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Jax Tyres Pty. Ltd. v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation.

Judges:
Beaumont J

Court:
Federal Court

Judgment date: Judgment handed down 28 September 1984.

Beaumont J.

These proceedings, originally instituted in the High Court of Australia, were remitted to this Court by order made by Deane J. on 27 June 1984. By its amended statement of claim, the plaintiff, a retreader of tyres, seeks declaratory relief that retreaded tyres are not ``goods'' within the meaning of the Sales Tax Assessment Act (No. 1) or the Sales Tax Assessment Act (No. 3) or the Sales Tax Act (No. 1) or the Sales Tax Act (No. 3); that the operations of retreading carried on by the plaintiff are not the ``manufacture'' of goods by the plaintiff within the meaning of the Sales Tax Assessment Act (No. 1) or the Sales Tax Act (No. 1) and are not goods ``manufactured'' in Australia within the meaning of the Sales Tax Assessment Act (No. 3) and the Sales Tax Act (No. 3); and that the retreading of a tyre for another party where the plaintiff does not purchase the tyre is not deemed to be or to involve a ``sale'' by the plaintiff to the person for whom a tyre is so retreaded for the purposes of the Sales Tax Assessment Act (No. 1).

The plaintiff carries on business in premises it describes as a ``retread factory'' in a Sydney suburb. In some cases, the plaintiff retreads tyres for customers and charges a fee for its services; no property in the tyres passes to the plaintiff. In other cases, the plaintiff purchases worn tyres, processes them and sells them itself as ``retreads''. In the case of truck tyres, almost all (90%-95%) of the tyres retreaded by the plaintiff fall into the former class of case. For passenger car tyres, the plaintiff retreads tyres for customers in about the same numbers as it processes for itself with a view to sale.

The processes of retreading employed by the plaintiff are known as ``topcapping'', ``fullcapping'', ``remoulding'' and ``pre-curing''. In the process of topcapping, new tread rubber is applied only to the area of the casing which normally comes into contact with the road. For fullcapping, new tread rubber is not only applied to that area of the worn tyre casing which comes into contact with the road, but is extended to cover the shoulder areas as well. In remoulding, rubber is removed as is necessary and new rubber, extending from bead to bead, is applied. (The bead area is that part of the tyre made of steel wires, wrapped or reinforced by ply cords and shaped to fit the rim of the wheel.) Pre-curing is mentioned below.

For each of the aforesaid processes, the plaintiff obtains worn tyres, for both passenger and truck vehicles, from worn tyre (casing) dealers, tyre retailers and private owners, particularly truck operators. Upon its receipt at the plaintiff's factory, a tyre is examined externally and internally to ensure that it is suitable for retreading in accordance with the standards prescribed by Australian Standard Specification No. A.S. 1973-1976 in respect of

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``retreaded pneumatic passenger car tyres''. If the casing of a tyre remains sound, it may be retreaded more than once. This frequently happens in the case of truck tyres.

In the retreading process, the tread surface to be treated is uniformly buffed, in accordance with the Australian Standard Specification, to remove all old and excess rubber and to prepare a clean surface. Truck tyres and, in some cases, passenger car tyres, are then sprayed with a rubber solution to ensure adhesion of tread rubber to the buffed surface. The rubber is then applied by one of two methods. In the processes of recapping, topcapping or remoulding, an orbitread machine is used to apply extruded tread rubber to the casing. The rubber is extruded in the form of a continuous hot ribbon which is wound, in overlapping layers, around the circumferences of the casing. In the process of pre-curing, which the plaintiff uses only for retreading truck tyres, the tread rubber purchased by the plaintiff is already cured with the desired tread pattern moulded into it. A thick layer of unvulcanised rubber bonding is applied to the back of the pre-cured tread. After the application of the new tread rubber, the tyre is ready for curing. The curing processes vary, but it will suffice to say that they involve the application of heat and pressure to the tyre.

The rubber which is applied to the tread area of a tyre is significantly stronger than that forming or applied to the casing, but, since casing rubber does not come into contact with the road, it does not wear as quickly as the tread area so that, as has been mentioned, it is possible to retread a tyre more than once. At the same time, there are limits to the depth of tread which can be applied to a worn casing. During use, a tyre will build up heat which is directly related to tread depth; the greater the tread depth, the greater the build up of heat with a consequent increase in the prospect of failure in the casing.

Although retreaded, the original tyre does not lose its identity. The retreading processes are apparently well developed and effective but I accept the evidence of Mr. Hurrell, a director of the plaintiff, that it is easy, even for the inexperienced, to distinguish between a new tyre and a retreaded tyre. One manufacturer of truck tyres, Toyo Australia Limited, specifically contemplates that a retread will be carried out as part of the framework of its warranty on the sale of a new tyre. The warranty is in these terms:

``Toyo Australia Limited warrants the TOYO radial truck tyre casing against defects in workmanship or materials for a period of three years (36 months) from the date of manufacture or up to the buffing stage of the second recap, whichever comes first, provided that the recap has been carried out by one of Toyo's own retread factories.''

At least one of the States has legislated in this area. By the Motor Traffic Regulations, 1935 (N.S.W.) (Sch. F. para. 82(d)), on or after 1 January 1980, no tyre which has been treated by the process known as retreading shall be fitted to any motor car (an omnibus excepted), unless such tyre complies with Australian Standard Specification No. A.S. 1973-1976. This specification sets out minimum requirements for the retreading of pneumatic passenger car tyres, and defines the performance, and dimensional and physical requirements for the retreaded tyres. The specification includes requirements for retread materials, limits of damage, processing, marking and final inspection. The range of tyre referred to is that covered by Australian Standard Specification ASD31, that is, new pneumatic passenger car tyres and corresponding older tyres. The specification adopts the dictionary definition of retreading as ``a process of reconditioning a worn tyre by topcapping, fullcapping or remoulding''. The performance standard prescribed by the specification in the case of a retreaded radial ply car tyre, the most common type, is a maximum road speed of 135 kilometres p.h. Further, each retreaded tyre is required by the specification to be marked with the word ``retread''.

In the case of a passenger tyre, the average weight of rubber applied in the retreading process is approximately three kilograms. For a truck tyre, the weight is in the range of 10 to 12 kilograms.

In the case of truck tyres, a retread is approximately $200 cheaper than a new tyre. The retail price of a cheap radial tyre for a passenger vehicle is in the range of $45 to $50. The same type of tyre, when retreaded, is sold as a retread in the retail price range of $26 to $35. There is also a market for second-hand or used tyres. Usually, they are tyres which have not been retreaded.

The general scheme of the sales tax legislation is to levy sales tax on the last wholesale sale of goods, usually by the last

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wholesaler to the retailer. The tax is imposed on goods which are made in, or imported into, Australia for consumption here. Second-hand goods are not subject to tax (see
D.F.C. of T. (S.A.) v. Ellis & Clark Limited (1934) 52 C.L.R. 85).

By sec. 3(1) of the Sales Tax Assessment Act (No. 1), 1930, ``goods'' includes commodities, but does not include:

``(a) goods which have, either through a process of retailing or otherwise, gone into use or consumption in Australia; or

(b) goods which are sold as second-hand goods and are manufactured exclusively or principally from goods which -

  • (i) have, whether alone or as parts of other goods, gone into use or consumption in Australia; and
  • (ii) in the opinion of the Commissioner, in their condition as parts of the goods so manufactured, retain their character as goods or parts of goods which have gone into use or consumption in Australia.''

``Manufacture'' is defined to include:

``(a) production;

(b) the combination of parts or ingredients whereby an article or substance is formed which is commercially distinct from those parts or ingredients, except such combination... as, in the opinion of the Commissioner, it is customary or reasonably practicable for users or consumers of those articles or substances to undertake;

...''

By sec. 3(4) of the Assessment Act (No. 1), for the purposes of the Act, a person shall be deemed to have sold goods if, in the performance of any contract (not being a contract for the sale of goods) under which he has received, or is entitled to receive, valuable consideration, he supplies goods the property in which (whether as goods or in some other form) passes, under the terms of the contract, to some other person. Thus, where any person, for valuable consideration, repairs the goods of another person and, in the course of carrying out those repairs, supplies goods which are used in, wrought into or attached to the goods of that other person, the goods so supplied are deemed to be sold by the repairer to that other person (see Commonwealth Sales Tax, Australian Government Publishing Service, 1970, at p. 216).

By sec. 17(1) of the Assessment Act (No. 1), the sales tax imposed by the Sales Tax Act (No. 1) 1930 shall be levied and paid upon the sale value of goods manufactured in Australia by a taxpayer and sold by him or treated by him as stock for sale by retail or applied to his own use. By sec. 17A(1) of the Assessment Act (No. 1), where:

``(a) goods have been manufactured in Australia by a person for another person (... the `customer') under an agreement entered into after 20 September 1978; and

(b) the goods were manufactured in whole or in part out of materials supplied by the customer,

the manufacturer of the goods shall, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed to have sold the goods to the customer at the time when the goods were delivered to the customer, or were delivered under an agreement with the customer to some other person, and the customer shall... be deemed to be the purchaser of the goods.''

The plaintiff first submits that none of the processes of retreading tyres involves a ``manufacture''. Alternatively, it submits that, even if there is a manufacture, the retreads are not ``goods'' within the meaning of the statute.

In aid of its argument on the construction of the Acts, the plaintiff referred to the parliamentary history of the relevant legislation (cf. Acts Interpretation Act 1901, sec. 15AB). In its original form, the Assessment Act (No. 1) simply defined ``manufacture'' as including production. ``Goods'' was simply defined as including commodities. But, in 1932, the Act was amended as a result of the decision of the High Court in
Irving v. Munro & Sons Limited (1931) 46 C.L.R. 279. There, the defendant imported motor cycles into Australia in cases, each case containing all the parts necessary to complete a motor cycle, with the exception of tyres and tubes. Upon arrival at the defendant's works, the parts were removed from the case and re-assembled. Locally purchased tyres and tubes were fitted. It was held that the defendant was not a ``manufacturer'' within the meaning of the Assessment Act (No. 1).

As a result of this decision, by Act No. 39 of 1932, the definition of ``manufacture'' in the

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Act was omitted and the following definition was substituted:

```Manufacture' includes production, and also the combination of parts or ingredients whereby an article or substance is formed which is commercially distinct from those parts or ingredients, except such combination as, in the opinion of the Commissioner, is customary or reasonably practicable for users or consumers of those articles or substances to undertake;.''

In the second reading speech on the Bill for the amendment, the Minister introducing the Bill, the Prime Minister and Treasurer, Mr. Lyons, said (Hansard, House of Representatives, 16 September 1932, at p. 586):

``The proposed amendments, which have as their object the removal of defects and anomalies and the clarification of the law, may be briefly stated and explained as follows:

  • (a) Extension of the definition of `manufacture' -
    • In consequence of a decision of the High Court, some doubt exists as to whether a person who imports or purchases fabricated parts and combines them into a distinct commercial article can be treated as a manufacturer.
    • It is essential that the law should be clarified for the purpose of ensuring that the tax should fall, as intended, on the sale value of the completed article, and that the person who both fabricates and combines the parts of any commercial article should not be at a disadvantage in competition with persons who produce a similar article by a combination of purchased or imported parts.''

The plaintiff submits, I think correctly, that this explanation of the mischief at which the amendment was aimed supports a construction of the amendment which limits its operation to the type of case described by the Prime Minister. That class of case would not pick up a process such as retreading a worn tyre. But, as the Commissioner submits, since the definition of ``manufacture'' is framed as an inclusive one, there remains the question whether this process constitutes the manufacture of goods in any ordinary sense (see
Cohns Industries Pty. Ltd. v. D.F.C. of T. 79 ATC 4243).

The Assessment Act (No. 1) was further amended in 1936 after the decision of the High Court in Ellis & Clark (supra). The definition of ``goods'' in sec. 3(1) was amended to exclude items (a) and (b) set out in the definition provision previously cited. In introducing the amending Bill in the second reading speech, the Treasurer, Mr. Casey, as he then was, said (Hansard, House of Representatives, 19 November 1936, at p. 2130):

``Clause 5 provides for the exemption of goods manufactured wholly or principally from second-hand materials and sold as second-hand goods. The High Court's decision that sales tax was not payable on second-hand goods did not have any application to goods manufactured from second-hand materials. In very many cases where goods are so manufactured the second-hand raw materials lose their second-hand character in the process of manufacture, for instance, when scrap jewellery is melted down and used in the manufacture of other articles of jewellery. There is no doubt that such products are taxable. In some cases, however, the second-hand materials retain their second-hand character, and the product is sold as second-hand goods. The simplest instances of that are found where a bicycle is manufactured from second-hand bicycle parts or a motor car is produced by attaching a new body to a second-hand chassis. The Taxation Department has been advised that, in the latter cases, sales tax is payable on the sale of goods so produced. In some of those cases, however, it is almost impossible to determine whether the article is a manufactured article or merely repaired second-hand goods. In any case, the department is faced with the claim that the taxation of the article is contrary to the spirit of the High Court's decision on second-hand goods. The attitude of the Government is that, in view of the exemption of second-hand goods, justice is satisfied by the taxation of such new material as may be used in the production of the article which is sold as second-hand goods. The bill proposes to give effect to that attitude.''

In
Adams v. F.C. of T. (1948) 8 A.T.D. 332, the taxpayer was engaged in restoring the

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efficiency of ineffective batteries. The batteries were dismantled and each internal compartment was completely rebuilt. Part of the internal reconstruction was composed of second-hand materials, but the whole of the plates were new. The batteries were reconstructed substantially of materials supplied by the customers. The Board of Review ((1943) 11 T.B.R.D. 392) decided that the replated batteries were goods ``manufactured by the taxpayer'' within the meaning of sec. 17 of the Assessment Act (No. 1).

In argument, the taxpayer's representative referred to the retreading of tyres by way of analogy but the Board said (at p. 399):

``His reference to the retreading of tyres is in point, but it is adverse to the taxpayer. Practically the whole of the expense is represented by the cost of the materials to be combined with an otherwise practically useless old tyre and the cost of the process by which they are combined, but there is no manufacture because the retreader starts with a tyre and finishes with the same tyre (notwithstanding that without the retreading it might have been useless). This is no doubt the basis of the decision of the Magistrate in
Withers v. Wilkie's Tyre Service Co. (Local Court, Sydney, 6th August, 1931) and it marks the general characteristic which invariably distinguishes repair from manufacture: the one maintains an existing entity; the other creates a new entity.''

The taxpayer appealed to the High Court but Williams J. held that no question of law arose and dismissed the reference under sec. 42(6) of the Assessment Act (No. 1) as involving a question of fact only. However, his Honour did embark upon a consideration of the taxpayer's argument (at p. 334):

``In Ellis & Clark's case (supra) it was held that a person who purchased second-hand and other electrical goods (principally electrical motors) and resold them either with or without first repairing them was not liable to sales tax. It was pointed out that the general policy of the sales tax legislation, which must be considered as a whole, is to levy sales tax once and for all upon the last sale of the goods by wholesale, that is upon the sale to the retailer by the last wholesaler, and that to avoid double taxation goods which have gone through the process of retailing into use and consumption in Australia, and in this sense are second-hand, are outside the scope of the legislation. Dr. Louat contended that since the batteries which customers left with the taxpayer to be reconditioned were second-hand goods on which sales tax had been paid, the policy of the legislation explained in Ellis & Clark's case could only be carried into effect and double taxation avoided if the reconditioned batteries were regarded not as being a new manufacture but as the same goods as the original batteries put into repair.''

The argument was rejected (at p. 334):

``The exception contained in para. (a) of the definition of goods in the amending Act adopts the decision in Ellis & Clark's case, and the inclusion of the further exception in para. (b) enlarges the exemption of second-hand goods. But the taxpayer does not claim exemption under para. (b). He relies on para. (a). The batteries left by customers for renovation are, at the time they are left, clearly goods which fall within this exception. If therefore all that the taxpayer did was to perform some work on the batteries which could be fairly described as a repair, as for instance if he recharged them or supplied some minor part, it would be unreasonable to hold that the batteries had lost their original identity and exemption as second-hand goods. But the batteries were completely dismantled, and each internal compartment completely rebuilt. Part of this internal reconstruction was composed of second-hand materials, although the whole of the plates were new, but the alterations in the components of the batteries returned to the customers compared with their components when handed in and the work done to effect these alterations was substantial. The batteries were reconstructed substantially of materials supplied by the customers, but a person is a manufacturer within the meaning of the definition if he manufactures goods whether or not he owns the materials out of which the goods are manufactured.''

In any event, Williams J. held that the case raised only a question of fact, saying (at p. 335):

``The definition of `manufacture' in the Act is not exhaustive. It merely states what manufacture includes. So far as its meaning is not defined in the Act, the word must be

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given its ordinary grammatical meaning at the date the Act came into force. But the definition expressly includes the combination of parts or ingredients whereby an article is formed which is commercially distinct from those parts or ingredients. This part of the definition would appear merely to incorporate an ordinary grammatical meaning of the word which is to work up materials into forms suitable for use.''

The plaintiff argues, again I think correctly, that the result in Adams (supra) may be distinguished from the present case, insofar as there can be no suggestion here that the goods were completely rebuilt.

In
F.C. of T. v. Jack Zinader Proprietary Limited (1949) 78 C.L.R. 336, a furrier company received from customers fur garments which had become too badly worn and damaged to be repaired, and, after removing the defective parts, by various processes, remodelled, for those customers, what was left into modern styles of coats, fur capes, fur collars, fur coats and stoles having regard to the extent, shape and nature of the available materials. The materials used by the company in remodelling were, except about 5% of the linings, confined to those available from the customer's garment. If new linings were required, the customer supplied them. It was held by Dixon and Williams JJ., Webb J. dissenting, that the articles which resulted from the remodelling were ``goods'' ``manufactured'' and sold within the meaning of the Assessment Act (No. 1) and were liable to tax under that Act.

Dixon J. after referring to the statement by Darling J. in
McNicol v. Pinch (1906) 2 K.B. 352 at p. 361 that ``the essence of making or of manufacturing is that what is made shall be a different thing from that out of which it is made'' said that the first, and possibly the decisive question in the case, was whether the garments which resulted from the process of remodelling were different things, that is, were different ``goods'' from the garments that the customer handed over (at p. 343). He concluded (at p. 344):

``On the whole the commissioner's view appears to be the more correct. The work of the furrier is to use skins to form garments. In skins he works with materials often of great value and usually of some permanence. His skill lies in the use he can make of them and the descriptions of garment he produces. Fashion, commercial usage and his customer's tastes combine to distinguish the various descriptions of garment he makes and to compel the recognization of them as separate categories of `goods'. When he takes skins made up into one description of fur garment and produces another, he cannot be treated as having altered an existing thing without producing a new one. He has made a different article.''

His Honour also rejected a defence, based on the reasoning in Ellis & Clark (supra), that the remodelled garments fell outside the scope of the legislation because they were second-hand goods.

Williams J., affirming his opinion in Adams (supra), that the question at issue was one of fact and degree, also saw no room for the application of the reasoning in Ellis & Clark and said (at p. 350):

``The ordinary meaning of the verb manufacture is to work up materials into forms suitable for use. Where new materials are supplied there would plainly be a notional manufacture of goods within the meaning of the Act. Where old materials are supplied there would only be such a manufacture if the work done was more than a mere repair or modification of the old materials and was such as to change the old goods into goods of a different character. The purpose of the customer in leaving an old fur garment with the defendant is not to have that garment repaired or made to fit the wearer but to provide the material required for the making and fashioning of the remodelled garment. It is immaterial whether the customer leaves the old garment complete as a garment or first unpicks the old garment and leaves the pieces of fur and linings with the defendant. The defendant is not concerned to repair or alter the old garment, it is concerned to fashion a different garment out of the serviceable pieces of the old garment or, in other words, to work up this material into a new form suitable for use. This is manufacture within the ordinary meaning of the word.''

In my view, the reasoning in Zinader (supra) is decisive in the present case. When applied, that reasoning leads to the conclusion that no ``manufacture'' has occurred here. The

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question, one of fact and degree, is whether a different thing has been produced. In my opinion, it has not. Although the tread on the tyre has been replaced, the application of the retreading processes has not produced anything that is different in character from the worn tyre submitted to those processes (cf.
Mayor of Guildford v. Brown (1915) 1 K.B. 256 at p. 259).

It may be accepted that, in the public mind, as the Australian Standard Specification indicates, a clear distinction is perceived between a new tyre, a retreaded tyre and a used tyre; that there is a distinct commercial market for retreaded tyres; and that the plaintiff carries on its retreading operations on a significant scale. Nonetheless, to pick up the dichotomy expressed in Zinader (at p. 343), in its essential features, the retreading process applied by the plaintiff should be characterised as in the nature of the repair of a tyre, in the sense of its being made fit for use, rather than its remodelling into something different. To adopt the language of the Australian Standard Specification, what is here involved is no more than the ``reconditioning of a worn tyre'' by one of the nominated processes. No sufficient transformation of the kind contemplated in Zinader has occurred, with the result that, for sales tax purposes, no ``goods'' have been ``manufactured''. If it be material, such a result is also consistent with the explanations of the legislation in the Ministerial statements previously mentioned.

The question is necessarily one of degree and thus one of general impression based upon a common usage of ordinary language (see, e.g.
M.P. Metals Pty. Limited v. F.C. of T. (1968) 117 C.L.R. 631 at p. 649). It is possible, in the present context, to imagine a case, as happened in Zinader, where a retreading process is applied to a worn tyre with the result that a different tyre is produced. For example, if the worn tyre is one originally designed for use on a motor car but, by some retreading process, its tread is not only replaced but significantly widened so as to be adapted for use on, say, a tractor, it may well be that a different thing is produced so that ``goods'' would then be ``manufactured''. If the old tyre is completely dismantled and then reconstructed, a different thing may well be produced. A ``manufacture'' may be involved if the taxpayer produces something, not part of the retreading process, yet brought into existence as a separate and distinct commercial commodity or article (see Case No. R37
(1965) 16 T.B.R.D. 158 at p. 161). But there can be no suggestion that the plaintiff's operations extend to activities of this kind. Nor is this a case where differences in utility for some purpose can be demonstrated (see M.P. Metals (supra), at p. 638).

The Commissioner sought to avoid the conclusion I have reached by submitting that Zinader and the earlier authorities could be distinguished on the ground that they dealt only with the physical aspect of the concept of manufacture. The Commissioner invited the Court to hold that, even if there were in this case no manufacture in the physical sense, it is possible to stretch the notion of manufacture, so as to pick up a reconditioning or even a repair process, where the application of such a process results in the creation of a product which, in terms of its marketability, is distinct from either a new tyre or a worn tyre. Although there is some support for the argument in the decision of the Board of Review in Case B56,
70 ATC 267 it must, I think, be rejected as inconsistent with the reasoning in Adams and in Zinader that the relevant enquiry for present purposes is confined to the processes of alleged manufacture rather than a broader search as to the subsequent reception of the product in the market place.

In the United States also, the view has been taken that retreading of worn carcasses does not constitute the manufacture of goods (see
Skinner v. United States 8 F. Supp. 999 (1934);
Zook v. Perkins 195 P. 2d 962 (1948);
State Ex Rel. A.M.F. Incorporated v. Spradling 518 S.W. 2d 58 (1974). The Canadian Courts seem to have taken a different approach. For instance, in
The King v. Boultbee Limited (1938) 1 DTC 443, the Exchequer Court of Canada drew a distinction for sales tax purposes between the case where one retreads or repairs a tyre for an individual owner, a causal and unknown customer in some instances, and the case where one procures used tyres in substantial quantities, for the purpose of repairing or improving them for the purpose of selling them to the public at a profit. The conduct in the latter situation was held to constitute a manufacture.

Such a test has never been suggested in any of the decisions of the High Court of Australia which are authoritative for present purposes. In any event, it is difficult, in principle, to

ATC 4776

understand how the scale, or, for that matter, any lack of scale, of the taxpayer's activities can bear upon the question whether what is produced is a different thing. That question must, I think, be resolved primarily by reference to what is done to a particular object regardless of how often it is done, even if the size of the taxpayer's operations may well be relevant to the different question of the meaning of ``manufacturing plant'' and ``manufactured goods'' for the purposes of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (see
Ready Mixed Concrete (W.A.) Pty. Limited v. F.C. of T. 71 ATC 4107 at p. 4109).

In short, since the retreading process involves no more than the repair of a product, the original identity of which is maintained throughout the process, no manufacture arises.

I propose to grant the declaratory relief sought so as to declare that the retreaded tyres are not liable to tax in the manner contended for by the Commissioner. As argument has been foreshadowed as to the precise terms of any declaration, I will hear submissions on the point. The Commissioner must pay the plaintiff's costs of the proceedings.

I make the following orders at this stage:

1. Direct the plaintiff to bring in short minutes of orders to give effect to these reasons.

2. Adjourn the proceedings to a date to be fixed.


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