Randwick Corporation v Rutledge
102 CLR 54[1959] HCA 63
[1960] ALR 66
33 ALJR 367
5 LGRA 127
(Judgment by: Fullagar J)
Randwick Corporation v Rutledge
Court:
Judges:
Dixon CJ
Fullagar JKitto J
Menzies J
Windeyer J
Subject References:
Local government
Rates
Exemptions
Meaning of 'dedicated'
Meaning of 'public reserve'
Meaning of 'public purpose'
Other References:
Local Government Act 1919 (NSW), ss 4, 132
Judgment date: 30 November 1959
SYDNEY
Judgment by:
Fullagar J
List of Judges
FULLAGAR J. The respondents base their claim that the land known as the Randwick racecourse is exempt from rating by the appellant municipality solely on s. 132 (1) (c) of the Local Government Act 1919 (N.S.W.). Section 132 (1), so far as material, provides that "all land in a municipality ... shall be ratable except- ... (c) land which is vested in ... trustees and is used for a public reserve". The land is vested in trustees, and the question in the case is whether it is "used for a public reserve" within the meaning of the section.
The term "public reserve" is defined by s. 4 of the Act as meaning "public park and any land dedicated or reserved from sale by the Crown for public health, recreation, enjoyment or other public purposes of the like nature, but does not include a common". It is obvious that this definition cannot be simply transcribed into s. 132 (1) (c), for so to transcribe it would produce nonsense. But this does not, I think, mean that the definition is to be ignored. The definition must be applied in the interpretation of s. 132 (1) (c), and the result of its application is, I think, that we must read the material part of s. 132 (1) (c) as meaning "land which is used as a public park, or has been dedicated or reserved from sale by the Crown for public health, recreation, enjoyment or other public purpose of the like nature, and is used for one of those purposes". It is clear, in my opinion, that the words "recreation" and "enjoyment," in the definition and in the resultant expansion of s. 132 (1) (c) mean respectively "public recreation" and "public enjoyment," and I agree with my brother Windeyer, whose judgment I have had the great advantage of reading, that the land in question is not dedicated for purposes which make it a "public reserve" within the meaning of the definition, and is not "used for a public reserve" within the meaning of s. 132 (1) (c). The appeal should be allowed.