Brutus Appellant v Cozens Respondent
[1973] AC 854(Judgment by: Lord Morris of Borth-Y-Gest)
Brutus Appellant
vCozens Respondent
Judges:
Lord Reid
Lord Morris of Borth-Y-GestViscount Dilhorne
Lord Diplock
Lord Kilbrandon
Legislative References:
Public Order Act 1936 - section 5
Judgment date: 19 July 1972
Judgment by:
Lord Morris of Borth-Y-Gest
My Lords, the charge which was brought against the appellant was that he "Did use insulting behavior whereby a breach of the peace was likely to be occasioned at the All England Lawn Tennis Club, Church Road, Wimbledon, S.W.19 on June 28, 1971." Having found the facts the magistrates came to the conclusion that the appellant's behavior was not "insulting behavior" within the terms of the offence charged under section 5 of the Public Order Act 1936, as amended: it was therefore unnecessary for them to consider any further matters. Under that section, provided other matters are proved, a person will commit an offence if he uses threatening behavior or if he uses abusive behavior or if he uses insulting behavior. In the present case the magistrates had to consider whether the appellant had used insulting behavior. The words "insulting behavior" are words that permit of ready comprehension. Having found the facts it was for the magistrates applying rational judgment and common sense to reach a decision. Manifestly they thought that however else the appellant's behavior might be characterised it was not to be described as insulting. Having had the case of Bryan v. Robinson [1960] 1 W.L.R. 506 cited to them, in which Lord Parker C.J. had pointed out that persons may be annoyed by behavior which is not insulting behavior, the magistrates may have thought that the appellant's behavior was annoying or very annoying but yet was not on that account to be held to have been insulting. The magistrates may have considered that in most cases insulting behavior is behavior which insults some person or persons: they may have thought that after the incident neither a spectator nor a player, however displeased or annoyed he might have been, could sensibly have complained that he had been "insulted."
In my view, the magistrates' decision was really a decision of fact just as would be the decision of a jury if called upon to decide whether someone had used insulting behavior. The decision either of magistrates or of a jury could be attacked if there had been misdirection. In the present case I can see no ground at all for suggesting that the magistrates had misdirected themselves.
The decision of the magistrates could, in my view, only be reversed if it is held that the facts as found show as a matter of law that the appellant's behavior was insulting. What the Divisional Court have done is to lay down a definition of the words "insulting behavior" and then to say that the appellant's behavior came within the definition. But the Act contains no such definition and indeed no words of definition are needed. The words of the section are clear and they convey of themselves a meaning which the ordinary citizen can well understand. The suggested definition would enlarge what Parliament has enacted, and it would do this in relation to a criminal offence. It would lay down that behavior which affronts other people and evidences a disrespect or contempt for their rights and which reasonable people would foresee would be likely to cause resentment or protest is insulting behavior for the purposes of section 5. It may well be that behavior which is insulting will often be behavior which shows a disrespect or contempt for people's rights but it does not follow that whenever there is disrespect or contempt for people's rights there must always be insulting behavior. Furthermore, there may be many manifestations of behavior which will cause resentment or protest without being insulting.
In the submissions made on behalf of the respondent it was acknowledged that the definition laid down by the Divisional Court was too wide and that it would embrace conduct going beyond what Parliament had intended. It was not supported. An alternative definition was propounded. It was suggested that in the concept of insulting behavior there are the two elements (a) that it is deliberate behavior which is intended or is likely to give offence and (b) that it is behavior which is contemptuous of or about those who are to be offended. My Lords, I find it unnecessary and indeed undesirable to compose a definition of a word which is in general use and which presents no difficulty of application or understanding. If the facts as found by the magistrates (which I do not recount because they are recorded in the case stated) were put to a juryman who was asked to say whether, in his view, they constituted insulting behavior I would think it probable that his answer would be the same as that given by the magistrates. But whether this be so or not I find it impossible to say that on the facts as they found them the magistrates were obliged as a matter of law to find that the behavior was insulting.
For the reasons which I have given I would allow the appeal and set aside the order made by the Divisional Court.