Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (NSW) v. Zest Manufacturing Co Pty Ltd

(1949) 79 CLR 166
23 ALJ 520

(Judgment by: Rich J)

Between: Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (NSW)
And: Zest Manufacturing Co Pty Ltd

Court:
High Court of Australia

Judges: Latham CJ

Rich J
Dixon J
McTiernan J
Williams J
Webb J

Hearing date: December 12 1949
Judgment date: 12 December 1949

Judgment by:
Rich J

The question for determination is the meaning of "livestock" in item 6 (4) of the Sales Tax (Exemptions and Classifications) Act 1935-1947. The context in which the word is set lifts the question out of the quagmire of dictionary meanings. "One of the main objects of every dictionary of the English language is to give an adequate and comprehensive definition of every word contained in it, which involves setting forth all the different meanings which can properly be given to the particular word. The Court, on the other hand, in determining what is the true meaning of a particular word used in an instrument which it has to construe, has to ascertain in what sense the parties to that instrument have used the word: all the help the Court can derive from dictionaries in such a case is, in case of doubt, to ascertain that the meaning which it comes to the conclusion ought to be attributed to the word is one which may properly be given to it" (Mills v. Cannon Brewing Co. Ltd. (1920) 2 Ch 38 , at pp 44, 45 ). (at p172)

The instrument in question, as is the case in some wills, furnishes its own dictionary. The whole structure of item 6 indicates that the livestock for which provision is there made consists of horses, cattle, sheep and pigs, and in Australia the words stock-yard and stock-whip refer to cattle. In ordinary parlance livestock would not include poultry, bees or fish. Moreover specific provision is made for poultry, bees and fish in items 11, 12 and 20a. (at p172)

The decision in the case referred to by Mr. White - Peterborough Royal Foxhound Show Society v. Inland Revenue Commissioners [1936] 2 KB 497 does not, in my opinion, affect this case. There the learned judge was construing s. 11 (2) of the Finance Act, 1923, 13 and 14 Geo. 5 c. 14, which defines "industry" as including agriculture, and "agriculture" is defined as including livestock breeding, and "livestock" is defined as animals of any description. And the learned judge considered that this definition was wide enough to include foxhound breeding. But in the instant case there is no definition of livestock and one does not construe one statute by expressions and definitions in another statute. (at p172)

I would answer the question submitted in the negative. (at p172)