Brutus Appellant v Cozens Respondent
[1973] AC 854(Judgment by: Lord Kilbrandon)
Brutus Appellant
vCozens Respondent
Judges:
Lord Reid
Lord Morris of Borth-Y-Gest
Viscount Dilhorne
Lord Diplock
Lord Kilbrandon
Legislative References:
Public Order Act 1936 - section 5
Judgment date: 19 July 1972
Judgment by:
Lord Kilbrandon
My Lords, I agree that this appeal should be allowed. At the close of the prosecution evidence, the magistrates found no case to answer, and gave their decision in the following terms:
"Having considered the evidence and the authorities cited to us, we came to the conclusion that the respondent's behavior was not insulting within the terms of the offence alleged against him. 'Insulting behavior' being an essential element of an offence within section 5 of the Public Order Act, 1936, we did not consider the other points raised before us and accordingly dismissed the information without calling upon the respondent." The authorities were Bryan v. Robinson [1960] 1 W.L.R. 506, Jordan v. Burgoyne [1963] 2 Q.B. 744 and Cooper v. Shield [1971] 2 Q.B. 334. In the first, a case of alleged insulting behavior, Lord Parker C.J. had laid it down, at p. 509, that "somebody can be annoyed by behavior which is not insulting behavior." We must assume that the magistrates weighed the evidence against this ruling, and appreciated accordingly that, while the spectators may have been annoyed, that did not necessarily mean that they had been insulted. The second relates to insulting words which might have been expected to, and did, cause a riot to break out at a public meeting; this could not have assisted the magistrates or affected their decision. The third is concerned with whether the locus of the incident was a public place, and the present point did not arise. No authority was cited to the magistrates, or indeed before this House, which declares that any positive test is available by which insulting behavior can be recognised as such; nevertheless, we were in effect invited to apply some such test. We were asked to hold that, accepting as facts the incidents described in the stated case, it followed as matter of law that the conduct of the accused was insulting and therefore, in the circumstances, criminal. This seem to me to be impossible. It may well be that if the magistrates had found the appellant's behavior to have been insulting, their decision would not have been challengeable, but that only means that their decision, whichever way it went, must have been a decision on a question of fact; no question of law can be spelled out of their evaluation of behavior which, in the absence of a specific finding that it was of an insulting character, is capable of more than one interpretation. The drawing of inferences from behavior is a fact-finding process. It would be unwise, in my opinion, to attempt to lay down any positive rules for the recognition of insulting behavior as such, since the circumstances in which the application of the rules would be called for are almost infinitely variable; the most that can be done is to lay down limits, as was done in Bryan v. Robinson [1960] 1 W.L.R. 506, in order to ensure that the statute is not interpreted more widely than its terms will bear.
I did not myself find the quotation of dictionary definitions helpful, as it might perhaps have been had the question been whether, the magistrates having convicted, there is any accepted meaning of the word "insulting" which they might be said legitimately to have adopted in coming to their conclusion. But "insulting" is an ordinary uncomplicated English word. Boswell defends Dr. Johnson, to whose work we were referred, against a charge of obscurity in his definitions, by quoting from the preface to the dictionary:
"To explain, requires the use of terms less abstruse than that which is to be explained, and such terms cannot always be found. ... The easiest word, whatever it may be, can never be translated into one more easy." One felt the force of this upon being offered as exegetical substitutions for the word "insult" such words as "insolence" or "affront." All three words are as much, or as little, in need of interpretation.
It was conceded before us that the question which has been submitted to us as involving a point of law of public importance could not be answered in the affirmative. To do so would be to declare that, among other manifestations, "conduct which evidences a disrespect for the rights of others so that it is likely to cause their resentment" must as matter of law be held to be insulting, and punishable under the Public Order Act 1936. A common example might be, an assertion, by throwing down a gate, of a public right of way. This would be showing disrespect of a right of property, and would certainly be resented, but the behavior might in certain circumstances be in fact lawful. I would accordingly allow this appeal.Appeal allowed. (J. A. G. )