State Government Insurance Office (Q) v Rees
144 CLR 54926 ALR 341
(Judgment by: Barwick CJ)
State Government Insurance Office (Q)
v Rees
Judges:
Barwick C.J.Gibbs J.
Stephen J.
Mason J.
Aickin J.
Subject References:
Companies
Judgment date: 12 October 1979
Sydney
Judgment by:
Barwick CJ
My brother Mason, in his reasons for judgment in this appeal which I have had the advantage of reading, sets out the statutory provisions which will govern its result.
In my opinion, the appeal should be dismissed. My reason for holding that opinion is twofold: first, that the list of debts to be given priority which is found in s. 292 (1) of the Companies Act 1961 (Q.) appears to me to be designed by sub-par. (c) to protect a worker who has not been paid by his employer the compensation which the employer properly owed him under the relevant Workers' Compensation Act at the date of the winding up. Quite clearly, because of the structure of The Workers' Compensation Act 1916 (Q.), as amended (the Act), the company in this case as an employer was under no such liability for the payment for which the Act provided.
My second reason is that the exclusion from sub-par. (c), effected by s. 292(8)(a) of the Act, of the liability of an employer for workers' compensation who was covered in that respect by a policy of insurance, appears to me to indicate that the sub-par. (c) is confined to the case where the worker's only source of payment of workers' compensation is the employer. Workers' Compensation Acts generally provide for a right over in the worker against an insurance company where there is a contract of insurance for liability to pay workers' compensation. It seems to me quite reasonable that if the worker has a right to obtain payment of his compensation otherwise than from the employer, which is in liquidation, any debt for workers' compensation due by that employer should not be given priority as against other creditors.
I do not think that the undoubted width of the words "in respect of" is sufficient to overcome the consequence of these two grounds.
I would accordingly agree that the appeal be dismissed.