Re Bushnell (deceased) Lloyds Bank Ltd and others v. Murray and others

[1975] 1 All ER 721

(Judgment by: Goulding J)

Re Bushnell (deceased) Lloyds Bank Ltd and others
v Murray and others

Court:
Chancery Division

Judge:
Goulding J

Hearing date: 3 December 1974
Judgment date: 4 December 1974

Judgment by:
Goulding J

The testator in this case was Frank George Bushnell, who was a doctor of medicine and lived near Working. He made his will on 28 September 1940 and died on 14 October 1941. By his will he set up a trust fund on terms that his widow should have the income during her life. She died on 16 May 1972. Consequently, it has become necessary for the court now to decide on the validity, and if valid on the mode of operation, of the provisions which the testator made to deal with the fund after Mrs Bushnell's death.

The will is a long document and I shall have to read a great deal of it to make the arguments in the case and my decision on them intelligible. It may be helpful if I first of all show the general scheme of the will.

The testator began by appointing three executors and trustees, namely, the plaintiffs in the present proceedings. He bequeathed his household goods and effects to his wife absolutely, and then gave all the residue of his estate to the plaintiffs on trusts of a usual character for conversion and investment of the proceeds. He then directed the plaintiffs, or otherwise the trustees for the time being of his will, to hold the residuary fund-

'UPON TRUST to pay the income thereof including income from any part of my unconverted estate which may be accrued or accruing due but not actually paid at my death to my said Wife Eleanor Murton Bushnell during her life and after her death IN TRUST as to both the capital and income thereof to pay the same to the Socialist Medical Association the Haldane Society the Labour Research Department and the Marx Memorial Library and Workers School (hereinafter called "the Endowment Trustees") and the receipt of such Endowment Trustees or the survivor or survivors of them shall be a sufficient discharge unto my Trustees for all moneys so paid to them as aforesaid and I DIRECT that such Fund shall be used by the Endowment Trustees for the advancement and propagation of the teaching of Socialised Medicine ... in accordance with and subject to the following conditions namely [then follow numbered clauses].'

I stop there to observe that the four bodies appointed as endowment trustees are all of them unincorporated associations. I also observe that the phrase 'the advancement and propagation of the teaching of Socialised Medicine' is one that qualifies most or all of what follows. Certainly it governs cll 1-5. I shall not yet read those clauses. They set out a number of what the testator called 'conditions', in accordance wherewith the endowment trustees were to discharge their functions. I shall call the scheme set up by cll 1-5 'the first trust'. For the moment I will observe only that under the first trust the application of the income of the trust fund was to be made not directly by the endowment trustees, who held the fund, but by certain individuals termed 'managers'.

Having set out the detailed provisions of the first trust, the testator continued in cl 6 as follows:

'IF at any time hereafter the Endowment Trustees are satisfied that it is impracticable or impossible to carry out the Trusts hereinbefore declared concerning the Fund subsequent to the death of my said Wife or if for any other reason whatever the Endowment Trustees are satisfied that the said trusts are not being carried out in the manner prescribed then I DIRECT that the Endowment Trustees shall give to the Managers at least three months' notice in writing of their intention to determine the payments or authorities to the Managers and upon the expiration of such period the Trust hereinbefore declared shall come to an end and whereupon the Endowment Trustees shall stand possessed of the Fund or so much thereof as shall remain unexpended IN TRUST to pay the income thereof for ever to the Managers without being liable to see to the application thereof and with the like power to give orders for the dividends interest and other income of the Fund to be paid direct to the banking account of the Managers as aforesaid.'

Clauses 7-13 then contain provisions by which, after cl 6 has operated, the fund is to be applied. The scheme constituted by those later provisions I shall call 'the second trust'.

There remain eight further clauses in the will-cll 14-21. They contain administrative provisions regarding the managers and the endowment trustees, and also some administrative powers for the plaintiffs or their successors in office as general trustees of the will. I think the only one of those administrative clauses at the end of the will which was referred to in argument was cl 18, which provides: 'THE statutory power of appointing new Trustees shall apply to the Endowment Trustees.'

That being the scheme of the will, I propose to enquire first into the validity of the first trust, and having dealt with that to examine, if and so far as necessary, the further directions of the testator. I proceed, therefore, to read or summarise the clauses containing the first trust.

Clause 1 provides:

'The Fund shall be administered by Eleven Managers who shall be constituted and appointed within six months of the death of the survivor of myself and my said Wife by the Endowment Trustees who shall so far as practicable and in their unfettered opinion desirable select such Managers as follows:-(a) The Council Executive Committed or other Governing Body of each of the following Institutions or Associations namely:-The Haldane Society, The Socialist Medical Association, The Marx Memorial Library and Workers School, The Labour Party, The Independent Labour Party and Guild of Youth, The National Council of Labour Colleges, The Fabian Society, The University Labour Federation, Labour Research Department, The United Hospitals Socialist Association and The Womens Cooperative Guild Shall be asked to put forward a nominee or nominees for the office of Manager and the Endowment Trustees may appoint one manager for each of the said Associations from the said nominees but shall not be bound to make all or any such appointments. (b) If for any reason it is not practicable or in the opinion of the Endowment Trustees desirable for any Manager to be appointed as aforesaid then the Endowment Trustees shall appoint to fill such place any person (chosen from the Governing Bodies concerned) whom they may in their absolute discretion think fit. If no such person will accept appointment the Endowment Trustees may appoint any person for the vacancy in question.'

Clause 2 prescribes the range of securities in which the endowment trustees are to invest the fund, and I need not read it. Clause 3 is as follows:

'THE Endowment Trustees shall hold the Fund UPON TRUST to pay the income thereof for ever to the Managers without being liable to see to the application thereof and in particular may give orders for the dividends interest and other income of the Fund to be paid direct to the banking account of the Managers.'

Clause 4 contains the substantive provisions of the first trust:

'THE Managers shall apply the income of the Fund so received by them as aforesaid from the Endowment Trustees towards furthering the knowledge of the Socialist application of Medicine to public and personal health and well-being and to demonstrating that the full advantage of Socialised Medicine can only be enjoyed in a Socialist State by the following means:-(a) BY engaging from time to time lecturers and speakers to give addresses and lessons in Great Britain on socialised health and medicine at such places and at such times and upon such conditions as the Managers shall in their absolute discretion determine. The lecturers and speakers shall be duly qualified medical practitioners dentists pharmacists or health or sanitary inspectors qualified midwives radiologists biologists or other such suitable persons as the Managers shall select and such lectures shall be given free to the public and all Socialist workers. (b) By printing publishing and distributing for sale or free distribution such books pamphlets leaflets or other literature on or connected with Socialised Medicine and up-to-date educational facilities such as pictorial posters diagrams models statistics lantern slides films plays radio slogans and advertisements visits to places of health and medical interest and the purchase or hiring of premises equipped for such addresses and meeting as the Managers shall determine.'

The directions of cl 4 are then subjected to certain further requirements by cl 5. I point out, as it has been much dwelt on in argument, that the auxiliary verb 'must' appears a great many times in the contents of cl 5. I would also observe, so as to explain the way I read it, that in my judgment the full-stop which appears in the middle of sub-cl (a) of 5 must, to make grammatical sense, be read as if it were a comma, and that sub-cl (h) appears grammatically to be one with the preceding sub-clause.

With those comments, I proceed to read cl 5:

'ALL such lectures lessons books and literature and other means of information shall deal with some aspect of Socialised Medicine in accordance with the following principles:-(a) That in as much as any Socialised Medical Service must be able to determine and regulate all measures possible for the planned creation and maintenance of the health of the community and the economic security and full maintenance thereof including the proper working hours and working conditions and rest hours and holidays and recreation centres in all trades industries and professions and must be able to make effective recommendations for the proper manufacture preservation and distribution of food and housing and must have absolute powers for the prevention and treatment of communicable industrial and other epidemic and endemic and other diseases and must have absolute and adequate powers for the protection of expectant mothers mothers of young children infant children and adolescent youths and the care and after care of patients as well as many other special powers for regulating the common life of the community and preserving the health of the individual. It must be made evident that such a Socialised Medical Service can only operate effectively in a Socialised State that is to say in a state in which all production is planned for use and happiness of the Community by the State and not for profit by the individual. (b) That any Socialised Medical Service must be free and available to every member of the community and must be a service and function of the State itself to the community. (c) That all branches and particularised parts of any such Socialised Medical Service must be under the unified control of a State Department of Public Health and that the State through this Department must maintain and pay for an efficient and complete organisation for the maintenance of health as well as for the treatment of disease and that this organisation must include within a single network State Hospitals Sanatoria Rest Homes Recreation Centres Nursery and Open Air Schools or Preventoria especially for children "contacts" with open tuberculosis Health Centres and Maternity and Consultative Clinics and that the State through its department of Public Health must maintain an adequate and properly unified supply throughout the whole Country of specialists consultants and domiciliary practitioners who must be fully supported in the carrying out efficiently of their offices and functions by the Health Authorities. (d) That in order that any such State Department of Public Health may be constantly maintained adequate to the changing and developing needs of the community from time to time such a Socialised Medical Service must set up and include within the State Department of Public Health adequate machinery (including workers and medical workers) through which the community may voice its criticism comments and suggestions especially as to the elimination of autocratic bureaucracy and may effectively make its needs felt. (e) That any such State Department of Public Health must be able to maintain obtain and use the finest human material in its service wherever it may find it without distinction of class race or religion and must therefore provide complete medical education and training for all workers of either sex in all branches and sections of the State Department of Public Health. (f) That any such State Department of Public Health must in order to maintain a standard of medical knowledge and practice including medical clinical and scientific research and the maintenance of the health of air water soil agriculture and animals commensurate with the developing social and industrial practice of the community maintain and pay for complete and adequate research stations and laboratories in every department of public health. (g) That any such State Department of Public Health must provide for the constant universal education of the public by health and hygiene education and culture institutes and Museums fully equipped in all up-to-date methods and adequate and available for the whole population especially at health centres and clinics in the practice of the principles underlying public and personal hygiene and the encouragement of all to work actively for health and (h) Fre e socialised training from which the profit making system or motive will be eliminated for all workers in the Medical or "Associated Medical" services before and after graduation.'

In such comprehensive terms the testator declared what I have called his first trust. The obvious attack which it invites is the assertion that the objects for which it was set up are not in law charitable purposes. For if the purposes are not charitable then it is clear in my view that the first trust must fail, both because it is designed to go on for ever-and therefore would fall foul of the rule against perpetuities-and also because no individual beneficiaries are ascertained and so the purposes can only be enforced by the court if within the ambit of charity.

The attack developed along two lines. The question mostly argued, put concisely, is whether the essential or dominant purpose of the first trust is education or a political object. It is well known that trusts for what the courts term in this context 'political objects' cannot be supported as legal charities. A leading case on that aspect of the matter is Bowman v Secular Society Ltd where Lord Parker of Waddington said ([1917] AC at 442, [1916-17] All ER Rep at 18):

'... but a trust for the attainment of political objects has always been held invalid, not because it is illegal, for every one is at liberty to advocate or promote by any lawful means a change in the law, but because the Court has no means of judging whether a proposed change in the law will or will not be for the public benefit, and therefore cannot say that a gift to secure the change is a charitable gift. The same considerations apply when there is a trust for the publication of a book. The court will examine the book, and if its objects be charitable in the legal sense it will give effect to the trust as a good charity ... but if its object be political it will refuse to enforce the trust ... '

The testator died in the year 1941, and it is common ground that for the purpose of this particular objection the matter must be tested as at his death. In my judgment, there is no doubt that in this country in 1941 the establishment of a state health service, or of anything that could fairly be identified with the testator's scheme of 'socialised medicine', required major legislative changes, and a trust for that purpose would accordingly fail as one for a political object. It is, however, maintained that on a fair reading of the first trust it is not in essence or in dominant purpose a trust to promote or bring about the establishment of a state health service, but is a trust to inform the medical profession and the lay public about the character and advantages of such an organisation of medicine, so that they, the profession and the public, can lend their efforts to promoting, or indeed to resisting, such a reform as they may think fit when fully acquainted with the arguments. Thus it is said the true character of the first trust is not political but educational, and as such it is a good charity.

The existence of some political motive is not necessarily fatal to a good charitable trust. Counsel for the first four defendants, in supporting the validity of the first trust, referred me, among other authorities, to the speech of Lord Normand in National Anti-Vivisection Society v Inland Revenue Comrs ([1947] 2 All ER 217 at 239, [1948] AC 31 at 76):

'A society for the prevention of cruelty to animals, e.g., may include, among its professed purposes, amendments of the law dealing with field sports or with the taking of eggs or the like. Yet it would not, in my view, necessarily lose its right to be considered a charity, and if that right were questioned, it would become the duty of the court to decide whether the general purpose of the society was the improvement of morals by various lawful means including new legislation, all such means being subsidiary to the general charitable purpose. If the court answered this question in favour of the society, it would retain its privileges as a charity. But if the decision was that the leading purpose of the society was to promote legislation in order to bring about a change of policy towards field sports, or the protection of wild birds, it would follow that the society should be classified as an association with political objects and that it would lose its privileges as a charity. The problem is, therefore, to discover the general purposes of the society and whether they are in the main political or in the main charitable. It is a question of degree of a sort well known to the courts.'

A test propounded in such general terms is, perhaps, easier to state than to apply. But the books fortunately contain a number of reported judgments in which it has been necessary for the court to determine whether what from one point of view is an educational trust is so bound up with the promotion of a political object that the general purpose, or main purpose, of the trust can only be regarded as political. I may mention briefly three of those. The first was the decision of Finalay J, in a revenue case, Bonar Law Memorial Trust v Comrs of Inland Revenue. That related to the college at Ashridge connected with the Conservative Party, and the relevant trust was to cause the house and gardens and park-

'to be used for the purposes of an educational centre or college for educating persons in economics, in political and social science, in political history with special reference to the development of the British Constitution and the growth and expansion of the British Empire and in such other subjects as the governing body may from time to time deem desirable.'

In that case, having regard to the way the trust was expressed and to the character of the governing body itself, which as appears from what I have just read could determine the subjects of instruction without, apparently, and overriding limitation, the judge decided that the trust could not be considered as one for educational purposes only, and accordingly was not charitable as regards income tax.

Then there was the decision of Vaisey J in Re Hopkinson (deceased). There a gift had been made by will for the advancement of adult education with particular reference, but without limiting the trustees' general discretion in applying the fund for adult education, to the education of men and women of all classes on the lines of the Labour Party's memorandum headed 'A Note on Education in the Labour Party'. That is only a summary of the leading trust, and the learned judge held that it was a trust for the attainment of political objects and not charitable. The judge put the problem that he had to decide in this way ([1949] 1 All ER at 348, 349):

'In my judgment, there are two ways of reading the words which I have quoted. They may be read, first, as equivalent to a general trust for the advancement of adult education which, standing alone, would admittedly be charitable, the super-added purpose being treated merely as a rough guide to be followed or as a hint to be taken as to the kind of adult education which the testator had in mind, the strictly educational main purpose always being adhered to, or, secondly, they may be read as indicating that the first part is to be taken as a general direction and the second part beginning with te words "with particular reference to" as the particular direction dominating the whole of the trust. The second of these alternative views seems to me to be the right one.'

The third of this group of cases is Re The Trusts of the Arthur McDougall Fund. The decision was that of Upjohn J. He was dealing with a trust established by a deed inter vivos, and the provisions of the deed declared purposes which can fairly be described as promoting education in the subject of political science and allied branches of enquiry. There was nothing prescribing political opinions of any kind, or the attainment of any political object, in the trusts themselves, but the trustees were required to be members of, and could be removed by, the Proportional Representation Society. On those facts, the learned judge had no difficulty in deciding that the trust was a good charity. It is clear from that and other authorities that the choice of trustees does not convert an otherwise educational trust into one for political purposes, because the trustees, whoever they are, bound to carry out the directions of the founder of the trust, and are subject to the control of the Attorney General and the courts in doing so.

I need not, I think, review the other authorities cited in support of the first trust. They included such well-known cases as Re Scowcroft, followed by the Court of Appeal in Re Hood, which show that a certain degree of mingling or association with a political object is by no means fatal to a primary object that is clearly charitable in law.

I now seek to apply the test appearing from the cases, particularly from what Lord Normand ([1947] 2 All ER at 239, [1948] AC at 76) said, for that is the formulation chiefly relied on by counsel for the first four defendants, to the words of the testator's will in the present case. I am quite unable to avoid the conclusion that the main or dominant or essential object is a political one. The testator never for a moment, as I read his language, desired to educate the public so that they could choose for themselves, starting with neutral information, to support or oppose what he called 'socialised medicine'. I think he was trying to promote his own theory by education, if you will be propaganda, but I do not attach any importance to that word. He starts off in the very beginning of the first trust by saying that the fund is to be used 'for the advancement and propagation of the teaching of Socialised Medicine', and then in cl 4 not only are the managers to further 'the knowledge of the Socialist application of Medicine to public and personal health and well-being', but they are also to demonstrate 'that the full advantage of Socialised Medicine can only be enjoyed in a Socialist State'. Then again all lecturers and authors of books commissioned by the trust are to deal with some aspect of socialised medicine in accordance with the very detailed and rigid principles laid down by the testator himself in sub-cll (a) to (h) of cl 5, all of which I have read.

Accordingly, on that branch of the argument I conclude that the first trust cannot be supported as an educational trust. Just as Vaisey J thought of the trust in Re Hopkinson (deceased), which I have cited, so I think here that the directions regarding the principles of socialised medicine are to be taken as dominating the whole of the trust.

In the later stages of the argument is was suggested that, even though not supportable as an educational trust, for the reasons I have just given,the first trust could be upheld as a valid charitable trust within the fourth or miscellaneous head of the well-known classification in Income Tax Special Purposes Comrs v Pemsel. The point was mainly developed by counsel for the Attorney General, though adopted and supported by counsel for the first four defendants also. The way the argument was put is this. Let it be that the trust is one for the setting-up of a state health service. If immediately after the testator's death the court had had to enquire whether such a health service would be for the public benefit, it would have been unable to answer the question because, as Lord Parker said in Bowman v Secular Society Ltd ([1917] AC at 442, [1916-17] All ER Rep at 18), the court cannot judge of the desirable or undesirable character of proposed changes in the law. Today, however, when after the death of the testator's widow the question becomes ripe for decision, Parliament has brought into being a state health service, thereby demonstrating, in a manner which the court is bound to accept, an opinion that such an institution is for the public benefit. Accordingly, a trust for the promotion of a state health service must today be accepted by the court as charitable because it is beneficial to the public, and beneficial in a way, namely, the promotion of public health, which is within the spirit and intendment of the Statute of Elizabeth I, namely, the Charitable Uses Act 1601. I hope I do not misrepresent the argument of counsel for the Attorney General in putting it thus.

That way of looking at the matter derived some support, it was suggested, from a case in the House of Lords, Scottish Burial Reform and Cremation Society Ltd v Glasgow City Corpn. That was a rating case. The question was whether the appellant company was entitled to partial exemption from rates on the ground that its objects were charitable purposes. The objects of the appellant company were: '(a) To promote reform in the present method of burial in Scotland ... (b) To promote inexpensive and at the same time sanitary methods of disposal of the dead ... ', in particular cremation, and so on. I should add that for the purpose of the rating statute in question, the law of charity that had to be applied was that of England and not of Scotland, although the appeal was a Scottish one. More than one of the noble and learned Lords who made speeches allowing the appeal there relied on the Cremation Act 1902 as showing that whatever might have been the case in 1890, when the appellant company was incorporated, yet in the 1960s the provision of crematoria was clearly for the public benefit.

In my judgment, that appeal was dealing with an entirely different problem. It did not matter there whether the company's objects at the time of its incorporation had been charitable or not. The question was: were they charitable in the year in respect of which the particular rates were levied? That is quite different from the problem of a trust set up by will which must, in my view, stand or fall by the character of the objects at the date of the testator's death.

The argument for the Attorney General ran into an additional difficulty which counsel foresaw, namely, that the testator's purposes went far beyond anything that Parliament has hitherto approved, because he, the testator, was aiming at a socialised medical service within the setting of a socialist state of the fullest character where alone, he though, a socialised medical service could operate effectively. Counsel proposed to deal with that difficulty by saying that the requirement of a socialist state could be rejected and the residue of the testator's first trust validated by reference to the Charitable Trusts (Validation) Act 1954. Counsel did not read the provisions of the 1954 Act, but on briefly referring to it during the short adjournment, it appeared to me from s 1(1) that the 1954 Act could only operate if-

'consistently with the terms of the provision, the property could be used exclusively for charitable purposes, but could nevertheless be used for purposes which are not charitable'.

On that I would only say that I am at least very doubtful whether it would be possible consistently with the terms of the will to advocate the health service as it exists in this country at the present time and go no further. However, I do not mean to express a decided opinion on that point because the ground on which I reject the argument based on the fourth head of Pemsel's case is that the matter has to be decided according to the facts and law as they stood at the death of the testator. The first trust accordingly fails.

I must now look again at cl 6 of the will. It will be remembered that cl 6 brought the second trust into operation. It reads as follows:

'IF at any time hereafter the Endowment Trustees are satisfied that it is impracticable or impossible to carry out the trusts hereinbefore declared concerning the Fund subsequent to the death of my said Wife or if for any other reason whatever the Endowment Trustees are satisfied that the said trusts are not being carried out in the manner prescribed ... '

then according to cl 6 the endowment trustees were to give three months' notice to the managers and the first trust would come to an end on the expiration of that period.

In my judgment, that language cannot apply to the event which has actually occurred, namely, the first trust proving for legal reasons invalid ab initio. The language is simply not apt to meet that event. If I am wrong on that, I am further of the view that the provisions of cl 6 make the second trust a contingent one. Accordingly, since the operation of cl 6 may occur at any time when the endowment trustees find that the first trust has become 'impracticable or impossible', the second trust is also invalid for perpetuity even if charitable. The case in that respect would be similar to Re Spensley's Will Trusts.

I ought, however, in case both the reasons I have given are wrong, to examine whether the second trust is intrinsically of a chartitable quality, or whether it fails for the same reasons as the first trust, even if cl 6 is free from the vice that I have suggested. I must, therefore, now read cll 7-13 of the will:

'7. THE Managers shall then apply the income of the Fund so received by them as aforesaid from the Endowment Trustees for the purpose of providing educational facilities for the teaching of the principles and practice of Socialised health and medicine as defined in the primary trusts in the form of suitable premises to be hired or purchased and equipped with books printed matter pictorial posters diagrams statistics models cinema films lantern slides a stage for health plays or displays or any other form of teaching that the Managers may consider desirable or convenient.'

I would draw attention there in passing to two things. One is that what the managers are to provide are 'educational facilities for the teaching of the principles and practice of Socialised health and medicine'. The second is that the principles and practice to be taught are those defined in the primary trusts. That I take to be a reference to the principles set out in cl 5.

The will continues:

'8. THE premises so acquired as aforesaid will form a Model Workers Health Institute Museum and Centre for Health Hygiene and will be free and open to all workers and the public. The exhibits in such premises and the activities carried on therein will be intended specifically for the education and co-operation of the public in the practice of socialised health and medicine and any exhibits may be kept on the said premises permanently or lent out for educational tours in this as in other countries in the absolute discretion of the Managers.
'9. SUCH premises should be situated in a district readily accessible to the working population and should contain a large room or hall where daily addresses could be given to the public free at hours and of duration convenient to the workers by such teachers or lecturers as may be selected by the Managers from Medical or "Associated Medical" or lay workers of socialist principles, and such other rooms as may be available wherein the exhibits shall be disposed as for example in bays as in the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine Museum and elsewhere and one of such rooms shall be used for the purpose of a reading and research centre and library of Socialised medicine medical industrial and labour sociology school and dwellings hygiene health surveys and any other aspect of socialism applied to health as the Managers may from time to time decide. The rooms can be used for instructions in simple anatomy and physiology mother and child welfare hygiene diet cancer tuberculosis Rheumatoid arthritis preventive inoculation blood transfusion and such other subjects of a similar nature as the Managers may from time to time deem necessary or advantageous to the carrying out of the primary objects of the trust. A stage should be provided in the large room or hall for the acting of health plays or for the showing of cinema films and lantern slides.'

On cl 9 I would remark that the second trust, unlike the first trust, requires the teachers or lecturers themselves to be persons of socialist principles. I would also remark that some of the activities envisaged in cl 9 appear to be intrinsically free from any political quality whatever, namely, instructions in simple anatomy and other subjects. I has been pointed out, however, that those instructions are not obligatory, but merely a permissive use of the trust property, introduced as they are by the words, 'The rooms can be used', in contrast to the preceding sentence where the phrase is, 'one of such rooms shall be used'.

The will continues:

'10. THE Staff should consist of a paid curator if possible one with experience of similar institutions in the U.S.S.R. or elsewhere but who need not necessarily be a doctor and if the Managers so feel it desirable they may appoint visiting lecturers and an honorary socialist medical and lay committee to manage the Institution.
'11. THE provision and upkeep of the premises exhibits and equipment would be made from the Endowment Funds and such other sources as may be available including the hire of the Hall and other lecture rooms to the Socialist Medical Association or other Socialist bodies.
'12. THE Exhibits to be shown in the said premises will fall under the following heads:-(a) Statistical as for example charts showing the incidence of disease, death rates and results of treatment. (b) Pictorial by means of posters photographs or other means showing the causes and prevention of disease the organisation of the health and medical and dental services and their liaisons with the workers and the public and of medical and health centres as well as physical education and such other matters as the Managers shall decide. (c) Models (preparation or other methods) illustrating hospitals sanatoria rest homes recreation centres and clinics specimens showing adequate diets methods of prevention of industrial and other diseases and the early diagnosis of infectious communicable and other diseases their prevention and after care. (d) Preparations and other methods of dealing with the early diagnosis of infectious and communicable diseases and their prevention and after care.
'13. THE Institute or museum would co-operate fully with the medical "Associated Medical" maternity hospital dental and educational services and with voluntary workers in bringing the value of the knowledge of health and how to create and preserve it to the public.'

Once again it appears to me that the main intention or dominant purpose is not educational, in spite of the purely educational character of some of the activities referred to. As in the case of the first trust, so in my judgment the second trust is essentially aimed at the promotion of a political object. That is shown eloquently in my view by the provisions of cl 7, which require the teaching under the second trust to be of the principles defined in the first trust, and so carry one straight back to cl 5. It also appears from the test of opinion that I have already pointed out in cl 9, namely, the requirement that teachers and lecturers are to be persons of socialist principles. Accordingly, in my judgment the second trust fails for the same reasons as the first trust.

The Attorney General did not contend that on that view any general charitable intention could be found in the will. Nor was the Charitable Trusts (Validation) Act 1954 invoked, except in the limited connection with which I have already dealt.

I will, therefore, answer question 1 of the originating summons by declaring that on the true construction of the will of the testator the trusts thereby declared to take effect after the death of his widow are not charitable trusts, and accordingly are void for want of ascertainable beneficiaries and also for perpetuity.