly, if so, was it likely to occasion a breach of the peace. Both were questions of fact for them to decide. In considering the first, it was relevant for them to consider whether the behavior was such as to indicate an intention to insult anyone, and if so whom; and if the magistrates in this case did so, they may well have concluded that the appellant's behavior did not evince any intention to insult either players or spectators, and so could not properly be regarded as insulting.
In my opinion, the answer to the question certified by the Divisional Court is in the negative, for proof of the matters therein referred to does not suffice to show or tend to show that the behavior was insulting and the decision of the Divisional court was wrong.
I would therefore allow the appeal with costs.