Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd
28 CLR 1291920 - 0831A - HCA
(Judgment by: Knox CJ, Isaacs J, Rich J, Starke J)
Between: Amalgamated Society of Engineers
And: Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd
Judges:
Knox CJ
Isaacs JHiggins J
Gavan Duffy J
Rich J
Starke J
Subject References:
Constitutional law
Interpretation
Rule in D'Emden v Pedder
State instrumentalities
Jurisdiction of President of Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration
Legislative References:
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act (Cth) - 63
&
64 Vic c 12 s v
The Constitution - ss 51, 106-109
Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth) - s 4
State Trading Concerns Act 1916 (WA) No 12 - Act
Judgment date: 31 August 1920
MELBOURNE
Judgment by:
Knox CJ
Isaacs J
Rich J
Starke J
This is a case stated under the Judiciary Act, s. 18, for the consideration of the Full Court, on the hearing of a summons under s. 21AA of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act.
The Amalgamated Society of Engineers is claimant in a plaintend under the last mentioned Act. There are eight hundred and forty-four respondents in various parts of Australia. Among the respondents are the Minister for Trading Concerns, Western Australia; the State Implement and Engineering Works, North Fremantle, and the State Sawmills, D. Humphries, Perth. The Western Australian Trading Concerns Acts of 1912 and 1916, as was conceded in argument, leave no doubt of two facts: (1) that the respondents carry on trading operations which in point of fact could give rise to "industrial disputes" within the meaning of pl. XXXV. of s. 51 of the Constitution, if the respondents were private employers, and (2) that the respondents are not private employers, but represent the State of Western Australia. The case in effect states that in fact, and within the meaning of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act, an industrial dispute exists to which these respondents are parties, unless upon the true interpretation of the Constitution no such dispute can be found to exist between Government trading concerns and their employees in such concerns. The questions for the determination of this Court are as follow:(1) Has the Parliament of the Commonwealth power to make laws binding on the States with respect to conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of one State? (2) As to each of the respondents named in the special case-Is the dispute which has been found to exist in fact between the claimant and the Minister for Trading Concerns (W.A.) an industrial dispute within the meaning of s. 51 (XXXV.)?
The Commonwealth and the States of New South Wales. South Australia. Tasmania and Victoria have, by leave, intervened: so that all possible interests are fully represented. Queensland was given leave to intervene, but has not thought it necessary to do so. The question presented is of the highest importance to the people of Australia, grouped nationally or sectionally, and it has necessitated a survey, not merely of the Constitution itself, but also of many of the decisions of this Court on various points more or less closely related to the question we have directly to determine. The more the decisions are examined, and compared with each other and with the Constitution itself, the more evident it becomes that no clear principle can account for them. They are sometimes at variance with the natural meaning of the text of the Constitution; some are irreconcilable with others, and some are individually rested on reasons not founded on the words of the Constitution or on any recognized principle of the common law underlying the expressed terms of the Constitution, but on implication drawn from what is called the principle of "necessity," that being itself referable to no more definite standard than the personal opinion of the Judge who declares it. The attempt to deduce any consistent rule from them has not only failed, but has disclosed an increasing entanglement and uncertainty, and a conflict both with the text of the Constitution and with distinct and clear declarations of law by the Privy Council.
It is therefore, in the circumstances, the manifest duty of this Court to turn its earnest attention to the provisions of the Constitution itself. That instrument is the political compact of the whole of the people of Australia, enacted into binding law by the Imperial Parliament, and it is the chief and special duty of this Court faithfully to expound and give effect to it according to its own terms, finding the intention from the words of the compact, and upholding it throughout precisely as framed. In doing this, we follow, not merely previous instances in this Court and other Courts in Australia, but also the precedent of the Privy Council in Read v Bishop of Lincoln, [F1] at p. 655, where the Lord Chancellor, speaking for the Judicial Committee in relation to reviewing its own prior decisions, said: "Whilst fully sensible of the weight to be attached to such decisions, their Lordships are at the same time bound to examine the reasons upon which the decisions rest, and to give effect to their own view of the law." The grounds upon which the Privy Council came to that conclusion we refer to, but need not repeat, adding, however, that as the Commonwealth and State Parliaments and Executives are themselves bound by the declarations of this Court as to their powers inter se, our responsibility is so much the greater to give the true effect to the relevant constitutional provisions. In doing this, to use the language of Lord Macnaghten in Vacher & Sons Ltd v London Society of Compositors, [F2] at p. 118, "a judicial tribunal has nothing to do with the policy of any Act which it may be called upon to interpret. That may be a matter for private judgment. The duty of the Court, and its only duty, is to expound the language of the Act in accordance with the settled rules of construction."
It is proper, at the outset, to observe that this case does not involve any prerogative "in the sense of the word," to use the phrase employed by the Privy Council in Theodore v Duncan, [F3] at p. 282, "in which it signifies the power of the Crown apart from statutory authority." Though much of the argument addressed to us on behalf of the States rested on the prerogative, this distinction was not observed, but it exists, and, so far as concerns prerogative in the sense indicated, it is unnecessary to consider it. In several recent cases the Judicial Committee has had the broader question under consideration, as in Canadian Pacific Railway Co v Toronto Corporation [F4] and Bonanza Creek Gold Mining Co v The King, [F5] but in none of these was it found necessary to determine it. It is manifest that when such a question is involved in a decision, the nature of the prerogative, its relation to the Government concerned, and its connection with the power under which it is sought to be affected, may all have to be considered. In the Bonanza Creek Case [F6] Lord Haldane, speaking for the Privy Council, after favouring an interpretation of the British North America Act by which certain rights and privileges of the Crown would be reserved from Canadian legislative power, proceeded to say:"It is quite consistent with it" (that interpretation) "to hold that executive power is in many situations which arise under the statutory Constitution of Canada conferred by implication in the grant of legislative power, so that where such situations arise the two kinds of authority are correlative. It follows that to this extent the Crown is bound and the prerogative affected." In this case we have to consider the effect of certain statutory authority of the States, but in relation to pl. XXXV. only, and it is necessary to insert a word of caution. If in any future case concerning the prerogative in the broader sense, or arising under some other Commonwealth power-for instance, taxation,-the extent of that power should come under consideration so as to involve the effect of the principle stated in the passage just quoted from the Bonanza Creek Case , and its application to the prerogative or to the legislative or executive power of the States in relation to the specific Commonwealth power concerned, the special nature of the power may have to be taken into account. That this must be so is patent from the circumstance that the legislative powers given to the Commonwealth Parliament are all prefaced with one general express limitation, namely, "subject to this Constitution," and consequently those words, which have to be applied seriatim to each placitum, require the Court to consider with respect to each separate placitum, over and beyond the general fundamental considerations applying to all the placita, whether there is anything in the Constitution which falls within the express limitation referred to in the governing words of s. 51. That inquiry, however, must proceed consistently with the principles upon which we determine this case, for they apply generally to all powers contained in that section.
The chief contention on the part of the States is that what has been called the rule of D'Emden v Pedder [F7] justifies their immunity from Commonwealth control in respect of State trading. The rule referred to is in these terms: [F8] "When a State attempts to give to its legislative or executive authority an operation which, if valid, would fetter, control, or interfere with, the free exercise of the legislative or executive power of the Commonwealth, the attempt, unless expressly authorized by the Constitution, is to that extent invalid and inoperative." So far from that rule supporting the position taken up on behalf of the States, its language, strictly applied, is destructive of it. An authority has been set up by a State which is claimed to be an executive authority and which, if exempt from Commonwealth legislation, does fetter or interfere with free exercise of the legislative power of the Commonwealth under pl. XXXV. of s. 51, unless that placitum is not as complete as its words in their natural meaning indicate, or, since s. 107 applies to State concurrent powers equally with its exclusive powers, unless every Commonwealth legislative power, however complete in itself, is subject to the unrestricted operation of every State Act. It is said that the rule above stated must be read as reciprocal, because some of the reasoning in D'Emden v Pedder [F9] indicates a reciprocal invalidity of Commonwealth law where the State is concerned. It is somewhat difficult to extract such a statement from the judgment: it would be obiter if found. It is said, however, that the later cases regard D'Emden v Pedder as supporting that view, and ultimately the doctrine of mutual non-interference finds its most distinct formulation in Attorney-General for Queensland v Attorney-General for the Commonwealth. [F10] There Griffith C.J., assuming the implication of non-interference to arise prima facie from necessity in all cases, and then to be subject to exclusion where the necessity ended, proceeded to say: "It is manifest that, since the rule is founded upon the necessity of the implication, the implication is excluded if it appears upon consideration of the whole Constitution that the Commonwealth, or, conversely, the State, was intended to have power to do the act the validity of which is impeached." Then, how is that intention to be ascertained? The learned Chief Justice proceeds to ascertain it by reference to outside circumstances, not of law or constitutional practice, but of fact, such as the expectations and hopes of persons undefined that Crown lands then leased would become private property. It is an interpretation of the Constitution depending on an implication which is formed on a vague, individual conception of the spirit of the compact, which is not the result of interpreting any specific language to be quoted, nor referable to any recognized principle of the common law of the Constitution, and which, when started, is rebuttable by an intention of exclusion equally not referable to any language of the instrument or acknowledged common law constitutional principle, but arrived at by the Court on the opinions of Judges as to hopes and expectations respecting vague external conditions. This method of interpretation cannot, we think, provide any secure foundation for Commonwealth or State action, and must inevitably lead-and in fact has already led-to divergencies and inconsistencies more and more pronounced as the decisions accumulate. Those who rely on American authorities for limiting pl. XXXV. in the way suggested, would find in the celebrated judgment of Marshall C.J. in Gibbons v Ogden [F11] two passages militating strongly against their contention. One is at p. 189 in these words: "We know of no rule for construing the extent of such powers, other than is given by the language of the instrument which confers them, taken in connection with the purposes for which they were conferred." The other is at p. 196, where, speaking of the commerce power, the learned Chief Justice says: "This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the Constitution." In Keller v The United States, [F12] at p. 146 it is said of the State police power: "That power, like all other reserved powers of the States, is subordinate to those in terms conferred by the Constitution upon the nation." Passing to one of the latest American decisions, Virginia v West Virginia, [F13] and particularly at pp. 596, 603, the pre-eminence of federal authority within the ambit of the text of the Constitution is maintained with equal clearness and vigour.
But we conceive that American authorities, however illustrious the tribunals may be, are not a secure basis on which to build fundamentally with respect to our own Constitution. While in secondary and subsidiary matters they may, and sometimes do, afford considerable light and assistance, they cannot, for reasons we are about to state, be recognized as standards whereby to measure the respective rights of the Commonwealth and States under the Australian Constitution. For the proper construction of the Australian Constitution it is essential to bear in mind two cardinal features of our political system which are interwoven in its texture and, notwithstanding considerable similarity of structural design, including the depositary of the residual powers, radically distinguish it from the American Constitution. Pervading the instrument, they must be taken into account in determining the meaning of its language. One is the common sovereignty of all parts of the British Empire; the other is the principle of responsible government. The combined effect of these features is that the expression "State" and the expression "Commonwealth" comprehend both the strictly legal conception of the King in right of a designated territory, and the people of that territory considered as a political organism. The indivisibility of the Crown will be presently considered in its bearing on the specific argument in this case. The general influence of the principle of responsible government in the Constitution may be more appropriately referred to now.
In the words of a distinguished lawyer and statesman. Lord Haldane, when a member of the House of Commons, delivered on the motion for leave to introduce the bill for the Act which we are considering:"The difference between the Constitution which this bill proposes to set up and the Constitution of the United States is enormous and fundamental. This bill is permeated through and through with the spirit of the greatest institution which exists in the Empire, and which pertains to every Constitution established within the Empire-I mean the institution of responsible government, a government under which the Executive is directly responsible to- may, is almost the creature of-the Legislature. This is not so in America, but it is so with all the Constitutions we have granted to our self-governing colonies. On this occasion we establish a Constitution modelled on our own model, pregnant with the same spirit, and permeated with the principle of responsible government. Therefore, what you have here is nothing akin to the Constitution of the United States except in its most superficial features." With these expressions we entirely agree. The recent case of Commercial Cable Co v Government of Newfoundland [F14] is a landmark in the legal development of the Constitution. There the principle of responsible government was held by the Privy Council to control the question of the Crown's liability on an agreement made by the Government of Newfoundland. The elective Chamber having made a rule-not a law, be it observed-for regulating its own proceedings, requiring certain contracts to be approved by a resolution of the House, it was held that, in view of the constitutional practice of the Executive conforming, under the principle of responsible government, to the requirement of the elective Chamber, the rule was a restriction on the Governor's power under his commission to represent the Crown, and consequently on his power on behalf of the Crown to contract, which everyone transacting public business with him must be taken to know. The rule was in terms held to have become part of the Constitution of Newfoundland. How far that principle affects the question of executive power, necessarily correlative to legislative power, is indefinite, and does not now fall to be considered. But it is plain that, in view of the two features of common and indivisible sovereignty and responsible government, no more profound error could be made than to endeavour to find our way through our own Constitution by the borrowed light of the decisions, and sometimes the dicta , that American institutions and circumstances have drawn from the distinguished tribunals of that country. See also the observations of Sir Henry Jenkyns in British Rule and Jurisdiction Beyond the Seas, at p. 90. We therefore look to the judicial authorities which are part of our own development, which have grown up beside our political system, have guided it, have been influenced by it and are consistent with it, and which, so far as they existed in 1900, we must regard as in the contemplation of those who, whether in the Convention or in the Imperial Parliament, brought our Constitution into being, and which, so far as they are of later date, we are bound to look to as authoritative for us.
The settled rules of construction which we have to apply have been very distinctly enunciated by the highest tribunals of the Empire. To those we must conform ourselves: for, whatever finality the law gives to our decisions on questions like the present, it is as incumbent upon this Court in arriving at its conclusions to adhere to principles so established as it is admittedly incumbent upon the House of Lords or Privy Council in cases arising before those ultimately final tribunals.
What, then, are the settled rules of construction? The first, and "golden rule" or "universal rule" as it has been variously termed, has been settled in Grey v Pearson, [F15] at p. 106 and the Sussex Peerage Case, [F16] at p. 143, in well-known passages which are quoted by Lord Macnaghten in Vacher's Case. [F17] Lord Haldane L.C., in the same case, [F18] made some observations very pertinent to the present occasion. His Lordship, after stating that speculation on the motives of the Legislature was a topic which Judges cannot profitably or properly enter upon, said:"Their province is the very different one of construing the language in which the Legislature has finally expressed its conclusions, and if they undertake the other province which belongs to those who, in making the laws, have to endeavour to interpret the desire of the country, they are in danger of going astray in a labyrinth to the character of which they have no sufficient guide. In endeavouring to place the proper interpretation on the sections of the statute before this House sitting in its judicial capacity. I propose, therefore, to exclude consideration of everything excepting the state of the law as it was when the statute was passed, and the light to be got by reading it as a whole, before attempting to construe any particular section. Subject to this consideration. I think that the only safe course is to read the language of the statute in what seems to be its natural sense." In the case of Inland Revenue Commissioners v Herbert [F19] Lord Haldane reaffirms the principle, with special reference to legislation of a novel kind. Other cases, of equal authority, could be cited, but it is not necessary.
With respect to the interpretation of a written Constitution, the Privy Council has in several cases laid down principles which should be observed by Courts of law, and these principles have been stated in the clearest terms. In R. v Burah [F20] Lord Selborne, in speaking of the case where a question arises as to whether any given legislation exceeds the power granted, says:"The established Courts of Justice, when a question arises whether the prescribed limits have been exceeded, must of necessity determine that question: and the only way in which they can properly do so, is by looking to the terms of the instrument by which, affirmatively, the legislative powers were created, and by which, negatively, they are restricted. If what has been done is legislation, within the general scope of the affirmative words which give the power, and if it violates no express condition or restriction by which that power is limited (in which category would, of course, be included any Act of the Imperial Parliament at variance with it), it is not for any Court of Justice to inquire further, or to enlarge constructively those conditions and restrictions." In Attorney-General for Ontario v Attorney-General for Canada, [F21] at p. 583 Lord Loreburn L.C., for the Judicial Committee, said:"In the interpretation of a completely self-governing Constitution founded upon a written organic instrument, such as the British North America Act, if the text is explicit the text is conclusive, alike in what it directs and what it forbids. When the text is ambiguous, as, for example, when the words establishing two mutually exclusive jurisdictions are wide enough to bring a particular power within either, recourse must be had to the context and scheme of the Act."
In two decisions the Judicial Committee has applied these principles to the interpretation of this Constitution, namely, Webb v Outrim [F22] and the Colonial Sugar Refining Co 's Case. [F23] In the first mentioned case, quite independently of any observations as to the meaning of the word "unconstitutional," it is clear that their Lordships proceeded on the ordinary lines of statutory construction. In the second case the Judicial Committee considered the nature of the instrument itself in order to determine the more satisfactorily the depository of residual powers, and having arrived at the conclusion, as to which this Court has never faltered, that the Commonwealth is a government of enumerated or selected legislative powers, their Lordships examined the language of s. 51 to ascertain from its words whether the suggested power could be deduced. The method of arriving at the conclusion is all that is relevant here. We therefore are bound to follow the course of judicial investigation which those two august tribunals of the Empire have marked out as required by law.
Before approaching, for this purpose, the consideration of the provisions of the Constitution itself, we should state explicitly that the doctrine of "implied prohibition" against the exercise of a power once ascertained in accordance with ordinary rules of construction, was definitely rejected by the Privy Council in Webb v Outrim. [F24] Though subsequently reaffirmed by three members of this Court, it has as often been rejected by two other members of the Court, and has never been unreservedly accepted and applied. From its nature, it is incapable of consistent application, because "necessity" in the sense employed-a political sense-must vary in relation to various powers and various States, and, indeed, various periods and circumstances. Not only is the judicial branch of the Government inappropriate to determine political necessities, but experience, both in Australia and America, evidenced by discordant decisions, has proved both the elusiveness and the inaccuracy of the doctrine as a legal standard. Its inaccuracy is perhaps the more thoroughly perceived when it is considered what the doctrine of "necessity" in a political sense means. It means the necessity of protection against the aggression of some outside and possibly hostile body. It is based on distrust, lest powers, if once conceded to the least degree, might be abused to the point of destruction. But possible abuse of powers is no reason in British law for limiting the natural force of the language creating them. It may be taken into account by the parties when creating the powers, and they, by omission of suggested powers or by safeguards introduced by them into the compact, may delimit the powers created. But, once the parties have by the terms they employ defined the permitted limits, no Court has any right to narrow those limits by reason of any fear that the powers as actually circumscribed by the language naturally understood may be abused. This has been pointed our by the Privy Council on several occasions, including the case of the Bank of Toronto v Lambe, [F25] at pp. 586-587. The ordinary meaning of the terms employed in one place may be restricted by terms used elsewhere: that is pure legal construction. But, once their true meaning is so ascertained, they cannot be further limited by the fear of abuse. The non-granting of powers, the expressed qualifications of powers granted, the expressed retention of powers, are all to be taken into account by a Court. But the extravagant use of the granted powers in the actual working of the Constitution is a matter to be guarded against by the constituencies and not by the Courts. When the people of Australia, to use the words of the Constitution itself, "united in a Federal Commonwealth," they took power to control by ordinary constitutional means any attempt on the part of the national Parliament to misuse its powers. If it be conceivable that the representatives of the people of Australia as a whole would ever proceed to use their national powers to injure the people of Australia considered sectionally, it is certainly within the power of the people themselves to resent and reverse what may be done. No protection of this Court in such a case is necessary or proper. Therefore, the doctrine of political necessity, as means of interpretation, is indefensible on any ground. The one clear line of judicial inquiry as to the meaning of the Constitution must be to read it naturally in the light of the circumstances in which it was made, with knowledge of the combined fabric of the common law, and the statute law which preceded it, and then lucet ipsa per se.
The Constitution was established by the Imperial Act 63 & 64 Vict. c. 12. The Act recited the agreement of the people of the various colonies, as they then were, "to unite in one indissoluble Federal Commonwealth under the Crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and under the Constitution hereby established." "The Crown," as that recital recognizes, is one and indivisible throughout the Empire. Elementary as that statement appears, it is essential to recall it, because its truth and its force have been overlooked, not merely during the argument of this case, but also on previous occasions. Distinctions have been relied on between the "Imperial King." the "Commonwealth King" and the "State King." It has been said that the Commonwealth King has no power to bind the first and the last, and, reciprocally, the last cannot bind either of the others. The first step in the examination of the Constitution is to emphasize the primary legal axiom that the Crown is ubiquitous and indivisible in the King's dominions. Though the Crown is one and indivisible throughout the Empire, its legislative, executive and judicial power is exercisable by different agents in different localities, or in respect of different purposes in the same locality, in accordance with the common law, or the statute law there binding the Crown (Williams v Howarth; [F26] Municipalities' Case; [F27] Theodore v Duncan, [F28] and The Commonwealth v Zachariassen and Blom). [F29] The Act 63 & 64 Vict. c. 12, establishing the Federal Constitution of Australia, being passed by the Imperial Parliament for the express purpose of regulating the royal exercise of legislative, executive and judicial power throughout Australia, is by its own inherent force binding on the Crown to the extent of its operation. It may be that even if s. V. of the Act 63 & 64 Vict. c. 12 had not been enacted, the force of s. 51 of the Constitution itself would have bound the Crown in right of a State so far as any law validly made under it purported to affect the Crown in that right: but, however that may be, it is clear to us that in presence of both s. V. of the Act and s. 51 of the Constitution that result must follow. The Commonwealth Constitution as it exists for the time being, dealing expressly with sovereign functions of the Crown in its relation to Commonwealth and to States, necessarily so far binds the Crown, and laws validly made by authority of the Constitution, bind, so far as they purport to do so, the people of every State considered as individuals or as political organisms called States-in other words, bind both Crown and subjects.
The grant of legislative power to the Commonwealth is, under the doctrine of Hodge v The Queen, [F30] at p. 132 and within the prescribed limits of area and subject matter, the grant of an "authority as plenary and as ample ... as the Imperial Parliament in the plenitude of its power possessed and could bestow," a doctrine affirmed and applied in a remarkable degree in Attorney-General for Canada v Cain and Gilhula, [F31] at p. 547. "The nature and principles of legislation" (to employ the words of Lord Selborne in Burah's Case), [F32] the nature of dominion self-government and the decisions just cited entirely preclude, in our opinion, a a priori contention that the grant of legislative power to the Commonwealth Parliament as representing the will of the whole of the people of all the States of Australia should not bind within the geographical area of the Commonwealth and within the limits of the enumerated powers, ascertained by the ordinary process of construction, the States and their agencies as representing separate sections of the territory. These considerations establish that the extent to which the Crown, considered in relation to the Empire or to the Commonwealth or to the States, is bound by any law within the granted authority of the Parliament, depends on the indication which the law gives of intention to bind the Crown. It is undoubted that those who maintain the authority of the Commonwealth Parliament to pass a certain law should be able to point to some enumerated power containing the requisite authority. But we also hold that, where the affirmative terms of a stated power would justify an enactment, it rests upon those who rely on some limitation or restriction upon the power, to indicate it in the Constitution.
Applying these principles to the present case, the matter stands thus:Sec. 51 (XXXV.) is in terms so general that it extends to all industrial disputes in fact extending beyond the limits of any one State, no exception being expressed as to industrial disputes in which States are concerned: but subject to any special provision to the contrary elsewhere in the Constitution. The respondents suggest only section 107 as containing by implication a provision to the contrary. The answer is that s. 107 contains nothing which in any way either cuts down the meaning of the expression "industrial disputes" in s. 51 (XXXV.) or exempts the Crown in right of a State, when party to an industrial dispute in fact, from the operation of Commonwealth legislation under s. 51 (XXXV.). Section 107 continues the previously existing powers of every State Parliament to legislate with respect to (1) State exclusive powers and (2) State powers which are concurrent with Commonwealth powers. But it is a fundamental and fatal error to read s. 107 as reserving any power from the Commonwealth that falls fairly within the explicit terms of an express grant in s. 51, as that grant is reasonably construed, unless that reservation is as explicitly stated. The effect of State legislation, though fully within the powers preserved by s. 107, may in a given case depend on s. 109. However valid and binding on the people of the State where no relevant Commonwealth legislation exists, the moment it encounters repugnant Commonwealth legislation operating on the same field the State legislation must give way. This is the true foundation of the doctrine stated in D'Emden v Pedder [F33] in the so-called rule quoted, which is after all only a paraphrase of s. 109 of the Constitution. The supremacy thus established by express words of the Constitution has been recognized by the Privy Council without express provision in the case of the Canadian Constitution (see. e.g., La Compagnie Hydraulique v Continental Heat and Light Co, [F34] at p. 198). The doctrine of "implied prohibition" finds no place where the ordinary principles of construction are applied so as to discover in the actual terms of the instrument their expressed or necessarily implied meaning. The principle we apply to the Commonwealth we apply also to the States, leaving their respective acts of legislation full operation within their respective areas and subject matters, but, in case of conflict, giving to valid Commonwealth legislation the supremacy expressly declared by the Constitution, measuring that supremacy according to the very words of s. 109. That section, which says "When a law of a State is inconsistent with a law of the Commonwealth, the latter shall prevail, and the former shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be invalid," gives supremacy, not to any particular class of Commonwealth Acts but to every Commonwealth Act, over not merely State Acts passed under concurrent powers but all State Acts, though passed under an exclusive power, if any provisions of the two conflict; as they may-if they do not, then radit qaestio .
We therefore hold that States, and persons natural or artificial representing States, when parties to industrial disputes in fact, are subject to Commonwealth legislation under pl. XXXV. of s. 51 of the Constitution, if such legislation on its true construction applies to them.
That answers the first of the questions for our determination, which we have categorically set out.
The Minister for Trading Concerns.-The second question arises as to each respondent. Of the three State respondents mentioned, the only real one is the Minister for Trading Concerns; the other two may turn out to be mere names. The dispute to which the Minister is party, being manifestly and admittedly one which no one would deny was an "industrial dispute" if a private person were the employer, it follows from what has been said that it is, as regards the Minister, an industrial dispute within the meaning of s. 51 (XXXV.).
Previous Cases.-It is proper that, in view of our revision of prior decisions, we should, for the guidance of Commonwealth and States and the better to evidence the meaning of this judgment, indicate the future authority or otherwise of some of the principal cases involved in our consideration of this matter.
D'Emden v Pedder [F35] was a case of conflict between Commonwealth law and State law. The Commonwealth law (Audit Act 1901) made provision as to how public moneys of the Commonwealth were to be paid out: written vouchers were required for all accounts paid (ss. 34 (6) and 46). The irresistible construction of the Act is that these vouchers, which the law requires for the protection of the Commonwealth Consolidated Revenue Fund, are to be under the sole control of the Commonwealth authorities. A State Act making it an offence to give such a voucher except on a condition imposed by the State Parliament, namely, a tax in aid of the State revenue, was, so far, manifestly inconsistent with the Commonwealth law. Section 109 of the Constitution applies to such a case, and establishes the invalidity to that extent of the State law. The decision rests on the supremacy created by s. 109. and is sound. So far as any observation in that case can be regarded as favouring a reciprocal doctrine creating invalidity of Commonwealth legislation by reason of State Constitution or legislation, that observation must be considered as unwarranted by the Constitution, and overruled.
Deakin v Webb and Lyne v Webb [F36] were cases in which it was held that the State Income Tax Act of Victoria did not validly extend to tax moneys which had been received as Commonwealth salary. The decision was rested on two grounds, both found in the American case of Dobbins v Erie County. [F37] The first ground is that taxation of a person who is a Federal officer necessarily, per se, so far as it reaches money he received as salary, and although it so reaches that money by reason of provisions which apply generally to the whole community without discrimination, is an interference with the means employed by the Commonwealth for the performance of its constitutional functions. The second ground is that the State Income Tax Act was in conflict with the Commonwealth law fixing the officer's salary. The law, as laid down in those cases, was dissented from by the Privy Council in Webb v Outrim, [F38] and was disapproved by two Justices as against three in the subsequent case of Baxter v Commissioners of Taxation (N.S.W.). [F39] Having regard to the principles we have stated, the first ground is erroneous. An act of the State Legislature discriminating against Commonwealth officers might well be held to have the necessary effect of conflicting with the provision made by the Commonwealth law for its officers relatively to the rest of the community. The second ground depends on the construction of the Commonwealth Act with which the State Act is alleged to conflict. If, on a proper construction of both Acts, they conflict, the State Act is, to that extent, invalid. But that is so by force of the express words of s. 109, and not by reason of any implied prohibition. The final result is to be reached, not by a Commonwealth Act permitting the State Legislature to exercise a power it does not possess-except where the Constitution itself so provides, as in s. 91 and s. 114-but by valid Commonwealth legislation expressly or impliedly by marking limits conflicting with State legislation which is valid except for the operation of s. 109. It is on this ground that the actual decision in (Caplin v Commissioner of Taxes (S.A.) [F40] is to be upheld as correct. Baxter's Case, [F41] of course, is in the same position as Deakin v Webb. [F42]
In the Railway Servants' Case [F43] the decision in D'Emden v Pedder [F44] was applied e converso. To reach that result the Court, relying upon a great number of American cases, held (1) that the rule as quoted from the earlier case could and should be applied conversely, and (2) that State railways were specially recognized by the Constitution as "State instrumentalities" for "governmental functions" and beyond the ambit of Commonwealth legislative power. It is apparent that if, as we have stated, the true basis of D'Emden v Pedder [F45] is the supremacy of Commonwealth law over State law where they meet on any field, there can be no possible reciprocity. Mutual supremacy is a contradiction of terms. Commonwealth legislation on an exclusive field, such as the Post Office, might conflict in incidental provisions with State legislation on a main exclusive field or as to incidental provisions; for instance, offences might be inconsistently dealt with, or, as recent examples, the prohibition of State referenda, and the closing of hotels on Commonwealth election day. The first ground is not legally sustainable. With respect to the second ground, the general proprietary right of the States in respect of their railways is undoubtedly recognized and specially protected: but the Constitution just as clearly confers upon the Commonwealth Parliament the express power stated in pl. XXXV., and does not proceed to except therefrom the States, as it does (subject to a qualification) in relation to banking (pl. XIII.) and insurance (pl. XIV.). But, as Lord Danedin said for the Privy Council in Attorney-General for Canada v Ritchie Contracting and Supply Co, [F46] at p. 1005: "It has often been pointed out that the domain of legislation is quite a different matter from proprietary rights." It was so pointed out, for instance, in Attorney-General for Canada v Attorney-General for Ontario (the Fisheries Case) [F47] and in Ontario Mining Co v Scybold, [F48] at p. 82. Railways not only can be, but have been, and are at the present time, privately owned and operated. They do not stand in any different position, so far as regards the legislative authority of the Commonwealth under pl. XXXV., from that occupied by the trading concerns of Western Australia. "The text is explicit," to repeat Lord Loreburn's phrase. So the matter stands with respect to the Railway Servants' Case [F49] in principle. But further, it is hopelessly opposed to the decision in the following volume of the Commonwealth Law Reports-Attorney-General for New South Wales v Collector of Customs for New South Wales (the Steel Rails Case). [F50] In that case it was unanimously decided by five Justices that, apart from s. 114 of the Constitution, there was nothing to prevent the Commonwealth Customs Act operating so as to prevent the States importing steel rails for their railways free of duty. If the Customs Act applied at all, it could apply to prohibit the importation of steel rails or any other article required for State railways. A more drastic interference than that case sanctions can hardly be imagined. It was an insistence on money being applied from the State Treasury for purposes of the Commonwealth Treasury as a condition of the State being allowed to import steel rails from abroad for use on its railways. Some difference of opinion occurred as to the nature of the duty, but none as to the primary validity of the interference. Difference of opinion also arose as to the reasons for permitting the primary interference. Griffith C.J. relied on (1) the doctrine of "necessity" and (2) that the State function protected must be exercised within the State. The first ground we have dealt with, and as to the second it is to be observed that the function sought to be protected was the function not of importing goods but of operating State railways. Barton J. thought that as the legislative power of the Commonwealth was exclusive, the State could not complain. But no distinction is made in the Constitution as to Commonwealth authority between its exclusive and its concurrent powers. That distinction affects the legislative power of the States, but not the effect of Commonwealth Acts once made, O'Connor J. rested on the necessity of maintaining the effective exercise of the Commonwealth power. But that applies to every power. Isaacs J. rested on his views in R. v Sutton (the Wire Netting Case). [F51] In that case Isaacs J. and Higgins J. held primarily that the Commonwealth commerce power as to foreign trade was complete, that the Crown was indivisible, but that its power varies in different localities, even in the same locality, and therefore the Crown, in right of New South Wales, was bound by what the Crown, in right of the Commonwealth, had enacted.
It is plain, therefore, that the utmost confusion and uncertainty exist as the decisions now stand. The Railway Servants' Case [F52] is wholly irreconcilable with the Steel Rails Case. [F53] The latter is sustainable on the principles we have enunciated; the former is not. The Railway Servants' Case , consequently, cannot any longer be regarded as law. There are other cases in which the doctrine of implied prohibition is more or less called in aid to limit the otherwise plain import of legislative grants to the Commonwealth: it is sometimes difficult to say how far the decision is dependent upon such a doctrine, and therefore we hesitate to pronounce upon those cases, and leave them for further consideration, subject to the law as settled by this decision; but it is beyond any doubt that the doctrine of "implied prohibition" can no longer be permitted to sustain a contention, and, so far as any recorded decision rests upon it, that decision must be regarded as unsound.
We have anxiously endeavoured to remove the inconsistencies fast accumulating and obscuring the comparatively clear terms of the national compact of the Australian people: we have striven to fulfil the duty the Constitution places upon this Court of loyally permitting that great instrument of government to speak with its own voice, clear of any qualifications which the people of the Commonwealth or, at their request, the Imperial Parliament have not thought fit to express, and clear of any questions of expediency or political exigency which this Court is neither intended to consider nor equipped with the means of determining.
We therefore answer the two questions in the terms to be stated by the Chief Justice.